The Political Theory Of The Constitution

Jan-Erik Lane begins by examining the origins and history of constitutionalism, the doctrine that the state must be regulated by means of a set of institutions that guarantee citizen rights and procedural accountability. He then examines the structure of the state in order to identify the essential elements that constitutional institutions regulate. Lane asks why constitutions exist, and how they matter for society. Finally he seeks out the requirements for a fair and democratic constitution by referring to three key concepts in political theory: justice, equality and the rule of law. The book also offers a comparative survey of formal constitutional arrangements in different countries, and an analysis of how constitutions develop in practice, through the implementation of constitutional and administrative law in a country's courts.

Originally prepared as lectures arranged by the Miller Center.

This book provides a complete overview of the Founders' natural rights theory and its policy implications.

The Political Theory of a Compound Republic examines the foundation of American constitutional design expressed in theFederalist. Through meticulous textual analysis, the logical principles of federalism_the extended and compound republic envisioned by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton_are revealed as thirteen propositions broadly applicable to any effort to design the institutions of a self-governing polity. The final chapters, expanded and revised by Vincent Ostrom and Barbara Allen, turn to the American experiment in constitutional choice at the threshold of the twenty-first century. In this revised edition, Ostrom and Allen consider the continuing story of federal institutional development by focusing on two current concerns: the 'imperial presidency' and the ideal of universal human rights. This third, revised and expanded edition of The Political Theory of a Compound Republic continues to be of interest to scholars of federalism, institutional analysis and development, political economy and public choice, and students of the American founding. It is also useful in undergraduate and graduate courses on American government and political thought.

In this representative edition of Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde's definitive work in constitutionalism, law, and politics, readers have access to the legal discourse of one of Germany's leading contemporary theorists and former judge of the federal constitutional court.

Donald Lutz begins A Preface to American Political Theory by explaining what the book doesn't do. It doesn't begin with a panegyric to the American founding. It doesn't answer the following questions: "What are the basic principles in the U.S. Constitution? What were the intentions of the founders with respect to (fill in your own topic)? What is the meaning of pluralism, or separation of powers, or democracy, or (fill in your own concept)?" In short, it doesn't provide an overview of the content, development, or major conclusions of American political theory. What it does do is provide "a pre-theoretical analysis of how to go about studying questions like the ones above-how to conceptualize the project, how to proceed in looking for answers, how to avoid the logical traps peculiar to the study of American political theory." Lutz sets out to emancipate American political theorists from empiricism and inappropriate European theories and methadologies. The end result is to establish the foundation for the systematic study of American behavior, institutions, and ideas; to provide a general introduction to the study of American political theory; and to illustrate how textual analysis, history, empirical research, and analytic philosophy are all part of the enterprise. Designed for students and scholars in all disciplines, including political science, history, and legal studies, A Preface to American Political Theory doesn't provide answers to central continuing issues in American political theory. Rather, it provides an effective, sophisticated entree into the study of American political theory. Readers will be armed with the intellectual tools to engage in systematic study and makes them aware of the pitfalls they will inevitably encounter.

Edward S. Corwin is the twentieth century's most eminent commentator on the Constitution. Unfortunately, he died before he could write the single definitive work on the Constitution he had planned. In three volumes, of which this is the first, Richard Loss has edited and introduced major essays by Corwin that best delineate his argument in political thought and constitutional law. The essays in Volume One examine the foundations of American political and constitutional thought, the powers of Congress, and the President's power of removal. Corwin addresses topics that vary from "The Worship of the Constitution" to "The Constitution as Instrument and Symbol." He discusses the lessons of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, takes up the relationship of the Constitution to New Deal democracy, and examines democratic dogma and political science. A fascinating essay treating the theory of evolution shows how this idea replaced the idea of natural law in American constitutional tradition. Loss's introduction provides a biographical sketch of Corwin, elaborates and appraises his argument and characterizes Corwin's legacy to the present generation of scholars. Loss shows that far from ending debate, Corwin's essays on political thought and the removal power establish an intellectual agenda for further inquiry into the tenets of constitutional law. In an epilogue Loss deals with Corwin's understanding of Alexander Hamilton's position on the President's removal power, an important topic involving not only presidential prerogative, but the comparative rank of Hamilton's Federalist papers on the presidency and Hamilton's Pacificus letters. Corwin on the Constitution will be of particular interest to judges, historians, law teachers, political scientists, students of constitutional law and American political thought.

Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely down-played. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. The Constitution as Political Structure emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory. In its exposition of the textual and theoretical rationales for judicial enforcement of the structural values embodied in the Constitution, this book presents a principled alternative to the extremes of judicial abdication articulated by certain scholars and Justices on the one hand, and the result-oriented ideological involvement advocated in some quarters on the other. This work will be of great interest to scholars of law and political science.

Should we try to “live in the present”? Such is the imperative of modernity, Jed Rubenfeld writes in this important and original work of political theory. Since Jefferson proclaimed that “the earth belongs to the living”—since Freud announced that mental health requires people to “get free of their past”—since Nietzsche declared that the happy man is the man who “leaps” into “the moment—modernity has directed its inhabitants to live in the present, as if there alone could they find happiness, authenticity, and above all freedom. But this imperative, Rubenfeld argues, rests on a profoundly inadequate, deforming picture of the relationship between freedom and time. Instead, Rubenfeld suggests, human freedom—human being itself—-necessarily extends into both past and future; self-government consists of giving our lives meaning and purpose over time. From this conception of self-government, Rubenfeld derives a new theory of constitutional law’s place in democracy. Democracy, he writes, is not a matter of governance by the present “will of the people” it is a matter of a nation’s laying down and living up to enduring political and legal commitments. Constitutionalism is not counter to democracy, as many believe, or a pre-condition of democracy; it is or should be democracy itself--over time. On this basis, Rubenfeld offers a new understanding of constitutional interpretation and of the fundamental right of privacy.