The Gulf States And Israeli Palestinian Conflict Resolution

The changing regional geopolitics of the Middle East have created new opportunities for the Gulf states to engage in Arab-Israeli conflict resolution after the Arab Spring. This policy report examines the potential role that the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), might play in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. It presents policy recommendations on how the Gulf states can engage with regional and international partners and build upon the greater space for action as the shifting parameters of Middle East politics create new regional pathways for action and cooperation.

This final book from Rosemarie Said Zahlan, renowned scholar of Middle East Politics and History, explores the relationships between Palestine and the Gulf since the 1930s. She demonstrates how the regional Gulf politics will long continue to be impacted by the abiding non-resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Why does Hamas refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel? What makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so intractable? Reflecting both Israeli and Palestinian points of view, this volume addresses the two powerful, bitterly contested, competing historical narratives that underpin the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This book explores efforts being made to create Russian-American cooperation in managing recurrent conflict in the Middle East. Theoretical, historical, and policy sections provide the framework for chapters that represent the most current, multinational thinking on issues of war prevention, crisis avoidance, and conflict resolution. The contributors--including scholars from the United States, Russia, Israel, and Arab states--examine the specific aspects of such crisis experiences as the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 October War. The history of the Palestinian question is reviewed and the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli triangle of tension is evaluated, with a focus on the impact of the crisis in the Gulf. Finally, the authors turn to policy implications and prospects for Russian-American cooperation in the Middle East in the future. They discuss the practical steps that must be taken to achieve lasting peace in the region, particularly in the area of arms control, and look at the effects that changing international great power policies will have on stability in the Middle East.

This book represents an overview of the policies of Russia, France, Germany, the United States and Britain vis-à-vis the Gulf states. Specialists in the field of international politics explore the involvement of these five influential powers throughout the region. They consider the various interests of these states in security, energy, social development, commerce and trade, as well as in the war against international terrorism.

From the outset of his presidency, Donald Trump sought to narrow differences between Israel and the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-as part of his strategy to isolate Iran.With that objective in mind, Trump's first visit abroad as president was to Riyadh in May 2017-where he addressed the U.S.-Arab-Islamic Summit-immediately followed by a visit to Israel.The President's message was clear: Saudi Arabia and Israel would serve as co-pillars of the U.S. security architecture for the broader Middle East. Under that vision, Egypt, Jordan and the six Gulf monarchies-together with Israel-would isolate Iran diplomatically. The second plank of this strategy was anchored in the so-called "Maximum Pressure" campaign, which sought for all practical purposes to expedite the collapse of Iran's economy as part of an effort to strengthen Washington's standing vis-à-vis Tehran. The third plank focused on solving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. These dynamics, the Trump-administration reasoned, would help set the stage for the renegotiation of the Iran agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.Trump's vision, however, faced immediate resistance-not from Iran or its regional proxies, but rather from some of Washington's very own Gulf partners when they imposed a blockade on Qatar only weeks after his Riyadh address. While the crisis between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt over Qatar was initially understood in Washington as an inter-Arab dispute, Sigurd Neubauer examines the overlooked and widely misunderstood Israeli and Omani roles in this feud.The Gulf crisis, Neubauer goes on to argue, has shattered a widely held preconception, namely that Israel and the Gulf states are drawing closer because of their shared animosity towards Iran and its regional agenda. While the Gulf states and Israel are indeed drawing closer, it is not primarily driven by fear of Iran but rather by inter-GCC rivalry, including in Washington, where an inexperienced administration had to dedicate significant political capital to solve the Gulf crisis.

The human rights records of more than ninety countries and territories are put into perspective in Human Rights Watch's signature yearly report. Reflecting extensive investigative work undertaken in 2016 by Human Rights Watch staff, in close partnership with domestic human rights activists, the annual World Report is an invaluable resource for journalists, diplomats, and citizens, and is a must-read for anyone interested in the fight to protect human rights in every corner of the globe.

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.

Collection of papers and keynote presentations that were delivered at a conference called "Pathways to Peace," which was held in March of 2008.