The Metaethics Of Constitutional Adjudication

In this book Bosko Tripkovic develops a theory of value-based arguments in constitutional adjudication. In contrast to the standard question of constitutional theory that asks whether the courts get moral answers wrong, it asks a more fundamental question of whether the courts get the morality itself wrong. Tripkovic argues for an antirealist conception of value -one that does not presuppose the existence of mind-independent moral truths- and accounts for the effect this ought to have on existing value-based arguments made by constitutional courts. The book identifies three dominant types of value-based arguments in comparative constitutional practice: arguments from constitutional identity, common sentiment, and universal reason, and explains why they fail as self-standing approaches to moral judgment. It then suggests that the appropriate moral judgments emerge from the dynamics between practical confidence, which denotes the inescapability of the self and the evaluative attitudes it entails, and reflection, which denotes the process of challenging and questioning these attitudes. The book applies the notions of confidence and reflection to constitutional reasoning and maintains that the moral inquiry of the constitutional court ought to depart from the emotive intuitions of the constitutional community and then challenge these intuitions through reflective exposure to different perspectives in order to better understand and develop the underlying constitutional identity. The book casts new light on common constitutional dilemmas and allows us to envisage new ways of resolving them.

Analysis of case law from the US, Germany, South Africa, Canada, Israel, and the ECtHR forms the basis of Tripkovic's exploration of constitutional adjudication from an antirealist standpoint. This highly original work identifies the salient value-based arguments in constitutional practice and exposes the implicit assumptions that lie therein.

The thesis explores the metaethical foundations of value-based arguments in constitutional adjudication. The main argument develops in four steps. First, the thesis identifies three dominant types of value-based arguments in comparative constitutional practice: the argument from constitutional identity, the argument from common sentiments, and the argument from universal reason. Second, it brings to the fore the assumptions about the nature of moral value implicit in these arguments and subjects them to a critique. The thesis maintains that these arguments presuppose inadequate conceptions of value and fail as self-standing approaches to moral judgment. Third, the thesis develops an account of moral value and explains its practical consequences. It argues that a credible understanding of value suggests that the appropriate moral judgment emerges from the dynamics between practical confidence, which denotes the inescapability of the self and of the contingent evaluative attitudes it entails, and reflection, which denotes the process of challenging and questioning these attitudes. Fourth, departing from this conception of value, the thesis reconstructs the existing value-based arguments of constitutional courts. It applies the ethics of confidence and reflection to constitutional reasoning and shows how the arguments from constitutional identity, common sentiments and universal reason can be combined to refashion the moral perspective of a constitutional court so that it coheres with a sound understanding of value. The thesis argues that the moral inquiry of the constitutional court ought to depart from the emotive intuitions of the constitutional community and then challenge these intuitions through reflective exposure to different perspectives in order to better understand and develop the underlying constitutional identity. The thesis contends that this model enables us to perceive some common constitutional dilemmas in new light and allows us to move forward in resolving them.

Ambitious legal thinkers have become mesmerized by moral philosophy, believing that great figures in the philosophical tradition hold the keys to understanding and improving law and justice and even to resolving the most contentious issues of constitutional law. They are wrong, contends Richard Posner in this book. Posner characterizes the current preoccupation with moral and constitutional theory as the latest form of legal mystification--an evasion of the real need of American law, which is for a greater understanding of the social, economic, and political facts out of which great legal controversies arise. In pursuit of that understanding, Posner advocates a rebuilding of the law on the pragmatic basis of open-minded and systematic empirical inquiry and the rejection of cant and nostalgia--the true professionalism foreseen by Oliver Wendell Holmes a century ago. A bracing book that pulls no punches and leaves no pieties unpunctured or sacred cows unkicked, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory offers a sweeping tour of the current scene in legal studies--and a hopeful prospect for its future.

Judges and lawyers have to shape their moral competences in order to maintain their professional ethics at a high standard if they want to effectively meet the challenges that modern society will throw at them. This requirement is due to the growing expectation that they will be socially and morally responsible for the law. Thus, the need to place ethics at the heart of legal education, and to make ethical reflection pervasive in academic courses, becomes more obvious every day. Using the concept and examples of moral dilemmas is a way of facilitating this task. The main purpose of this book is to analyse the concept of moral dilemma in context of judicial and legal ethics, and to provide material for legal education. The structure of this book is designed with this double aim in mind. The theoretical part presents the concept of dilemmas on grounds of metaethics and the perspectives for its application in a professional legal context. The former encompasses situations of conflict of duties or obligations, in which the choice of one conduct necessarily prevents a different conduct, and therefore leads to an unacceptable outcome. Hence, the situation of dilemma always involves an issue of moral responsibility and the problem of “dirty hands”. How such situations are present in legal practice and how to deal with them is the main concern of this part. The considerations are divided into three levels of reflection – deontological, axiological, and moral responsibility. The practical part of the book contains an overview of 150 dilemmas that can be useful in legal ethics or other legal courses. The dilemmas are divided into chapters covering the following branches of law: criminal law, civil and commercial law, family and custody law, labour and social security law, and constitutional law. Every dilemma presents a description of the facts, a reconstruction of dilemma, its standard solution and some critical remarks from a meta-ethical perspective. The dilemmas cover situations regularly met in everyday practice, as well as examples of more exceptional challenges in connection with constitutional crises that have occurred in Poland in recent years.

We live in a pluralist world of multi-level law and governance. More than ever before multiple legal systems and governing authorities at different levels - sub-state, state, supranational, international - are recognized as applying to, and claiming authority over, the affairs of the same sets of individuals and institutions. Yet our constitutional theories fail to adequately capture this pluralist state of affairs. This book examines some of the key conceptual and theoretical puzzles which the contemporary state of multilevel pluralism poses for our constitutional theories. It offers fresh perspectives on these questions by addressing the pluralism of norms and authorities from the viewpoint of legality and legitimacy respectively, proposing novel solutions for pluralizing constitutional theory in the light of contemporary multilevel governance. Our turbulent times are on a steady trajectory of ever-more pluralism of law and governance to tackle the defining social and political problems of our age including populism, pandemic, and climate change and this book provides an essential intervention in debates on how to pluralize constitutional theory to better understand and, perhaps more importantly, legitimize the tools to address these increasingly shared problems.

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

Can a constitutional democracy commit suicide? Can an illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through democratic elections and amend liberalism and democracy out of the constitution entirely? In Weimar Germany, these theoretical questions were both practically and existentially relevant. By 1932, the Nazi and Communist parties combined held a majority of seats in parliament. Neither accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Their only reason for participating democratically was to amend the constitution out of existence. This book analyses Carl Schmitt's state and constitutional theory and shows how it was conceived in response to the Weimar crisis. Right-wing and left-wing political extremists recognized that a path to legal revolution lay in the Weimar constitution's combination of democratic procedures, total neutrality toward political goals, and positive law. Schmitt's writings sought to address the unique problems posed by mass democracy. Schmitt's thought anticipated 'constrained' or 'militant' democracy, a type of constitution that guards against subversive expressions of popular sovereignty and whose mechanisms include the entrenchment of basic constitutional commitments and party bans. Schmitt's state and constitutional theory remains important: the problems he identified continue to exist within liberal democratic states. Schmitt offers democrats today a novel way to understand the legitimacy of liberal democracy and the limits of constitutional change.

The powerful private sectors of the world economy remain largely unconstrained by fundamental constitutional rules, leading to human rights abuses on a massive scale. This book examines how the values of constitutional governance can be applied to the private sphere in the modern world, through a network of constitutional fragments.

When we think of constitutional law, we invariably think of the United States Supreme Court and the federal court system. Yet much of our constitutional law is not made at the federal level. In 51 Imperfect Solutions, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton argues that American Constitutional Law should account for the role of the state courts and state constitutions, together with the federal courts and the federal constitution, in protecting individual liberties. The book tells four stories that arise in four different areas of constitutional law: equal protection; criminal procedure; privacy; and free speech and free exercise of religion. Traditional accounts of these bedrock debates about the relationship of the individual to the state focus on decisions of the United States Supreme Court. But these explanations tell just part of the story. The book corrects this omission by looking at each issue-and some others as well-through the lens of many constitutions, not one constitution; of many courts, not one court; and of all American judges, not federal or state judges. Taken together, the stories reveal a remarkably complex, nuanced, ever-changing federalist system, one that ought to make lawyers and litigants pause before reflexively assuming that the United States Supreme Court alone has all of the answers to the most vexing constitutional questions. If there is a central conviction of the book, it's that an underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and federal courts in protecting individual liberty. In trying to correct this imbalance, the book also offers several ideas for reform.