The Prudential Regulation Of Banks

The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.

Financial stability is one of the key tenets of a central bank’s functions. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, an area of hot debate is the extent to which the central bank should be involved with prudential regulation. This book examines the macro and micro-prudential regulatory frameworks and systems of the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Canada and Germany. Drawing on the regulator frameworks of these regions, this book examines the central banks’ roles of crisis management, resolution and prudential regulation. Alison Lui compares the institutional structure of the new ‘twin-peaks’ model in the UK to the Australian model, and the multi-regulatory US model and the single regulatory Canadian model. The book also discusses the extent the central bank in these countries, as well as the ECB, are involved with financial stability, and argues that the institutional architecture and geographical closeness of the Bank of England and Financial Policy Committee give rise to the fear that the UK central bank may become another single super-regulator, which may provide the Bank of England with too much power. As a multi-regional, comparative study on the importance and effectiveness of prudential regulation, this book will be of great use and interest to students and researchers in finance and bank law, economics and banking.

Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.

The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.

To establish an effective program of banking supervision and prudential regulation, the public policy role of bank supervision must be clearly defined and understood and actions taken along several parallel tracks to strengthen the bank supervisory process, the legal framework, accounting and auditing, and the institutions themselves.

This departmental paper discusses the evolving prudential frameworks for nonbank issuers of electronic money. Some jurisdictions take a relatively light-touch approach to regulating electronic money issuers (EMIs). Others have sought to apply more stringent requirements to protect electronic money (e-money) users, as the sector has grown in importance. The paper aims to build on previous IMF staff contributions to the literature and to draw policy conclusions for strengthening e-money regulatory regimes; in particular in jurisdictions where issuers, individually or collectively, have grown to a size to which they are of macro-financial importance (see below). Chapter 2 provides background on the development of e-money, its economic benefits, and potential risks. Chapter 3 discusses prudential supervision of EMIs, followed in Chapter 4 by their oversight from a payments system perspective. Chapter 5 discusses potential additional measures for user protection and contingency arrangements for EMI failure. The last chapter presents policy recommendations for policymakers, especially in those emerging market economies and developing countries wherein EMIs have reached a scale at which they could have a significant economic impact if they were to fail.

The financial market events in 2007-2009 have spurred renewed interest and controversy in debates regarding financial regulation and supervision. This book takes stock of the developments in EU legislation, case law and institutional structures with regards to banking regulation and supervision, which preceded and followed the recent financial crisis. It does not merely provide an update, but anchors these developments into the broader EU law context, challenging past paradigms and anticipating possible developments. The author provides a systematic analysis of the interactions between the content of prudential rules and the mechanisms behind their production and application European Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision includes discussions of the European banking market structure and of regulatory theory that both aim to circumscribe prudential concerns. It scrutinises the content of prudential norms, proposes a qualification of these norms and an assessment of their interaction with other types of norms (corporate, auditing and accounting, consumer protection, competition rules). It also features an analysis of the underpinning institutional set-up and its envisaged reforms, focusing on the typical EU concerns related to checks and balances. Finally, the book attempts to revive the debate on supervisory liability, in light of the developments discussed. This book will be of great value to all those interested in financial stability matters (practitioners, policy-makers, students, academics), as well as to EU law scholars.

Bank Regulation, Risk Management, and Compliance is a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the primary areas of US banking regulation – micro-prudential, macroprudential, financial consumer protection, and AML/CFT regulation – and their associated risk management and compliance systems. The book’s focus is the US, but its prolific use of standards published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and frequent comparisons with UK and EU versions of US regulation offer a broad perspective on global bank regulation and expectations for internal governance. The book establishes a conceptual framework that helps readers to understand bank regulators’ expectations for the risk management and compliance functions. Informed by the author’s experience at a major credit rating agency in helping to design and implement a ratings compliance system, it explains how the banking business model, through credit extension and credit intermediation, creates the principal risks that regulation is designed to mitigate: credit, interest rate, market, and operational risk, and, more broadly, systemic risk. The book covers, in a single volume, the four areas of bank regulation and supervision and the associated regulatory expectations and firms’ governance systems. Readers desiring to study the subject in a unified manner have needed to separately consult specialized treatments of their areas of interest, resulting in a fragmented grasp of the subject matter. Banking regulation has a cohesive unity due in large part to national authorities’ agreement to follow global standards and to the homogenizing effects of the integrated global financial markets. The book is designed for legal, risk, and compliance banking professionals; students in law, business, and other finance-related graduate programs; and finance professionals generally who want a reference book on bank regulation, risk management, and compliance. It can serve both as a primer for entry-level finance professionals and as a reference guide for seasoned risk and compliance officials, senior management, and regulators and other policymakers. Although the book’s focus is bank regulation, its coverage of corporate governance, risk management, compliance, and management of conflicts of interest in financial institutions has broad application in other financial services sectors. Chapter 6 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.