The Future Of The Non Proliferation Treaty

In 1995 a Conference is to be convened to review and extend the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Future of the NPT brings together a distinguished group of individuals, including the elected President of the 1995 NPT Conference, to analyse four crucial agenda areas relevant to the Conference: the preConference activities to be undertaken by both States Parties and the Conference Secretariat; those security issues that relate to a review of the treaty, such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances; peaceful uses and verification questions; and regional issues. With nuclear nonproliferation currently occupying a prominent position on the international security agenda, the 1995 Conference offers a unique opportunity for a constructive discussion on these areas and it is hoped that this volume will provide a contribution to that end.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is the cornerstone of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Yet its negotiation and success were not inevitable. This book aims to address the developments that led to the negotiation of the treaty, examine its implementation, and address challenges that the NPT faces going forward.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Despite their Cold War rivalry, the United States and the Soviet Union frequently engaged in joint efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders in Washington and Moscow recognized that nuclear proliferation would serve neither country’s interests even when they did not see eye-to-eye in many other areas. They likewise understood why collaboration in mitigating this nuclear danger would serve both their own interests and those of the international community. This volume examines seven little known examples of US-Soviet cooperation for non-proliferation, including preventing South Africa from conducting a nuclear test, developing international safeguards and export control guidelines, and negotiating a draft convention banning radiological weapons. It uses declassified and recently-digitized archival material to explore in-depth the motivations for and modalities for cooperation under often adverse political circumstances. Given the current disintegration of Russian and US relations, including in the nuclear sphere, this history is especially worthy of review. Accordingly, the volume’s final chapter is devoted to discussing how non-proliferation lessons from the past can be applied today in areas most in need of US-Russian cooperation.

The author presided over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in 1995, which decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The conference also reviewed the performance of the treaty over the 1990-1995 period. This book is an analytical record of a major multilateral conference, involving 175 countries, that succeeded in adopting final decisions without a vote. With the 2005 review taking place in May 2005, amid major concerns over non-adherence to the treaty and non-disclosure by several states, this is a relevant dissection of elements that can lead to successful outcomes in such multilateral conferences.

The 1995 conference on the review and extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may well mark an important turning point. The treaty itself, but also the wider international regime built around it are at stake. The Future of the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime deals with various aspects of the problems of nuclear proliferation and the international struggle against it. Authors from Europe, the United States and Australia have contributed to this book, which was produced under the auspices of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations `Clingendael'. The reader is first offered regional case studies on North Korea, South Asia, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, followed by chapters on nuclear safeguards and export controls systems and contributions on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and security guarantees. The two concluding chapters evaluate and propose policies to strengthen the non-proliferation regime beyond 1995. It will be of interest to policy-makers, students of international relations and journalists.

What were the calculations made by the US and its major allies in the 1960s when they faced the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? These were all states with the technological and financial capabilities to develop and possess nuclear weapons should they wish to do so. In the end, only the United Kingdom and France became nuclear weapon states. Eventually, all of them joined the non-proliferation regime. Leading American, British, Canadian, French, German and Japanese scholars consider key questions that faced the signatories to the NPT: How imperative was nuclear deterrence in facing the perceived threat to their country? How reliable did they think the US extended deterrence was, and how costly would an independent deterrent be both financially and politically? Was there a regional option? How much future was there in the civilian nuclear energy sector for their country and what role would the NPT play in this area? What capabilities needed to be preserved for the country’s future and how could this be made compatible with the NPT? What were the determining factors of deciding whether to join the NPT?

There is almost universal support for the view that the world would be an even more dangerous place if there were to be more nuclear-weapon states. There would be more fingers on more triggers and, probably, a greater risk that a trigger might be pulled with incalculable consequences. It is easy to see, therefore, that there is a collective interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. Nations do not, however, normally undertake or refrain from actions because of such a collective interest; they do so because of their individual interests. This is especially true in the field of national security. A nation perceiving that it has a real interest in developing nuclear weapons is not very likely to refrain from doing so merely because it is told such development would be bad for the world community. If the global interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to more coun tries is to succeed, conditions that make it in the interest of each individual nation to renounce nuclear weapons need to be created or maintained. Fortunately, conditions have prevailed in which the vast majority of nations have seen an advantage in making legally binding nonproliferation commitments. An important rationale for many of these countries has been that these commitments would facilitate the transfer of desired civil nuclear technology.