The Iranian Crisis And The Birth Of The Cold War

This work examines the Iranian Crisis of 1946 and its active role in shaping the Cold War that followed. It is intended to serve as a case study of how the United States was able to successfully flex its short-lived atomic monopoly and achieve its international objectives in the early postwar era. This writing engages with the robust academic field of U.S. foreign relations that over the past number of years revisited and reimagined the origins and driving forces of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s violation of a troop withdrawal agreement at the conclusion of the Second World War, coupled with its active support of Kurdish and Azeri separatist movements, aggressively tested the new and evolving international order. The primary objective of this work is to understand how the international community achieved a relatively peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iranian territory. I contend that: 1) Iran possessed, due to its wartime role and latent economic potential, a degree of leverage in negotiations with the United States and Russia that other nations did not; 2) that the Iranian prime minister, Ahmad Qavām, shrewdly manipulated both superpowers with his own brand of masterful statecraft while pursuing his own “Iran-centric” objectives; 3) that the United States used its preponderance of military, economic, and diplomatic might to effectively achieve its postwar aims; and 4) the primary actors in the crisis solidified the legitimacy of the United Nations and its Security Council, which had previously been in jeopardy. While lesser known than the Berlin Airlift or the Korean War or the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iranian Crisis revealed for the first time what a superpower clash might look like. This event provides a stunning example of crisis management by the primary participants. The Iranian Crisis was indeed the birth of the Cold War, and it established a model for state actions during and after this long conflict. The Crisis also provides a powerful example of how third-party entities outside of Europe, despite possessing relatively meager military and economic might, had the ability to alter and occasionally manipulate superpower behavior.

The Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 represented a landmark in the early stages of the Cold War and played a major role in shaping the future course of Iran's political development. In this book, originally published in 1992, Louise Fawcett presents a comprehensive study of the five-year struggle for control of Iran which culminated in the crisis of 1946. Dr Fawcett examines both the Iranian domestic scene and the role played by the three great powers. She explores the causes, course and consequences of the Azerbaijan crisis from an Iranian perspective. Dr Fawcett then argues that the Iranian crisis was a far more complex affair than was once realised. It brought into play the competitive and often conflicting relationship between not only the United States and the former Soviet Union, but also between Britain and these two superpowers. This study is firmly located within the extensive international relations literature of the Cold War. Iran and the Cold War is an ideal text for students and specialists of both international relations and Middle East studies.

For half a century, the United States and the Soviet Union were in conflict. But how and where did the Cold War begin? Jamil Hasanli answers these intriguing questions in At the Dawn of the Cold War. He argues that the intergenerational crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan (1945–1946) was the first event that brought the Soviet Union to a confrontation with the United States and Britain after the period of cooperation between them during World War II. Based on top-secret archive materials from Soviet and Azerbaijani archives as well as documents from American, British, and Iranian sources, the book details Iranian Azerbaijan's independence movement, which was backed by the USSR, the Soviet struggle for oil in Iran, and the American and British reactions to these events. These events were the starting point of the longer historical period of unarmed conflict between the Soviets and the West that is now known as the Cold War. This book is a major contribution to our understanding of the Cold War and international politics following WWII.

Richard Cottam served in the U.S. embassy in Tehran from 1956 to 1958 and was consulted by the Department of State during the 1979 hostage crisis. This book draws upon his expert personal knowledge of Iranian politics to describe the spiraling decline of U.S.-Iranian relations since the cold war and the political consequences of those years U.S. policy, he argues, is flawed by ignorance, inertia, the tenacity of a cold war mentality, a quixotic tilt toward Iraq, and the blatant inconsistency of the Reagan administration's arms-for-hostages scheme that produced the Iran-contra scandal.

This book is a study of the origins, development, and end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry in Iran from 1945 to 1962 and its influence on the political and economic development of the country. It traces the roots of this rivalry to the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941 during the Second World War that subsequently led to U.S. involvement in Iran in 1942 as part of the Allied war effort. While analyzing the superpower rivalry, the book also focuses on the development of U.S.-Iranian relations and U.S. policy toward Iran, whose primary goal was to keep Iran free from communism. The book traces the development of U.S.-Iranian relations and U.S. policy toward Iran through the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations and examines whether there were any elements of continuity among the three administrations in keeping Iran free from communism. The book also provides an in-depth analysis of the response of the Shah and the Iranian government to foreign-power rivalry in Iran.

This book provides a fresh perspective on the origins of the confrontation between the US and Iran. It demonstrates that, contrary to the claims of Iran's leaders, there was no instinctive American hostility towards the Revolution, and explains why many assumptions guiding US policy were inappropriate for dealing with the new reality in Iran.

This fascinating work is a series of explorations of key events in the adminstrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, each of which speculates on what might have happened if events had unfolded differently. The Reagan Era explores a time that saw the rise of the political conservatism that has dominated U.S. politics in recent years, as well as the end of the Cold War, which drove American foreign policy for nearly a half century. What if Jimmy Carter had successfully navigated the energy shortage and the Iranian hostage crisis? What if the assassination attempt on Reagan had succeed? What if Iran–Contra had not become a scandal? These are among the specific topics examined in the book, which looks at 11 crucial events and speculates on the effects of alternative outcomes. By showing how easily the world might be different, The Reagan Era reveals the lasting impact of that era's defining moments.

Published in 1999. These essays are not deconstructive in the postmodern sense. None of the authors have that depth of scepticism about knowledge claims, but they are all concerned that the terms of reference of Cold War enquiry have been inappropriately bounded. The chapters by Murray and Reynolds specifically address the broad theoretical issues involved with paradigms and explanation. The chapters by Dobson, Marsh, Malik, Evans and Dix stretch out Cold War paradigms with successive case studies of Anglo-American relations; the USA, Britain, Iran and the oil majors; the Gulf States and the Cold War; South Africa and the Cold War; and Indian neutralism. All five authors challenge the efficacy of neo-realist analysis and explanation and critique the way that assumptions derived from that position have been used in historical explanation. The chapters by Ryall, Rogers and Bideleux deal with Roman Catholicism in East Central Europe, with nuclear matters and with the Soviet perspective. Each work goes beyond the limits of Cold War paradigms. Finally, Ponting places the Cold War in the broad context of world history. These essays provide thought-provoking scholarship which helps us both to nuance our understanding of the Cold War and to realise that it should not be taken as an all-embracing paradigm for the explanation of postwar international relations.