The Military Strategy Of Global Jihad

Subject: America entered the Global War on Terrorism with little understanding of the enemy it faced. AI-Qaeda plays a leading role in the larger movement of global jihad, a splinter faction of militant Islamism intent on establishing its vision of strict Islamic rule in the Muslim world through armed action. Global jihadis have spent more than 40 years refining their philosophy, gaining experience, building their organization, and developing plans to reestablish what they see as the only true Islamic state on earth. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks set this plan in motion. In the years leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, global jihadis have written copiously on their military strategy for creating an Islamic state. This paper draws on those writings to examine and explain the mechanisms by which they plan to neutralize the superpower guardian of world order, claim land and peoples for Islamic emirates out of the resulting chaos, and bring these emirates together to become a true Islamic state. Their writings also expose weaknesses in their strategy, and this paper explores some of those potential vulnerabilities as well.

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A comprehensive look at the War on Terror and the best way to a safer future Scholar Daniel Byman offers a new approach to fighting the war on terrorism. He convincingly argues that two of the main solutions to terrorism offered by politicians--military intervention and the democratization of the Arab world--shouldn't even be our top priorities. Instead, he presents a fresh way to face intelligence and law enforcement challenges ahead: conduct counterinsurgency operations, undermine al-Qaeda's ideology, selectively push for reforms, and build key lasting alliances. Daniel Byman (Washington, DC) directs the Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. He is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and also served on the 9/11 Commission. He regularly writes about terrorism and the Middle East for the Washington Post, Slate, and other publications.

This book deals with the causes, nature, and impact of the divisions within the jihadi movement, and the splits between jihadis and other Islamic groups. Fault Lines in Global Jihad offers a systematic and comprehensive examination of the broad range of divisions that contribute to the weakening of the jihadi movement. It separates these divisions into two broad categories, namely fissures dividing jihadis themselves, and divisions separating jihadis from other Muslim and Islamist groups. The first part of the book covers intra-jihadi divisions, highlighting tensions and divisions over strategic, tactical, and organizational issues. The second part of the book addresses several important case studies of jihadi altercations with other Muslim and Islamist groups of non-jihadi persuasion, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Shii community. More than simply an enumeration of problems and cracks within al-Qa’ida and its cohorts, this book addresses critical policy issues of relevance to the broader struggle against the global jihadi movement. The editors conclude that these divisions have and continue to weaken al-Qa’ida, but neither in an automatic nor in an exclusive fashion—for these divisions render the global jihadi movement simultaneously vulnerable and more resilient. This book will be of much interest to students of jihadism, terrorism and political violence, Islamism, security studies and IR in general.

A specter haunts America, the specter of Global Jihad, Islamic Holy War. This specter was never more horrific than on September 11, 2001, when nineteen fanatics hijacked four jetliners and used them as guided missiles to destroy the twin World Trade Towers, damage the Pentagon, murder nearly 3,000 people, and cause as much as several hundred billion dollars’ worth of direct and indirect damage to New York City and the national economy. But Jihadists have periodically attacked Americans ever since November 1979, when mobs shouting death to America overran the American embassy in Tehran and held 52 officials hostage for 444 days. President George W. Bush responded to the September 11 atrocities by declaring a global war on terror. Now in its second decade, that war has cost the United States thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. Americans are haunted by horrific televised images from across a swath of the Muslim world of bomb-blasted cities, hundreds of slaughtered bodies, thousands of refugees huddled in squalid camps, and American journalists in orange jump suits kneeling in the desert before the black robed and masked men who will behead them. Americans increasingly question whether the global war on terror has been worth those costs for their own nation and the lands where it is fought. This book analyzes America’s crusade against Jihadism. The key related questions it addresses are these: Looking back, what were the successes and failures of Washington’s counter-Jihadist strategy before and after September 11? Looking ahead, should Americans stay the course or cut their losses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere? Was the catastrophic September 11 attack a one-time event or could its equivalent or worse in death and destruction happen again? Renowned Harvard professor Samuel Huntington asserted that: “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism, it is Islam, a different civilization, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.” Is that true? Just what of Muhammad’s words and deeds, if any, justifies the barbarism of al Qaeda, Islamic State, and other Jihadists? Finally, just how corporeal is that specter of global Jihad to the United States? A startling surprise awaits the reader in the final chapter as acclaimed expert William Nester weighs the specter of global Jihad against an array of other national security threats.

By consulting the work of well-known and obscure al-Qaeda theoreticians, Michael W. S. Ryan finds jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. Encouraging strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations, Ryan builds an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and constructs a compelling counternarrative to the West's supposed "war on Islam." Ryan examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a political-military context. He also reads the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. These authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap. They also incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on "fourth-generation warfare." Through these texts, readers experience events as insiders see them, and by concentrating on the activities and pronouncements of al-Qaeda's thought leaders, especially in Yemen, they discern the direct link between al-Qaeda's tactics and trends in anti-U.S. terrorism. Ryan shows al-Qaeda's political-military strategy to be a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad, adding invaluable dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.

"Despite His Alleged Capture In Pakistan In Late 2005, Abu Mus’Abal-Suri, A Syrian Originally Known As Mustafa Sethmarian Nasar, Remains A Potent Political And Ideological Figure. Al-Suri Trained A Generation Of Young Jihadis At Al-Qaida’S Afghan Camps And Helped Establish The Organisation’S European Networks. Having Gained Extensive Military Experience Fighting In The Syrian Islamist Insurgency Of The Early 1980S, He Helped To Shape Al-Qaida’S Global Strategy In A Series Of Writings, Including His Influential Global Islamic Resistance Call. In This 1,600 Page Book, Al-Suri Outlines A Broad Strategy For Al-Qaida’S Younger Generation To Follow And Describes Practical Ways To Implement The Theories And Tactics Of Jihadi Guerilla Warfare. In Architect Of Global Jihad, Brynjar Lia Translates Two Key Concepts From Al-Suri’S Global Islamic Resistance Call And Exposes His Methods For Maximizing The Political Impact Of Jihadi Violence And Building Successful, Autonomous Cells For ‘Individualised Terrorism’. Al-Suri’S Words Have Inspired Many Of Today’S Militants, Making Lia’S Detailed Portrait Required Reading For Students And Specialists Of Islamist Movements And The Study Of Contemporary Forms Of Terrorism."

In this paper, the author differentiates and characterizes terrorists and insurgents, and he conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This work lays out the case that terrorism and insurgency differ, and that the current "long war" is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency. As a result, the United States must amend and adapt its strategy to one of global counterinsurgency, beyond a global war on terrorism alone.

Fawaz Gerges' book on al Qaeda and the jihadist movement has become a classic in the field since it was published in 2005. In the intervening years, with the advance of the 'War on Terror' and the invasion of Iraq, much has changed and, just as Gerges showed, al Qaeda's fortunes have taken a significant downturn. Revisiting The Far Enemy in this edition, Gerges demonstrates that not only have the jihadists split ranks, but that voices from within the ultra-religious right, those that previously supported al Qaeda, are condemning its tactics as violent, unethical, and out of accord with the true meaning of jihad. In fact, millions of Muslims worldwide have rejected al-Qaeda's ideology and strategies and blame Osama bin Laden and his cohorts for the havoc the organisation has wreaked on their communities. Al-Qaeda is now in the wilderness suffering massive erosion of authority and legitimacy in Muslim eyes and facing a fierce revolt from within. As Gerges warns, the next US administration would do well to use political and socio-economic strategies rather than military means to ensure that it stays there.