The Russian Invasion Of Ukraine February December 2022

On 24 February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, intending to overthrow the Zelensky government and bring the former Soviet republic back into the Russian sphere of control. Vladimir Putin clearly expected a quick victory and many in the West also predicted that Kiev would fall in a few days. But they hadn't counted on the skilled, courageous and determined resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, nor the degree to which Russian military might had been overestimated. The initial Russian dash for Kiev was thrown back and their advances in the east and south also slowed by a combination of fierce resistance and their own unpreparedness, inadequate logistical planning and incompetent command. While the Russians ground their way forward in the east and south of the country, devastating towns and cities, they paid a heavy price in casualties and equipment losses. A carefully planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer forced the invaders into a series of humiliating retreats. As winter approached, the Russians still held considerable territory but the initiative and strategic momentum had clearly swung to the defenders. The illusion of Russian invincibility was shattered forever. US Major General (retired) John S Harrel, a graduate of the US Army War College, trained with the Ukrainian army in the 1990s and in 2006, and commanded Ukrainian troops as part of the NATO force in Kosovo in 2005. His military expertise and detailed knowledge of the combatants informs this clear narrative and analysis of the course of the first 10 months of the war. He gives the reasons for the failure of the Russian invasion and, conversely, explains how the Ukrainian defense exceeded expectations, while acknowledging that strategic mistakes were made on both sides.

"For the Military Enthusiast- an intriguing view of the war through the eyes of a contemporary Western Military Officer." — ARGunners.com On 24 February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, intending to overthrow the Zelensky government and bring the former Soviet republic back into the Russian sphere of control. Vladimir Putin clearly expected a quick victory and many in the West also predicted that Kiev would fall in a few days. But they hadn’t counted on the skilled, courageous and determined resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, nor the degree to which Russian military might had been overestimated. The initial Russian dash for Kiev was thrown back and their advances in the east and south also slowed by a combination of fierce resistance and their own unpreparedness, inadequate logistical planning and incompetent command. While the Russians ground their way forward in the east and south of the country, devastating towns and cities, they paid a heavy price in casualties and equipment losses. A carefully planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer forced the invaders into a series of humiliating retreats. As winter approached, the Russians still held considerable territory but the initiative and strategic momentum had clearly swung to the defenders. The illusion of Russian invincibility was shattered forever. US Major General (retired) John S Harrel, a graduate of the US Army War College, trained with the Ukrainian army in the 1990s and in 2006, and commanded Ukrainian troops as part of the NATO force in Kosovo in 2005. His military expertise and detailed knowledge of the combatants informs this clear narrative and analysis of the course of the first 10 months of the war. He gives the reasons for the failure of the Russian invasion and, conversely, explains how the Ukrainian defense exceeded expectations, while acknowledging that strategic mistakes were made on both sides.

On 24 February 2022, eight years after invading the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine and organizing an illegal referendum in support of a subsequent Russian annexation, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both Western and Russian intelligence services expected the invasion to quickly topple the democratically elected government in Kyiv and, with the help of collaborators, to overrun the Ukrainian armed forces in a matter of between 3 and 14 days. Early on 24 February, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) launched a series of missile and artillery strikes on the main air bases and dozens of other military facilities in Ukraine. Immediately afterwards, the VSRF launched a ground invasion, with its forces advancing on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Kherson. Although following a build-up that had begun in April 2021, and expected by many, the onslaught still came as a major surprise for the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian armed forces, and the majority of its allies in the West, and also for the mass of officers and other ranks of the VSRF, many of whom believed that they were only to participate in exercises. However, the deeper the Russians rolled into Ukraine, the more resistance they encountered: while some Russian units performed as expected, elsewhere whole armies began falling apart when ordered to advance at maximum possible speed without the necessary firepower and logistic support. After suffering catastrophic losses while failing to reach downtown Kyiv, and failing to reach and enter Chernihiv and Kharkiv, the war in northern and north-eastern Ukraine quickly settled down into a bloody stalemate. In the south, the Russians initially advanced at an astonishing rate, securing Melitopol during the second day of their invasion, and Kherson only a few days later. It was only once President Putin attempted to accelerate the rate of advance through ordering heliborne operations deeper into Ukraine that the VSRF suffered a severe blow in the fighting for Voznesensk and Mykolaiv, and its advance in this part of the country also came to an end. Richly illustrated with color photography and full color artworks, and providing a detailed study of the organization and order of battle of the armed forces involved on both sides, Volume 2 of War in Ukraine provides the first detailed account of the first two weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

"Russia's invasion was not unexpected. For months, President Vladimir Putin had been amassing his military along the Russian-Ukrainian border. By February, 190,000 troops stood ready to invade. For Putin, giving that command would be the first step in his long-sought goal of bringing Ukraine back under Russian influence. Ukrainians are fiercely loyal to their president and their country, and have shown remarkable courage in opposing the Russian invasion. Multiplied by thousands of like-minded Ukrainian citizens, such determination has made Putin's goal more difficult and its outcome less certain"--

"Americans! Yesterday – before coming here to Washington DC – I was at the frontline, in our Bakhmut. In our stronghold in the East of Ukraine – in the Donbas. The Russian military and mercenaries have been attacking Bakhmut non-stop since May. They have been attacking it day and night. But Bakhmut stands. Last year seventy thousand people lived there in Bakhmut and now only few civilians stay. Every inch of that land is soaked in blood. Roaring guns sound every hour. Trenches in the Donbas change hands several times a day in fierce combat and even hand fighting. But the Ukrainian Donbas stands. Russians use everything they have against Bakhmut and our other beautiful cities. The occupiers have a significant advantage in artillery. They have an advantage in ammunition. They have much more missiles and planes than we ever had." War Speeches I, February-March 2022, monthly editions. As well as our editions of the speeches in Ukrainian and Russian language, and our translations into German, Polish and Dutch. War Speeches, The Series, Volodymyr Zelensky, Kindle Edition "Zelensky speech sparks soul-searching in Germany,” Laurenz Gehrke, Politico. About Vladimir Putin: "This is the dictator who was courted in Germany. And for Schröder, Steinmeier, Merkel was the one not to be provoked. The madman who wants a war so much that he is no longer even willing to answer the phone when the Ukrainian president calls,” Paul Ronzheimer, Bild. "How Zelensky’s team of TV writers helps his victory message hit home,” Luke Harding, The Guardian.

For three decades after the Cold War, NATO member states no longer faced a major threat, and focussed on out-of-area operations. They took the opportunity to reduce defence spending and foster their own national defence industries; interoperability was limited to air and maritime missions on a small scale. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and war by proxy in eastern Donbass was a wake-up call, while China’s creeping seizure and fortification of islands in the South China Sea, as well as its relentless acquisition of Western technologies, similarly alerted the Western leadership to a less benign strategic environment. But the real shift occurred in 2022. China and Russia not only announced their ‘unlimited friendship’, but made clear their intention to reduce American hegemony by breaking up the NATO alliance and its Pacific equivalents. This volume is the first account of the challenges and solutions for so-called strategic integration in this coercive global situation. The contributors show, thematically and through selected national case-studies, how strategic integration and interoperability are conceived, debated, problematised and resolved. The chapters are written with specific reference to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has galvanised a new era of integration and alliance cooperation within NATO.

The papers presented in this volume analyze the civil uprising known as Euromaidan that began in central Kyiv in late November 2013, when the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych opted not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, and continued over the following months. The topics include the motivations and expectations of protesters, organized crime, nationalism, gender issues, mass media, the Russian language, and the impact of Euromaidan on Ukrainian politics as well as on the EU, Russia, and Belarus. An epilogue to the book looks at the aftermath, including the Russian annexation of Crimea and the creation of breakaway republics in the east, leading to full-scale conflict. The goal of the book is less to offer a definitive account than one that represents a variety of aspects of a mass movement that captivated world attention and led to the downfall of the Yanukovych presidency.

The Russo-Ukraine War is a vital learning opportunity for military strategists across the globe. The first and clearest lesson to be gleaned from it is this: the soundness of a military’s strategy and the nimbleness with which it can adapt to unforeseen circumstances are the two most important factors in deciding victory or defeat. The War for Ukraine analyzes the war through these twin lenses of strategy and adaptation, detailing how each army has succeeded or failed to plan for and adapt to this twenty-first century war. Author Mick Ryan examines the foundations of Ukrainian and Russian strategy for their ongoing war, looking back over several decades to reveal how both sides have evolved their military strategy and force structure. Each has undertaken institutional-level reforms of their military and national security enterprises in the decade leading up to this war. But because the emergent behavior of military forces after fighting begins cannot be fully predicted, these prewar reforms only constitute a starting point for adaptation during the war. Part I of the book covers the role of strategic leadership, with a focus on evolution of strategy since February 2022. From there, the second part of the book delves into how the Ukrainians and Russians have adapted their tactics, organizations, operational approaches, and strategic foundations for war-making throughout the conflict. Central to this discussion are the ways that, regardless of cutting-edge technology, human elements have remained a crucial deciding factor in Ukraine. Ryan shows how good leadership allows a nation to navigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of conflict, while poor leadership leaves it vulnerable to surprises. Likewise, The War for Ukraine offers case studies of the importance of an institution’s ability to nurture and reward human learning as it relates to combat. The book provides strategists, policymakers, and military leaders with a basis from which to plan for constant adaption in military organizations. General readers of contemporary global conflict will also find The War for Ukraine of great interest.

This book examines crucial facets of the Russian invasion: among them, the Russian sexual violence against occupied Ukrainians, their “collaboration” and “filtration,” legal prosecutions especially relating to kidnapped Ukrainian children, the portrayal of events in Bucha on Russian social media, and the lessons learned from the Ukrainian refugee crisis in Poland during the initial weeks of the war, as well the potential pursuit of justice at the International Court of Justice, and the genocide claim more generally. This anthology will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and the broader community involved in the study of genocide and conflict. It endeavours to offer not only insights into the immediate circumstances of the invasion but also a framework for broader discussions and a foundation for informed dialogues on the multifaceted dimensions of this geopolitical upheaval. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Journal of Genocide Research.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the use of airpower in the first year of the Ukraine conflict. Airpower has been central to political, military, and public debates from the outset of the Russo‐Ukrainian war. After having started with whether the US and NATO should attempt to establish a No‐Fly Zone over Ukraine to protect the civilian population, the international discussion soon focused on the underperformance of Russian airpower. The fact that the initial contest for air superiority over Ukraine ended in an uneasy state of mutual denial came as a surprise to Western analysts, who suspected Kyiv would fall within a relatively short period of time. The surprise and relief that it did not only fueled urgent and ongoing discussions on how NATO nations could support the Ukrainian war effort. Regardless of nationality, age, level of education, or ethnicity, the near‐daily footage of Russian missiles, bombs and drones hitting residential areas and bombarding infrastructure to deprive an entire population of electricity and water has been emotionally imprinted on generations who have only known peace. Why the Russians have used airpower with such brutality, and how Ukraine and its allies have defended against this threat, is an important topic to understand even outside a specialist military audience. The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide an analysis on why the air war over Ukraine unfolded as it did during the first year of the war. This book will be of much interest to students of air power, military and strategic studies, Russian and eastern European politics, and International Relations.