The Juridical Review

Covers general areas of Scottish law including criminal, commercial, contract, delict, environmental, family, administrative, and socio-legal issues. Also includes some articles on comparative law, plus book reviews and case notes.

Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective was the first book of its kind that gave a detailed commentary on the subject of Judicial review in New Zealand. The book is a treatise on the subject and well regarded in the Practitioner and Academic markets. It consists of four parts: The Basic Structure of Judicial Review, The Process of Judicial Review, Procedure and Evidence, and Ground of Judicial Review.

In this book, the author presents a new interpretation of the origin of judicial review. She traces the development of judicial review from American independence through the tenure of John Marshall as Chief Justice, showing that Marshall's role was far more innovative and decisive than has yet been recognized. According to the author all support for judicial review before Marshall contemplated a fundamentally different practice from that which we know today. Marshall did not simply reinforce or extend ideas already accepted but, in superficially minor and disguised ways, effected a radical transformation in the nature of the constitution and the judicial relationship to it.

Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system.

From two legal luminaries, a highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? Intolerable? American public law has long been riven by a persistent, serious conflict, a kind of low-grade cold war, over these questions. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed, as long as public officials are constrained by what they call the morality of administrative law. Law and Leviathan elaborates a number of principles that underlie this moral regime. Officials who respect that morality never fail to make rules in the first place. They ensure transparency, so that people are made aware of the rules with which they must comply. They never abuse retroactivity, so that people can rely on current rules, which are not under constant threat of change. They make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing rules that contradict each other. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, without explicit enunciation, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. But we can aspire for better. In more robust form, these principles could address many of the concerns that have critics of the administrative state mourning what they see as the demise of the rule of law. The bureaucratic Leviathan may be an inescapable reality of complex modern democracies, but Sunstein and Vermeule show how we can at last make peace between those who accept its necessity and those who yearn for its downfall.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.

This sophisticated but easy to understand exposition of the standards of review offers an invaluable resource for law students, law clerks, and practitioners. Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals invariably are shaped by the applicable standards of review. Filling a huge gap in the literature, Standards of Review masterfully explains the standards controlling appellate review of district court decisions and agency actions. Leading academics have described the text as a superb treatment, clear and comprehensive, of a crucial aspect of every appellate case, that makes accessible even the most complex doctrines of review.

This book analyses how the system of immigration judicial reviews works in practice, as an area which has, for decades, constituted the majority of judicial review cases and is politically controversial. Drawing upon extensive empirical research and unprecedented research access, it explores who brings judicial review challenges against immigration decisions and why, the type of immigration decisions that are challenged, how cases proceed through the judicial review process, how cases are settled out of court, and how judicial review interacts with other legal and non-legal remedies. It also examines the quality of immigration judicial review claims and the quality of the initial administrative decisions being challenged. Through developing a novel account of the operation of the immigration judicial review system in practice and the lived experience of it by judges, representatives, and claimants, this book adds a significant new perspective to the wider understanding of judicial review.

Who controls how one’s identity is used by others? This legal question, centuries old, demands greater scrutiny in the Internet age. Jennifer Rothman uses the right of publicity—a little-known law, often wielded by celebrities—to answer that question, not just for the famous but for everyone. In challenging the conventional story of the right of publicity’s emergence, development, and justifications, Rothman shows how it transformed people into intellectual property, leading to a bizarre world in which you can lose ownership of your own identity. This shift and the right’s subsequent expansion undermine individual liberty and privacy, restrict free speech, and suppress artistic works. The Right of Publicity traces the right’s origins back to the emergence of the right of privacy in the late 1800s. The central impetus for the adoption of privacy laws was to protect people from “wrongful publicity.” This privacy-based protection was not limited to anonymous private citizens but applied to famous actors, athletes, and politicians. Beginning in the 1950s, the right transformed into a fully transferable intellectual property right, generating a host of legal disputes, from control of dead celebrities like Prince, to the use of student athletes’ images by the NCAA, to lawsuits by users of Facebook and victims of revenge porn. The right of publicity has lost its way. Rothman proposes returning the right to its origins and in the process reclaiming privacy for a public world.

This major history of judicial review, revised to include the Rehnquist court, shows how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights with fateful political consequences." Originally published by Basic Books.