The Mayaguez Incident

"This investigation focuses largely on the decisions made during the four days of the Mayaguez crisis and the results of those decisions at all strategic, operational, and tactical levels -- from the National Security Council (NSC) down to the on-scene commanders of the airmen, sailors, soldiers, and marines, and also the captain of the Mayaguez. The book recounts the situational context and the diplomatic and military action, and analyzes the objectives, events, and outcomes of this brief but intense U.S. crisis. This volume also analyzes and evaluates the operational structure of the forces that implemented the decisions of the U.S. leadership and the intelligence community's performance during the crisis. Finally the book reinforces the position that this seemingly small event had significant consequences"--Introduction.

Examines the final military contest of the Vietnam War, relating the hijacking of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez, the deadly marine raid on a remote Cambodian island to free the ship and its crew, and the fate of three marines left behind after the battle.

The final battle of the Vietnam War left three forgotten marines on a Cambodian beach, a fact the Pentagon didn't admit for 20 years. The Last Battle recounts their story.

Preface -- Abbreviations -- Key figures in the Mayaguez Crisis -- Introduction -- Day one: Monday, May 12 -- Day two: Tuesday, May 13 -- Day three: Wednesday, May 14 -- Day four: Thursday, May 15 -- Critical crisis decisions -- Explaining decisions, behaviors and outcomes -- Refining the explanation: rationality, bureaucracy and beliefs -- Findings, issues, prescriptions -- Conclusion.

On May 12, 1975, less than two weeks after the fall of Saigon, Khmer Rouge naval forces seized the S.S. Mayaguez, an American container ship, off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Siam. The swift military response ordered by President Gerald Ford was designed to recapture the Mayaguez, held at anchor off the island of Koh Tang, to liberate her crew, and to demonstrate U.S. strength and resolve in the immediate aftermath of America's most humiliating defeat. Guilmartin, a former air rescue helicopter pilot stationed in Thailand, provides a unique and compelling account of the Mayaguez–Koh Tang crisis, shedding new light on the politics, the tactics, the orders, the high-level decision makers, and the fighting men entangled in a crucial military action that nearly ended in disaster for U.S. forces. ". . . a brilliant and exceptionally clear tactical study that offers a point of departure for broader reflections on the nature of contingency and uncertainty in all military operations."--Foreign Affairs "This is an exceptional book. . . [Guilmartin's] work transcends the events themselves, illustrating numerous aspects of men in war. His insights and observations are compelling."--Journal of Military History ". . . written with the flair and excitement of an adventure novel. Even those who know the outcome and the lessons of the Mayaguez incident will find this book hard to put down until finished."--Proceedings

Just two weeks after the close of the Vietnam War, communist Cambodian Khmer Rouge elements seized the S.S. Mayaguez in international waters. Believing they had to act quickly, United States Marines boarded the ship, only to find the crew had been removed. They then launched an assault on a nearby island where they believed the crew had been taken. Instead of a quick strike against a limited foe, the Marines encountered major opposition and were quickly pinned down. With large numbers of Cambodians closing in all around, the a desperate firefight developed as US forces tried to extract the Marines. This book recounts the bloody struggle on Koh Tang island, as a badly botched hostage rescue turned into a desperate evacuation.

In the nuclear era, the use of even low levels of force risks catastrophe for all mankind. Yet military force remains an important element of political strategy, and control and coordination of its use with other instruments of national power is of vital importance. The authors of this book, examining two crises that occurred during the Ford admini

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality. To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.