The Politics Of Naval Supremacy

Discusses the lessons which Britain learned in the war of 1739-48 which, when applied in later wars, brought about Britain's global naval supremacy.

U.S. and British naval power developed in quite different ways in the early 20th century before the Second World War. This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each. Naval power was the single greatest manifestation of national power for both countries. Their armies were small and their air forces only existed for part of the period covered. For Great Britain, naval power was vital to her very existence, and for the U.S., naval power was far and away the most effective tool the country could use to exercise armed influence around the world. Therefore, the decisions made about the relative strengths of the two navies were in many ways the most important strategic choices the British and American governments ever made. An important book for military historians and those interested in the exercise and the extension of power.

In his groundbreaking work, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, Sumida presents a provocative and authoritative revisionist history of the origins, nature and consequences of the "Dreadnought Revolution" of 1906. Based on intensive and extensive archival research, the book strives to explain vital financial and technical matters which enable readers to observe the complex interplay of fiscal, technical, strategic, and personal factors that shaped the course of British naval decision-making during the critical quarter century that preceded the outbreak of the First World War.

During World War I, Britain's naval supremacy enabled it to impose economic blockades and interdiction of American neutral shipping. The United States responded by building 'a navy second to none', one so powerful that Great Britain could not again successfully challenge America's vital economic interests. This book reveals that when the United States offered to substitute naval equality for its emerging naval supremacy, the British, nonetheless, used the resulting two major international arms-control conferences of the 1920s to ensure its continued naval dominance.

For five centuries, since Vasco de Gama's ships began making the Indian Ocean a Portuguese lake, many governments used naval force to serve their political purposes. The sceptre of the seas passed from one nation to another, but political success did not always reward the strongest navy. This selective, international history of naval force as a political instrument, whether in peace or war, ranges from Calicut, navally cannonaded in 1501, to Baghdad, assailed by sea launched missiles in 1991.