The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System

Hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans and surrounding areas in August 2005, ranks as one of the nation's most devastating natural disasters. Shortly after the storm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established a task force to assess the performance of the levees, floodwalls, and other structures comprising the area's hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina. This book provides an independent review of the task force's final draft report and identifies key lessons from the Katrina experience and their implications for future hurricane preparedness and planning in the region.

The hurricane protection systems that failed New Orleans when Katrina roared on shore in 2005 were the product of four decades of engineering hubris, excruciating delays, and social conflict. In Perilous Place, Powerful Storms, Craig E. Colten traces the protracted process of erecting massive structures designed to fend off tropical storms and examines how human actions and inactions left the system incomplete on the eve of its greatest challenge. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 provided the impetus for Congress to approve unprecedented hurricane protection for the New Orleans area. Army Engineers swiftly outlined a monumental barrier network that would not only safeguard the city at the time but also provide for substantial growth. Scheduled for completion in 1978, the project encountered a host of frustrating delays. From newly imposed environmental requirements to complex construction challenges, to funding battles, to disputes over proper structures, the buffer envisioned for southeast Louisiana remained incomplete forty years later as Hurricane Katrina bore down on the city. As Colten reveals, the very remedies intended to shield the city ultimately contributed immensely to the residents' vulnerability by encouraging sprawl into flood-prone territory that was already sinking within the ring of levees. Perilous Place, Powerful Storms illuminates the political, social, and engineering lessons of those who built a hurricane protection system that failed and serves as a warning for those guiding the recovery of post-Katrina New Orleans and Louisiana.

This report focuses on the direct physical causes and contributing factors to the failures of the hurricane protection system during and after Hurricane Katrina.

According to the US Army Corps of Engineers, the city of New Orleans is twice as likely to be struck by a hurricane as any other metropolitan area bordering the Gulf of Mexico. In this work, authors David F. Bastian and Nicholas J. Meis explore the historical records of storms that have affected the region in and around south Louisiana since the first colonizers set foot on the Mississippi delta in the late seventeenth century. Using letters, personal diaries, official records, newspaper articles, and expert analyses, Bastian and Meis delve into the effects of the monstrous storms that have irreparably impacted south Louisiana, including what went awry during Katrina in 2005. Also examined is the evolution of New Orleans's protection systems as well as what the city can do to avoid another catastrophe.

Hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans and surrounding areas in August 2005, ranks as one of the nation's most devastating natural disasters. Shortly after the storm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established a task force to assess the performance of the levees, floodwalls, and other structures comprising the area's hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina. This book provides an independent review of the task force's final draft report and identifies key lessons from the Katrina experience and their implications for future hurricane preparedness and planning in the region.

Breaches of the floodwalls protecting New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina caused significant flooding in many areas of downtown. Although most of the levee breaches in coastal Louisiana were the result of the storm's surge flowing over levees, preliminary evidence suggests that three major breaches in downtown New Orleans occurred prior to the floodwalls being overtopped; that is, the floodwalls failed before their design was exceeded. The failure of these floodwalls has many stakeholders' speculating about the causes of the failures, the reliability of the system of levees and floodwalls, and future options for protecting the city. One cause of failure being discussed is a poor or inadequate design for protecting the city from a Category 3 hurricane. The original design for the city's hurricane protection infrastructure was to control storm surge flowing into water bodies near downtown by building inlet barriers and canal floodgates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for designing and building much of the infrastructure as part of its Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to protect New Orleans and the surrounding parishes from a Category 3 hurricane; the local levee districts shared 30% of the construction costs and maintained the infrastructure. During the project's construction which began with authorization in 1965 and was ongoing when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, numerous factors contributed to changing the design of how to protect the city (e.g., including local environmental concerns, changing cost estimates, local flood protection preferences, and litigation); the final design attempted to reduce hurricane related flooding in the city by increasing the height of levees and floodwalls, in lieu of the barriers and floodgates. The findings of ongoing investigations about the causes of the floodwall failures are likely to shape not only the future design of the city's hurricane protection system but also plans for rebuilding sections of the city and perspectives on the federal role and responsibility in the city's rebuilding efforts. This report documents the evolution in the design of the Lake Pontchartrain project, with specific reference to how and by whom design decisions were made. The focus is on two major design developments relevant to the current investigations into floodwall failures in downtown New Orleans: (1) the shift from barriers at Lake Pontchartrain's inlets to higher levees along the lakeshore; and (2) the shift from floodgates at the mouth of the city's stormwater outfall canals that drain into Lake Pontchartrain to higher floodwalls along the length of the canals. The Corps' decision in the mid-1980s to recommend higher levees instead of the inlet barriers it had recommended in 1965 was shaped by multiple factors, including environmental litigation, project economics, and local preferences. The Corps preferred floodgates to floodwalls along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. The decision to not build floodgates, and instead build floodwalls along the canals, was made by local project sponsors. The original design and the final design were intended to provide the same level of protection, i.e., protection from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm surge. This report will be updated as events warrant.

"The objective of this report is to identify and establish a roadmap on how to do that, and lay the groundwork for transforming how this Nation- from every level of government to the private sector to individual citizens and communities - pursues a real and lasting vision of preparedness. To get there will require significant change to the status quo, to include adjustments to policy, structure, and mindset"--P. 2.

Natural disasters are having an increasing effect on the lives of people in the United States and throughout the world. Every decade, property damage caused by natural disasters and hazards doubles or triples in the United States. More than half of the U.S. population lives within 50 miles of a coast, and all Americans are at risk from such hazards as fires, earthquakes, floods, and wind. The year 2010 saw 950 natural catastrophes around the world-the second highest annual total ever-with overall losses estimated at $130 billion. The increasing impact of natural disasters and hazards points to increasing importance of resilience, the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events, at the individual , local, state, national, and global levels. Assessing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters reviews the effects of Hurricane Katrina and other natural and human-induced disasters on the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi and to learn more about the resilience of those areas to future disasters. Topics explored in the workshop range from insurance, building codes, and critical infrastructure to private-sector issues, public health, nongovernmental organizations and governance. This workshop summary provides a rich foundation of information to help increase the nation's resilience through actionable recommendations and guidance on the best approaches to reduce adverse impacts from hazards and disasters.

“Anyone who is interested in Hurricane Katrina, and in America’s failing infrastructure, will want to read this book . . . a fast-paced narrative.” —Scott G. Knowles, Drexel University 2020 Nautilus Silver Winner In the aftermath of one of the worst disasters in US history, Words Whispered in Water tells the story of one woman’s fight, against all odds, to expose a mammoth federal agency—and win. In 2005, the entire world watched as a major US city was nearly wiped off the map. The levees ruptured and New Orleans drowned. But while newscasters attributed the New Orleans flood to “natural catastrophes” and other types of disasters, citizen investigator Sandy Rosenthal set out to expose the true culprit and compel the media and government to tell the truth. This is her story. When the protective steel flood-walls broke, the Army Corps of Engineers—with cooperation from big media—turned the blame elsewhere. In the chaotic aftermath, Rosenthal heroically exposes the federal agency’s egregious design errors and changes the narrative surrounding the New Orleans flood. This engaging and revealing tale of man versus nature and man versus man is a horror story, a mystery, and David and Goliath story all in one. “Reveals what it takes to hold the powerful to account.” —Publishers Weekly “There are only a few civilians that fight like real warriors. Sandy Rosenthal is one of them.” —Russel L. Honoré, Lieutenant General, United States Army (Ret.)