The Role Of The Eu In The Non Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons

Much of the literature on the emerging role of the EU as a non-proliferation actor has only a minimal engagement with theory. This collection aims to rectify this by placing the role of the EU in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons within an analytical framework inspired by emerging literature on the performance of international organisations.

The recent controversy over Iran's nuclear programme represents an early and important test for a distinctively European approach to addressing concerns about suspected programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. Against this background, the report brings together European and Iranian perspectives on a range of security- and proliferation-related issues that have a bearing on diplomatic efforts to resolve the controversy. The contributors describe the discussions under way between Europe, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at clarifying the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear activities. They examine the development of the European Union's strategy to combat the spread of WMD; Iran's evolving security and defence structures and policies, including Iranian thinking about deterrence-based defence strategies and the requirements for credibly implementing them; and the internal dynamics of security policy decision making in Iran. The report highlights some of the problems and possibilities inherent in the EU's efforts to implement a more targeted, multifunctional strategy to prevent WMD proliferation.

The European Union has identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a key threat to its security, and considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a cornerstone of its strategy of fighting the spread of WMD. A successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 is thus of essential interest to the Union. However, the chances of achieving this objective are rather slim: the unresolved question of Iran, the unclear status of North Korea, a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Nuclear Weapons States for further steps towards disarmament, limited progress in the conclusion and implementation of the IAEA's Additional Protocol - to name only a few - are all obstacles to a successful conference. In this situation the EU, as the main protagonist of a multilateral, treaty-based approach to the fight against proliferation, has a particular responsibility to avoid the Review Conference becoming a failure. To achieve the EU's objective, member states have to overcome their traditional divergences on nuclear issues and put forward innovative proposals. This Chaillot Paper demonstrates that there is enough common ground to do so: four distinguished experts assess the main challenges currently facing the NPT regime and develop ideas for the EU's contribution to a successful conference.

Why have Europeans been slow to join the struggle against the spread of atomic weapons? Can their commitment to this cause grow stronger? The first comprehensive study of the initiatives for creating an effective European policy, this book examines the history, current structures and processes, constraints, and opportunities of a Western European non-profileration policy. The volume opens with a summary of the problems of formulating a specifically European response to the threat of nuclear proliferation, then presents studies of eight nations which are capable of developing substantial nuclear arsenals, and concludes with a blueprint for an effective European policy on curtailing arms proliferation.

The volume discusses the legal interpretation and implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and issues relating to nuclear disarmament. It examines the status of international law regarding nuclear capacity, considering competing legal approaches to the development of nuclear technology, non-proliferation, disarmament and regulating nuclear weapons within a contemporary international context.

Since the adoption of its Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU has raised its profile in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. However, the current crisis of arms control, which has recently seen the demise of key agreements like the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INT), represents a dual challenge for the EU: while its territory is most directly affected py the dismantlement of arms control treaties, it is not a party to them. Moreover, traditional divisions over disarmament among EU member states have been exacerbated by disagreements over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This Chaillot Paper suggests that the EU can prevent the deepening of such divisions and mitigate global polarisation in order to promote a successful outcome of the upcoming Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To this end, it can make use of its access to both advocates and detractors of the TPNW in order to foster dialogue, acting as a bridge-builder between both camps while preparing for a new arms control system to replace the agreements that are progressively being abandoned.