The Global Financial Crisis Its Distant Origins

Commentary on the financial crisis has offered technical analysis, political finger pointing, and myriad economic and political solutions. But rarely do these investigations reach beyond the economic and political causes of the crisis to explore their underlying intellectual grounds. The essays in this volume delve deeper into the cultural and intellectual foundations, philosophical ideas, political traditions, and economic movements that underlie the greatest financial crisis in nearly a century. Moving beyond traditional economic and political science approaches, these essays engage thinkers from Hannah Arendt to Max Weber and Adam Smith to Michel Foucault. With Arendt as a catalyst, the authors probe the philosophical as well as the cultural origins of the great recession. Orienting the volume is Arendt’s argument that past financial crises and also totalitarianism are rooted, at least in part, in the tendency for capital to expand its reach globally without regard to political and moral borders or limits. That politics is made subservient to economics names a cultural transformation that, in the spirit of Arendt, guides these essays in making sense of our present world. Including articles, interviews, and commentary from leading scholars and business executives, this volume offers views that are as diverse as they are timely. By reaching beyond “how” the crisis happened to “why” the crisis happened, the authors re-imagine the recent financial crisis and thus provide fresh thinking about how to respond.

As major financial centres are on high alert for the imminent collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, a young couple in New York is swept into an ancient financial plot. Around the world, strange and seemingly unrelated events – a murder in Venice, a plane crash in the South China Sea, a fatal accident in Sao Paulo – coincide with politicians and central bankers receiving secret messages. The powerful shadowy organization behind centuries of financial crises springs into action once again.

The 2008 financial crisis poses three fundamental questions for economists and policy makers; understanding the origins of the crisis, understanding the consequences of this crisis for the world economy, and finally understanding why the 2008 financial crisis is not as serious as the 1929 crisis. The prevailing view is that the 2008 financial crisis was solely the result of inadequate financial regulation together with a very loose monetary policy conducted by central banks, especially the Fed. It is believed that this crisis is a temporary detour in the normal course of the events, so that in the near future capitalist economies will resume the high growth path observed before the crisis. In terms of the third question, there is a widespread view that the fundamental reason that explains the avoidance of the harmful experiences of 1929 was the fiscal and monetary policy expansions in developed countries. No important role is assigned to developing countries in terms of the effects of the financial crisis. This book challenges the prevailing orthodoxy surrounding the origins and the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis. The book demonstrates that measures in addition to a profound change in the financial regulation are required if a new financial crisis is to be avoided in the future, measures include: a change in the conduct of economic policy; a reform of the national and international monetary systems; and a radical change in the pattern of income distribution. This book is essential reading for all interested in macroeconomics, monetary policy, development economics and the global impact of the financial crisis.

By reaching beyond "how" the crisis happened to "why" the crisis happened, the authors provide fresh thinking about how to respond

For the past two centuries, the great power sitting atop the international global financial system has enjoyed outsized rewards. As the saying goes, however, all good things come to an end. Providing insights into the evolution of the global political economy, From Malaise to Meltdown identifies the main instigators behind the global financial crises we’ve seen in the last two hundred years. Michael Lee shows that, in time, power diffuses from the leading economy to others, creating an intensely competitive push for global financial leadership. Hungry for the benefits of global leadership, declining leaders and aspiring challengers alike roll back long-standing regulatory safeguards in an effort to spark growth. Risks to global financial stability mount as a result of this rollback and waves of severe financial crises soon follow. As Lee deftly shows, the Long Depression of 1873–1896, the Great Depression of 1929–1939, and the financial crisis of 2008 are part of the same recurrent pattern: global competition disrupts the longstanding political equilibria, prompting a search for new, risky ideas among the most powerful states. From Malaise to Meltdown presents a sweeping but accessible historical narrative about the coevolution of power, ideas, and domestic politics, supported by archival research into the risky decisions that ushered in the worst financial crises in history.

"A co-publication with the Social Science Research Council."

In The Financial Crisis Reconsidered, Aronoff challenges the conventional view that reckless credit produced the US housing boom and the financial crisis, explaining how the large current account deficit, and its mercantilist origin, was a more fundamental cause. He also demonstrates that the decision to provide relief for bank creditors rather than underwater homeowners was responsible for the prolonged recession that followed the crisis. Aronoff proposes a novel theory to account for the ultimate origins of secular stagnation and economic volatility. He shows how accumulation, which occurs when a person or country earns more than it ever plans to spend, generates both an excess of saving and a deficiency in demand. While savings provide the funds to promote booms, under-consumption ensures that these booms will turn bust and that the economy will fall short of its potential growth rate. Aronoff argues that mercantilists and top income earners engage in accumulation, and that the influence of both types has grown in recent decades. Combining economic theory and historical narrative, this book offers a new perspective of the housing boom and the financial crisis, concluding with innovative policy proposals to reduce accumulation without compromising the benefits of a market economy.