The Politics Of Corporate Political Activity

Corporate Political Activities Deskbook provides a thorough grounding in the current state of the law on federal and state campaign finance, pay-to-play, lobbying, and gift compliance. It serves as a practical manual for in-house attorneys who advise corporations about involvement in the political process.After describing the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United--that began the expansion of permitted corporate speech in the political realm--and McCutcheon v. FEC--that expanded the exemption further, the book examines thoroughly the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requirements, federal lobbying and gift rules, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and practice and appearances before the FEC. The Deskbook includes an overview of state lobbying, gift, placement agent rules and pay-to-play rules as well as the federal pay-to-play rules (MSRB Rule G-37, SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and FINRA's proposed pay-to-play rule).Appendices include model documents, such as sample PAC bylaws, a PAC contribution card, a resolution for establishing a PAC, as well as a summary chart of the corporate, PAC and individual contribution limits in each of the 50 states.Corporate Political Activities Deskbook provides practical examples of best practices and "dos and don'ts." In many cases, the suggestions go beyond the black letter requirements to incorporate advice that can help corporations utilize the available avenues of interacting with the government while avoiding negative press, and public as well as legal regulatory attention.

This volume of The International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics explores and investigates contemporary challenges and issues facing the Asia-Pacific economies. For researchers and students of economics and finance, this volume is a fascinating exploration of emerging topics in one the fastest growing economies in the world.

Corporate Political Behavior centers on why corporations do what they do in politics. The text draws upon insights from the author’s forty years of government and political experience—insights placed within an operating framework grounded in the political science and strategic issue management disciplines. Robert Healy argues that corporate political behavior results from the interplay of behavioral drivers—commercial objectives, competitive political advantage, corporate political culture and leadership—and behavioral enablers—political capital, corporate political reputation, corporate campaign financing, and corporate political clout. This interplay all functions within a three-world environment: market, non-market, and internal corporate. The book examines how these factors structure a firm’s political positioning, its business-political strategies, and its political behavior as it seeks to attain its marketplace goals. The text features in-chapter side bars— events, or circumstances or political happenings of which the author either knew or participated—along with longer mini-cases in which the author also participated or was consulted. Each chapter concludes with a summary and takeaway points. Corporate Political Behavior will be applicable to courses in political science and in business school courses on strategic issue management, policy construction, corporate agency and corporate strategy, as well as of interest to corporations and practitioners.

The interaction of business with politics is a 'big strategy' (Whittington, 2012) phenomenon. Political activities of firms have consequences not only for firms, but also for democratic systems. But little is known about impact of corporate political activity on either firms or society. The many studies which have studied business politics interaction are overall inconclusive. In this essay we argue that the lack of understanding stems from inappropriate conceptualization and incorrect usage of corporate political activity as a theoretical concept. In this essay we argue that the understanding of corporate political participation can be improved by distinguishing between two related but distinct concepts: corporate political activity, and corporate political strategy. Denoting a set of activities as political activities is not as useful for Strategic Organization research as it may be in Sociology or Political Science. We argue that corporate political strategy might be a more useful conceptualization making political actions of corporations amenable to study in ways King & Walker (2014) called for.

Leading political innovation activist Katherine Gehl and world-renowned business strategist Michael Porter bring fresh perspective, deep scholarship, and a real and actionable solution, Final Five Voting, to the grand challenge of our broken political and democratic system. Final Five Voting has already been adopted in Alaska and is being advanced in states across the country. The truth is, the American political system is working exactly how it is designed to work, and it isn't designed or optimized today to work for us—for ordinary citizens. Most people believe that our political system is a public institution with high-minded principles and impartial rules derived from the Constitution. In reality, it has become a private industry dominated by a textbook duopoly—the Democrats and the Republicans—and plagued and perverted by unhealthy competition between the players. Tragically, it has therefore become incapable of delivering solutions to America's key economic and social challenges. In fact, there's virtually no connection between our political leaders solving problems and getting reelected. In The Politics Industry, business leader and path-breaking political innovator Katherine Gehl and world-renowned business strategist Michael Porter take a radical new approach. They ingeniously apply the tools of business analysis—and Porter's distinctive Five Forces framework—to show how the political system functions just as every other competitive industry does, and how the duopoly has led to the devastating outcomes we see today. Using this competition lens, Gehl and Porter identify the most powerful lever for change—a strategy comprised of a clear set of choices in two key areas: how our elections work and how we make our laws. Their bracing assessment and practical recommendations cut through the endless debate about various proposed fixes, such as term limits and campaign finance reform. The result: true political innovation. The Politics Industry is an original and completely nonpartisan guide that will open your eyes to the true dynamics and profound challenges of the American political system and provide real solutions for reshaping the system for the benefit of all. THE INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL INNOVATION The authors will donate all royalties from the sale of this book to the Institute for Political Innovation.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

In this important book, Mark S. Mizruchi presents and tests an original model of corporate political behavior. He argues that because the business community is characterized by both unity and conflict, the key issue is not whether business is unified but the conditions under which unity or conflict occurs.