The Security Implications Of Microdisarmament

In arms control, as in life, size tends to be a key factor in generating interest and absorbing resources. The greater the potential lethality of the device, be it battleship or Bomb, the more great minds become exercised towards great ideas of management and control. The relatively small numbers of major weapon systems in the hands of relatively few state powers allows for a certain elegance of thought to develop that is worthy of the attention of philosopher, strategist, and high policy maker. But while the architects of arms control dwell on their great designs the majority of the world's population are not concerned with the potential threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Instead, they are galvanized by the threat posed to their security by the mass of weapons of a more intimate destructive capability. For these people "small" arms do not equate with "small" threat but rather with "real" threat. It is toward a mitigation of this real threat posed by small arms, or light weapons, that the concept of microdisarmament is dedicated. The challenge is to identify and decommission those arms that already exist in an uncontrolled form and to inhibit the infusion of any more light weapons into the areas of concern. Such an Augean task will obviously involve entities at the national, supranational, and sub-national level and will require some sense of shared responsibility emanating from a consensually based, coherent, and clear strategy. Currently, such a strategy or even consensus does not yet exist. The remainder of this work will concentrate on clarifying the discrete elements of the problem (proliferation and decommissioning) and on identifying such strands of strategy that have already been proposed to address the problem.

"Since the mid-1990s, most of the international community has recognised the de-stabilising effect on failed and weak states of the illicit transfer, accumulation ad misuse of small arms and light weapons. They are said to fuel and prolong conflicts; obstruct relief operations; undermine peace initiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hinder post-conflict development and security and are perceived as 'fostering a culture of violence'. As a consequence, the United Nations (UN), regional governmental institutions, national governments together with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have proposed and developed various intiatives to curb the illicit trade and misuse of these weapons (UNDDA 2006). This paper considers the post-Cold War diffusion and proliferation of small arms, their attractiveness for violent non-state actors, some aspects of the arms trade and their impact on intra-state and cross-border conflicts."--l. 2.

On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.

In post-conflict situations, the success of humanitarian efforts is closely linked to the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament efforts, and both would benefit from a greater understanding of human security issues. This publication sets out case studies of humanitarian approaches that have had, or could have, a positive impact on disarmament processes. Cases studies included cover negotiations on anti-personnel mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and small arms, as well as emerging issues relating to gender and human security.

Pt. 1. Concepts : it works in ethics, does it work in theory? -- pt. 2. Implications.