The Future Of Nato Expansion

In 1999 three East-Central European states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) gained membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Professor Barany argues that, once it began, the Alliance should continue the enlargement process. Nevertheless he maintains that only states that satisfy NATO's membership criteria should be allowed to join. Through an extensive analysis of four countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who, at the time of the book's original publication in 2003 were NATO aspirants, Barany demonstrates that they were in several important respects unprepared for membership and that there was no pressing reason for NATO's haste. Barany argues that while NATO should be clear that its doors remain open to qualified candidates, the Alliance should hold off further expansion until prospective members will become assets rather than liabilities.

Fourteen contributions address the theoretical and pragmatic issues behind the issue of enlarging NATO's membership, examining the policies of some of NATO's leading member states and addressing the issue from the point of view of Russia and the Central and Eastern European candidates. Marred by a lack of index. Canadian LC C99- 900354-2. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Future NATO looks at the challenges facing NATO in the 21st century and examines how the Alliance can adapt to ensure its continued success For more than 70 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has helped to preserve peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It has been able to adjust to varying political and strategic challenges. We must ensure that NATO continues to be effective in the future. This requires looking ahead, challenging habitual approaches, exchanging ideas, and advancing new thinking. I highly recommend Future NATO to policymakers, military professionals and scholars alike, as it offers necessary critical and constructive analysis of current and future challenges posed to our security and defence.Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Minister of Defence, Germany Since 1949, NATO has successfully upheld common principles and adapted to new realities. As Future NATO examines, the Alliance is facing a new set of external and internal challenges in the decades to come. The Alliance and its partners need to remain committed to future changes. I recommend this excellent study to all, but especially to the younger generation of scholars and future policymakers. Trine Bramsen, Minister of Defence, Denmark Over the last 70 years, Europe has lived in peace and prosperity because of NATO, with unity as our most important weapon. We may have our differences, but we will continue to work on our common cause to promote peace, security and stability. To effectively do so, NATO needs to continuously adapt to changing security situations. An important current challenge is to ensure European Allies take more responsibility for their security. But we also need to look at future challenges and find innovative solutions for them. Future NATO offers a useful analysis that can help us prepare for what is to come for the Alliance. Ank Bijleveld, Minister of Defence, The Netherlands

In 1999 three East-Central European states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) gained membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Professor Barany argues that, once it began, the Alliance should continue the enlargement process. Nevertheless he maintains that only states that satisfy NATO's membership criteria should be allowed to join. Through an extensive analysis of four countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who, at the time of the book's original publication in 2003 were NATO aspirants, Barany demonstrates that they were in several important respects unprepared for membership and that there was no pressing reason for NATO's haste. Barany argues that while NATO should be clear that its doors remain open to qualified candidates, the Alliance should hold off further expansion until prospective members will become assets rather than liabilities.

The Kremlin has sought to establish an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in the nations lying between Russia and the EU, from Georgia in 2008 to Ukraine in 2014 and Belarus in 2020. It has extended its control by means of military intervention, territorial annexation, economic pressure and covert activities. Moscow seeks to justify this behavior by referring to an alleged threat from NATO and the Alliance’s eastward enlargement. In the rhetoric of the Kremlin, NATO expansion is the main source for Moscow’s stand-off with the West. This collection of essays and analyses by prominent politicians, diplomats, and scholars from the US, Russia, and Europe provides personal perspectives on the sources of the Russian-Western estrangement. They draw on historical experience, including the Russian-Western controversies that intensified with NATO's eastward expansion in the 1990s, and reflect on possible perspectives of reconcilitation within the renewed transatlantic relationship. The volume touches upon alleged and real security guarantees for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as well as past and current deficits in the Western strategy for dealing with an increasingly hostile Russia. Thus, it contributes to the ongoing Western debate on which policies towards Russia can help to overcome the deep current divisions and to best meet Europe’s future challenges.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.

Past NATO enlargement helped create a Europe whole, free, and at peace, but future enlargement, should it occur, faces a hostile and militarily revitalized Russia. This report examines the military requirements and resulting budget costs of extending NATO’s Article 5 commitment to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are actively seeking NATO membership, and Sweden and Finland, about which there has been analysis and speculation about membership. Costs to the United States range from $11 billion per year to defend Ukraine to half a billion dollars or less to defend Sweden. The project recommends that NATO incorporate force requirements and cost considerations into its future decisionmaking.

This work evaluates the pros and cons of NATO enlargement. It explains why NATO offered membership to three of its Cold War adversaries and makes recommendations about which countries, if any, should be offered membership in the future.

The central aims of the book is to present, in the form of a collection of papers, a variety of views on NATO from member states “formerly known as new”, and to assess in this context the prospects for NATO enlargement. Therefore, the book consists of two parts. The main objective of the first part is to present how NATO is now perceived in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Papers collected here offer an opportunity to reflect on the impact of the enlargements starting from 1999 on NATO functioning and evolution, roles, tasks and capabilities. The issue of how accession has transformed accessioning states will also be discussed. Last but not least, the perspective of “new” members on NATO’s future will be presented. The authors of the articles in this part mainly come from those countries that joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War. The second part is devoted strictly to the topic of enlargement. In this part we asked experts from NATO members (both “old” and “new”), potential candidates and other NATO partners (including Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Sweden, Finland etc.) how they view the future of NATO cooperation with external partners in Europe and the prospects for enlargement of the Alliance.