The Nietzschean Mind

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work continues to have a significant influence on philosophy, cultural criticism and modern intellectual history. The Nietzschean Mind seeks to provide a comprehensive survey of his work, not only placing it in its historical context but also exploring its contemporary significance. Comprising twenty-eight chapters by a team of international contributors, the volume is divided into seven parts: • Major works • Philosophical psychology and agency • The self • Value • Culture, society and politics • Metaphysics and epistemology • The affirmation of life This handbook includes coverage of all major aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, including his discussions of value, culture, society, the self, agency, action, philosophical psychology, epistemology and metaphysics; explorations of the philosophical and scientific influences upon Nietzsche’s thought; and discussion of Nietzsche’s major works. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, Nietzsche’s work is central to ethics, moral psychology and political philosophy.

Nietzsche's works are replete with discussions of moral psychology, but to date there has been no systematic analysis of his account. How does Nietzsche understand human motivation, deliberation, agency, and selfhood? How does his account of the unconscious inform these topics? What is Nietzsche's conception of freedom, and how do we become free? Should freedom be a goal for all of us? How does--and how should--the individual relate to his social context? The Nietzschean Self offers a clear, comprehensive analysis of these central topics in Nietzsche's moral psychology. It analyzes his distinction between conscious and unconscious mental events, explains the nature of a type of motivational state that Nietzsche calls the 'drive', and examines the connection between drives, desires, affects, and values. It explores Nietzsche's account of willing unity of the self, freedom, and the relation of the self to its social and historical context. The Nietzschean Self argues that Nietzsche's account enjoys a number of advantages over the currently dominant models of moral psychology--especially those indebted to the work of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant--and considers the ways in which Nietzsche's arguments can reconfigure and improve upon debates in the contemporary literature on moral psychology and philosophy of action.

Friedrich Nietzsche declared himself to be “a psychologist who has not his peer.” Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy: The New Doctors of the Soul illustrates why he was correct and indicates that he was also a soul doctor “who has not his peer.” He is usually unknown to psychologists and treated by philosophers as if he was a philosopher who, as such, wrote about some issues relating to the philosophy of mind. This book acquaints psychologists with Nietzsche and introduces him to philosophers in a new light. It presents Nietzsche’s contributions to psychology, wisdom of life, and psychotherapy dispersed throughout his writings. It hails him the “Overturner,” demonstrating how he overturned many of our notions about love, crime, happiness, morality, language, consciousness, logic, memory, emotions, happiness, and self-actualizing. He is portrayed as the precursor and champion of action-, chance-, and acceptance-oriented self-help and therapy, far from being, as is often claimed, a proponent of depth-, dynamic- or insight-oriented psychotherapy.

Nietzsche’s thought has been of renewed interest to philosophers in both the Anglo- American and the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions. Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind presents 16 essays from analytic and continental perspectives. Appealing to both international communities of scholars, the volume seeks to deepen the appreciation of Nietzsche’s contribution to our understanding of consciousness and the mind. Over the past decades, a variety of disciplines have engaged with Nietzsche’s thought, including anthropology, biology, history, linguistics, neuroscience, and psychology, to name just a few. His rich and perspicacious treatment of consciousness, mind, and body cannot be reduced to any single discipline, and has the potential to speak to many. And, as several contributors make clear, Nietzsche’s investigations into consciousness and the embodied mind are integral to his wider ethical concerns. This volume contains contributions by international experts such as Christa Davis Acampora (Emory University), Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick University), João Constâncio (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Frank Chouraqui (Leiden University), Manuel Dries (The Open University; Oxford University), Christian J. Emden (Rice University), Maria Cristina Fornari (University of Salento), Anthony K. Jensen (Providence College), Helmut Heit (Tongji University), Charlie Huenemann (Utah State University), Vanessa Lemm (Flinders University), Lawrence J. Hatab (Old Dominion University), Mattia Riccardi (University of Porto), Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen (New York University and EGS), and Benedetta Zavatta (CNRS).

Brian Leiter defends a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts and reasoning play almost no significant role in our actions and how our lives unfold. He presents a new interpretation of main themes of Nietzsche's moral psychology, including his anti-realism about value (including epistemic value), his account of moral judgment and its relationship to the emotions, his conception of the will and agency, his scepticism about free will and moral responsibility, his epiphenomenalism about certain kinds of conscious mental states, and his views about the heritability of psychological traits. In combining exegesis with argument, Leiter engages the views of philosophers like Harry Frankfurt, T. M. Scanlon, and Gary Watson, and psychologists including Daniel Wegner, Benjamin Libet, and Stanley Milgram. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in both philosophy and psychology.

Nietzsche's works are replete with discussions of moral psychology, but to date there has been no systematic analysis of his account. How does Nietzsche understand human motivation, deliberation, agency, and selfhood? How does his account of the unconscious inform these topics? What is Nietzsche's conception of freedom, and how do we become free? Should freedom be a goal for all of us? How does—and how should—the individual relate to his social context? The Nietzschean Self offers a clear, comprehensive analysis of these central topics in Nietzsche's moral psychology. It analyzes his distinction between conscious and unconscious mental events, explains the nature of a type of motivational state that Nietzsche calls the 'drive', and examines the connection between drives, desires, affects, and values. It explores Nietzsche's account of willing unity of the self, freedom, and the relation of the self to its social and historical context. The Nietzschean Self argues that Nietzsche's account enjoys a number of advantages over the currently dominant models of moral psychology—especially those indebted to the work of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant—and considers the ways in which Nietzsche's arguments can reconfigure and improve upon debates in the contemporary literature on moral psychology and philosophy of action.

In Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology, Mattia Riccardi offers a systematic account of Nietzsche's thought on the human mind. A central theme is the nature of and relation between the unconscious and conscious mind. Whereas Nietzsche takes consciousness to be a mere surface--as he writes in Ecce Homo--that evolved in the course of human socialisation, he sees the bedrock of human psychology as constituted by unconscious drives and affects. But how does he conceive of such basic psychological items and what does he mean exactly when he talks about consciousness and says it is a surface? And how does such a conception of human psychology inform his views about self, self-knowledge and will? Riccardi addresses these and related questions by combining historical accuracy with conceptual analysis: Nietzsche's claims are carefully reconstructed by taking into account the intellectual context in which they emerged; in order to work out their philosophical significance, Riccardi discusses them in the light of contemporary debates such as those about higher-order theories of consciousness and mind-reading.

This Element explains Nietzsche's ethics in his late works, from 1886 onwards. The first three sections explain the basics of his ethical theory – its context and presuppositions, its scope and its central tension. The next three sections explore Nietzsche's goals in writing a history of Christian morality (On the Genealogy of Morality), the content of that history, and whether he achieves his goals. The last two sections take a broader look, respectively, at Nietzsche's wider philosophy in light of his ethics and at the prospects for a Nietzschean ethics after Nietzsche.

Examines Nietzsche's thinking on the virtues using a combination of close reading and digital analysis.

Nietzsche's work has had a significant impact on the intellectual life of non-Western cultures and elicited responses from thinkers outside of the Anglo-American philosophical traditions as well. These essays address the connection between his ideas and ph