The Evolution Of Policy Experimentation In China

Most scholars credit policy experimentation with China's successful economic reforms and continued authoritarian resilience. This article contributes to this policy experimentation literature by providing a systematic overview of the motivations incentivizing Chinese policy entrepreneurs to experiment at local levels. This article traces the evolution of policy experimentation in China through the prism of understanding the varying motivations for experimentation, such as individual career incentives, improving good governance, and symbolic and factional politics. Despite the benefits of policy experimentation, there has been a notable reduction in experimentation in the Xi Jinping era due to the recentralization of political power through “top-level design” and an ongoing anti-corruption campaign. This has effectively created disincentives to innovate at the local level. Nevertheless, we do find remaining pockets of policy experimentation that we argue are due to ineffective institutional incentives, the influence of peer groups, and variations in the individual personalities of policymakers. However, it is unclear if the remaining experimentation is robust enough to assist in further economic reforms or adaptive governance.

Many governments have engaged in policy experimentation in various forms to resolve uncertainty and facilitate learning. However, little is understood about the characteristics of policy experimentation, and how the structure of experimentation may affect policy learning and policy outcomes. We aim to describe and understand China's policy experimentation since 1980, among the largest and most systematic in recent history. We collect comprehensive data on policy experimentation conducted in China over the past four decades. We find three main results. First, more than 80% of the experiments exhibit positive sample selection in terms of a locality's economic development, and much of this can be attributed to misaligned incentives across political hierarchies. Second, local politicians allocate more resources to ensure the experiments' success, and such effort is not replicable when policies roll out to the entire country. Third, the presence of sample selection and strategic effort is not fully accounted for by the central government, thus affecting policy learning and distorting national policies originating from the experimentation. Taken together, these results suggest that while China's bureaucratic and institutional conditions make policy experimentation at such scale possible, the complex political environments can also limit the scope and bias the direction of policy learning.

Many governments have engaged in policy experimentation in various forms to resolve uncertainty and facilitate learning. However, little is understood about the characteristics of policy experimentation, and how the structure of experimentation may affect policy learning and policy outcomes. We aim to describe and understand China's policy experimentation since 1980, among the largest and most systematic in recent history. We collect comprehensive data on policy experimentation conducted in China over the past four decades. We find three main results. First, more than 80% of the experiments exhibit positive sample selection in terms of a locality's economic development, and much of this can be attributed to misaligned incentives across political hierarchies. Second, local politicians allocate more resources to ensure the experiments' success, and such effort is not replicable when policies roll out to the entire country. Third, the presence of sample selection and strategic effort is not fully accounted for by the central government, thus affecting policy learning and distorting national policies originating from the experimentation. Taken together, these results suggest that while China's bureaucratic and institutional conditions make policy experimentation at such scale possible, the complex political environments can also limit the scope and bias the direction of policy learning.

This book introduces readers to the current social and economic state of China since its restructuring in 1949. Provides insights into the targeted institutional change that is occurring simultaneously across the entire country Presents context-rich accounts of how and why these changes connect to (if not contradict) regulatory logics established during the Mao-era A new analytical framework that explicitly considers the relationship between state rescaling, policy experimentation, and path dependency Prompts readers to think about how experimental initiatives reflect and contribute to the ‘national strategy’ of Chinese development An excellent extension of ongoing theoretical work examining the entwinement of subnational regulatory reconfiguration, place-specific policy experimentation, and the reproduction of national economic advantage

The resilience of the Communist party-state, in combination with a rapidly expanding economy, represents a significant deviant case for the debate about models of development. This book focuses on the manner in which China's governmental system can be developed, formulated, implemented, adjusted, and revised. Policy-making is seen as an open ended process with an uncertain outcome, driven by conflicting interests, recurrent interactions, and continuous feedback, rather than determined by history, regime type, or institutions. Key to this are the capacity to deal with both existing and emerging challenges, correction mechanisms when conflicts arise, and adaptive capabilities in a changing economic or international context.

This book introduces readers to the current social and economic state of China since its restructuring in 1949. Provides insights into the targeted institutional change that is occurring simultaneously across the entire country Presents context-rich accounts of how and why these changes connect to (if not contradict) regulatory logics established during the Mao-era A new analytical framework that explicitly considers the relationship between state rescaling, policy experimentation, and path dependency Prompts readers to think about how experimental initiatives reflect and contribute to the ‘national strategy’ of Chinese development An excellent extension of ongoing theoretical work examining the entwinement of subnational regulatory reconfiguration, place-specific policy experimentation, and the reproduction of national economic advantage

This book explores the institutional factors in social policymaking and implementation in China. From the performance evaluation system for local cadres to the intergovernmental fiscal system, local policy experimentation, logrolling among government departments, and the “top-level” design, there are a number of factors that make policy in China less than straightforward. The book argues that it is bureaucratic incentive structure lead to a fragmented and stratified welfare system in China. Using a variety of Chinese- and English-language sources, including central and local government documents, budgetary data, household surveys, media databases, etc., this book covers the development of China’s pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, and social assistance programs since the 1990s, with a focus on initiatives since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Providing a deeper understanding of policymaking and implementation in China, this book interests scholars of public administration, political economy, Asian politics, and social development.

Despite a centralized formal structure, Chinese politics and policy-making have long been marked by substantial degrees of regional and local variation and experimentation. These trends have, if anything, intensified as China’s reform matures. Though often remarked upon, the politicsof policy formation, diffusion, and implementation at the subnational level have not previously been comprehensively described, let alone satisfactorily explained. Based on extensive fieldwork, this book explores how policies diffuse across China today, the mechanisms through which local governments actually arrive at specific solutions, and the implications for China’s political development and stability in the years ahead. The chapters examine how local-level institutions solve governance challenges, such as rural development, enterprise reform, and social service provision. Focusing on diverse policy areas that include land use, state-owned enterprise reform, and house churches, the contributors all address the same overarching question: how do local policymakers innovate in each issue area to address a governance challenges and how, if at all, do these innovations diffuse into national politics. As a study of local governance in China today, this book will appeal to both students and scholars of Chinese politics, comparative politics, governance and development studies, and also to policy-makers interested in authoritarianism and governance.

All societies face a key question: how to empower governments to perform essential governmental functions while constraining the arbitrary exercise of power. This balance, always in flux, is particularly fluid in today's China. This insightful book examines the changing relationship between that state and its society, as demonstrated by numerous experiments in governance at subnational levels, and explores the implications for China's future political trajectory. Ann Florini, Hairong Lai, and Yeling Tan set their analysis at the level of townships and counties, investigating the striking diversity of China's exploration into different governance tools and comparing these experiments with developments and debates elsewhere in the world. China Experiments draws on multiple cases of innovation to show how local authorities are breaking down traditional models of governance in responding to the challenges posed by the rapid transformations taking place across China's economy and society. The book thus differs from others on China that focus on dynamics taking place at the elite level in Beijing, and is unique in its broad but detailed, empirically grounded analysis. The introduction examines China's changing governance architecture and raises key overarching questions. It addresses the motivations behind the wide variety of experiments underway by which authorities are trying to adapt local governance structures to meet new demands. Chapters 2–5 then explore each type of innovation in detail, from administrative streamlining and elections to partnerships in civil society and transparency measures. Each chapter explains the importance of the experiment in terms of implications for governance and draws upon specific case studies. The final chapter considers what these growing numbers of experiments add up to, whether China is headed towards a stronger more resilient authoritarianism or evolving towards its own version of democracy, and suggests a serie

A rural borderland just forty years ago, today Shenzhen is a city of twenty million and a technology hub. This success is attributed to its status as a Special Economic Zone, but no other SEZs compare. Juan Du looks to the past to understand why. It turns out that Shenzhen is no prefab “instant city,” but a place influenced by deep local history.