The Political Economy Of Employment Protection

According to most orthodox economists, labour market rigidities are the key culprit for such high unemployment as has been observed in Europe during the past three decades. But governments that have attempted to follow the standard prescription of removing rigidities have often faced harsh political opposition. This book looks at why labour market institutions such as employment protection, unemployment benefits, and relative wage rigidities exist, what role they play in society, why they seem so persistent, where the pressure to reform them comes from, and whether reform can be politically viable or not. The book ascribes a central role to the existence of underlying microeconomic frictions and to redistributive pressures between rich and poor, and shows how these ingredients may give rise to labour market rents, which in turn explain why a coherent set of rigidities arise as the outcome of the political process. It is also shown that, at the same time, such rents create resistance to reform, and contribute to locking society into a high-unemployment, rigid equilibrium. Finally, the basic principles exposed in the book are used to discuss various strategies for a successful labour market reform.

The economic crisis has revealed the dark side of deregulation in the labour market: rising unemployment, limited access to social security and, due to low wages, no savings to count upon in bad times. This book casts light on the empirical relationship between labour market deregulation through non-standard contracts and the three main dimensions of worker security: employment, income and social security. Focusing on individual work histories, it looks at how labour market dynamics interact with the social protection system in bringing about inequality and insecurity. In this context Italy is put forward as the epitome of flexibility through non-standard work and compared with three similar countries: Germany, Spain and Japan. Results show that when flexibility is carried out as a mere cost-reduction device and social security only relies on insurance principles, deregulation leads to insecurity. 'The political economy of work security and flexibility' is essential reading for academics, students, practitioners and policy makers interested in the outcomes of labour market developments in advanced economies over the past twenty years.

This book examines how trade policy is determined in democratic countries, and illustrates how protectionist policies are engendered by political processes that allow groups to pursue their own interests.

Employment has changed dramatically in the last few decades with the onset of neoliberal globalization. This change has become the objective of inquiry from different perspectives, such as development studies, labour economics or industrial relations, focusing on different units of analysis. The Political Economy of Employment Relations provides an exceptional contribution to existing literature by presenting alternative theory and practice on employment relations. It is within this critical theoretical intervention that solidarity economies emerge as a unique theoretical construct as well as a unit of analysis to expose the alternative paths that employment relations may resort to against the contemporary challenges of neoliberal globalization. This book analyses globalization, global economic crisis, and issues of work and labour from the point of view of the developing world, presenting local case studies from countries including the USA, India, Spain and Greece, and outlining alternative approaches to global challenges. This volume has relevance to those with an interest in industrial relations, sociology of work and occupations, labour economics and development economics.

(Cont.) This argument is evaluated in a dynamic model of labor turnover and employment protection. The third chapter presents an argument according to which employment protection is a policy that is difficult to introduce. If a country decides to introduce employment protection, it is reasonable to assume that firms can adjust employment levels before protection is actually implemented. Firms then have an incentive to dismiss some workers today in order to avoid high employment protection in the future. Anticipating this, these workers may oppose the introduction of employment protection. Delayed implementation can give rise to situations in which both low and high employment protection are stable political outcomes.

This paper explores the short-term employment effect of deregulating job protection for regular workers and how it varies with prevailing business cycle conditions. We apply a local projection method to a newly constructed “narrative” dataset of major regular job protection reforms covering 26 advanced economies over the past four decades. The analysis relies on country-sector-level data, using as an identifying assumption the fact that stringent dismissal regulations are more binding in sectors that are characterized by a higher “natural” propensity to regularly adjust their workforce. We find that the responses of sectoral employment to large job protection deregulation shocks depend crucially on the state of the economy at the time of reform——they are positive in an expansion, but become negative in a recession. These findings are consistent with theory, and are robust to a broad range of robustness checks including an Instrumental Variable approach using political economy drivers of reforms as instruments. Our results provide a case for undertaking job protection reform in good times, or for designing it in ways that enhance its short-term impact.