The Re Conquest Of Burma 1943 1945

Despatches in this volume include that on operations in Burma and North-East India between November 1943 and June 1944, by General Sir George J. Giffard; the despatch on operations in Assam and Burma between June 1944 June and November 1944, by General Sir George J. Giffard, Commander-in-Chief; the despatch on Naval operations in the Ramree Island area (Burma) in January and February 1945 by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station; and the despatch on operations in Burma between November 1944 and August 1945 by Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese.This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

This monograph examines the evolution and practice of operational art. The campaign for the reconquest of Burma in 1943-1945 as conducted by LTG William J. Slim while in command of Fourteenth Army is analyzed. The intent of the monograph is to evaluate theory in light of historical evidence, with operational art as the focus. The analysis reveals the importance of establishing a clear operational aim and of balancing the aim with means, ways, and risk. The Burma campaign is analyzed to answer two questions: what does the campaign suggest about the evolution of the operational art and what does it suggest about the relationship between the theory and practice of operational art? The two major operations of Fourteenth Army's campaign are described and analyzed. Slim set the aim of Fourteenth Army in both the Imphal-Kohima and Irrawaddy operations as the destruction of the main enemy force. To attain this aim Slim stretched his means to the limit, employed sound yet innovative ways, and accepted necessary risk. The analysis includes a discussion of Slim's application of certain theoretical aspects of a discussion of Slim's application of certain theoretical aspects of a discussion of Slim's application of certain theoretical aspects of operational art. These include center of gravity; decisive and objective points; interrelation of offense and defense; decisive battle; use of maneuver to create a force superiority; and strategic, operational, and tactical activities.

Covers the period from June 1944 to August 1945. The book describes the operations of the fourteenth Army conducted during the monsoon of 1944, the crossing of the Irrawaddy, the capture of Meiktila and Mandalay, and the double thrust to Rangoon down the river and the railway axes.

Describes the war plans and the conduct of operations leading to the Reconquest of Burma in 1945. Indian troops were called upon, first, to protect the north-eastern frontiers of India by blocking the progress of Japanese forces into India and then to push them out of India and Burma in cooperation with other Allied forces. The Volume also covers the planning aspect of the Reconquest of Burma.