The Politics Of Method In The Human Sciences

The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences provides a remarkable comparative assessment of the variations of positivism and alternative epistemologies in the contemporary human sciences. Often declared obsolete, positivism is alive and well in a number of the fields; in others, its influence is significantly diminished. The essays in this collection investigate its mutations in form and degree across the social science disciplines. Looking at methodological assumptions field by field, individual essays address anthropology, area studies, economics, history, the philosophy of science, political science and political theory, and sociology. Essayists trace disciplinary developments through the long twentieth century, focusing on the decades since World War II. Contributors explore and contrast some of the major alternatives to positivist epistemologies, including Marxism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, narrative theory, and actor-network theory. Almost all the essays are written by well-known practitioners of the fields discussed. Some essayists approach positivism and anti-positivism via close readings of texts influential in their respective disciplines. Some engage in ethnographies of the present-day human sciences; others are more historical in method. All of them critique contemporary social scientific practice. Together, they trace a trajectory of thought and method running from the past through the present and pointing toward possible futures. Contributors. Andrew Abbott, Daniel Breslau, Michael Burawoy, Andrew Collier , Michael Dutton, Geoff Eley, Anthony Elliott, Stephen Engelmann, Sandra Harding, Emily Hauptmann, Webb Keane, Tony Lawson, Sophia Mihic, Philip Mirowski, Timothy Mitchell, William H. Sewell Jr., Margaret R. Somers, George Steinmetz, Elizabeth Wingrove

In this captivating yet troubling book, Ian Shapiro offers a searing indictment of many influential practices in the social sciences and humanities today. Perhaps best known for his critique of rational choice theory, Shapiro expands his purview here. In discipline after discipline, he argues, scholars have fallen prey to inward-looking myopia that results from--and perpetuates--a flight from reality. In the method-driven academic culture we inhabit, argues Shapiro, researchers too often make display and refinement of their techniques the principal scholarly activity. The result is that they lose sight of the objects of their study. Pet theories and methodological blinders lead unwelcome facts to be ignored, sometimes not even perceived. The targets of Shapiro's critique include the law and economics movement, overzealous formal and statistical modeling, various reductive theories of human behavior, misguided conceptual analysis in political theory, and the Cambridge school of intellectual history. As an alternative to all of these, Shapiro makes a compelling case for problem-driven social research, rooted in a realist philosophy of science and an antireductionist view of social explanation. In the lucid--if biting--prose for which Shapiro is renowned, he explains why this requires greater critical attention to how problems are specified than is usually undertaken. He illustrates what is at stake for the study of power, democracy, law, and ideology, as well as in normative debates over rights, justice, freedom, virtue, and community. Shapiro answers many critics of his views along the way, securing his position as one of the distinctive social and political theorists of our time.

The scientific method is just over a hundred years old. From debates about the evolution of the human mind to the rise of instrumental reasoning, Henry M. Cowles shows how the idea of a single "scientific method" emerged from a turn inward by psychologists that produced powerful epistemological and historical effects that are still with us today.

For some two centuries, scholars have wrestled with questions regarding the nature and logic of history as a discipline and, more broadly, with the entire complex of the "human sciences, " with include theology, philosophy, history, literature, the fine arts, and languages. The fundamental issue is whether the human sciences are a special class of studies with a specifically distinct object and method or whether they must be subsumed under the natural sciences. German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey dedicated the bulk of his long career to there and related questions. His Introduction to the Human Sciences is a pioneering effort to elaborate a general theory of the human sciences, especially history, and to distinguish these sciences radically from the field of natural sciences. Though the Introduction was never completed, it remains one of the major statements of the topic. Together with other works by Dilthey, it has had a substantial influence on the recognition and human sciences as a fundamental division of human knowledge and on their separation from the natural sciences in origin, nature, and method. As a contribution to the issue of the methodologies of the humanities and social sciences, the Introduction rightly claims a place. This is the first time the entire work is available in English. In his introductory essay, translator Ramon J. Betanzos surveys Dilthey's life and thought and hails his efforts to create a foundational science for the particular human sciences, and at the same time, takes serious issue with Dilthey's historical/critical evaluation of metaphysics.

For the past fifty years anxiety over naturalism has driven debates in social theory. One side sees social science as another kind of natural science, while the other rejects the possibility of objective and explanatory knowledge. Interpretation and Social Knowledge suggests a different route, offering a way forward for an antinaturalist sociology that overcomes the opposition between interpretation and explanation and uses theory to build concrete, historically specific causal explanations of social phenomena.

A first-hand account of the genealogy of the discipline, and of the rise of a new era of social history, by one of the leading historians of a generation

Since the time of Plato, political philosophy has attempted to create a secure basis upon which to build the prescriptive claims for political action. However, if knowledge is a human construction, not the discovery of some essential reality, is it possible to support collective acts by reference to such foundational claims? If not, we must rethink our understanding society, politics, and the exercise of power. Beginning with the premise that our knowledge of political and social life is historical and contingent, Andrew Koch seeks to re-conceptualize our understanding of politics and power. Koch moves the discussions of power and politics away from search for foundational truths. Viewing politics and power through an epistemological lens, he explores what our understanding of politics and power looks like in the wake of deconstruction and genealogy. Koch begins with a general overview of the poststructuralist epistemology. From there the work contrasts this position with the interpretive sociology of Max Weber, uses deconstruction to politicize the work of Niklas Luhmann, and explores the implications of deconstruction for democracy, Marxist theory, institutional power, and anarchist politics.

Widely praised on its first publication, this second edition directly reflects new developments in the areas of philosophy and method.

Paul A Roth's book examines an important controversy in the philosophy of the social sciences that has developed since the demise of logical positivism and its conception of rationality. Roth contends that this controversy—a dispute over the canons of rationality—is the product of the mistaken belief in methodological exclusivism. Drawing on work in contemporary epistemology by W. V. O. Quine, Richard Rorty, and Paul Feyerabend, he argues that no single theory of human behavior has methodological priority; indeed, the existence of a plethora of theories for the study of human behavior, he believes, is an inevitable consequence of our epistemic situation.