The Emergence Of Oligopoly

Originally published in 1969. In describing the emergence of oligopoly, Professor Eichner has written a history of the American sugar refining industry, one based in part on records of the United States Department of Justice. Sugar refining was one of the first major industries to be consolidated, and its expertise was in many ways typical of the development of other industries. Eichner's focus is on the changing pattern of industrial organization. This study is based on a unique four-stage model of the process by which the industrial structure of the American economy has evolved. The first part of the book traces the early history of the sugar refining industry and argues that the classical model of a competitive industry is inherently unstable once large fixed investments are required. The more closely sugar refining approximated this model, the more unstable the model became in practice. This instability led, in 1887, to the formation of the sugar trust. The author contends that the trust was formed not to exploit economies of scale but with the intent of achieving control over prices. In the second part of the book, Eichner describes the political and legal reaction that transformed monopoly into oligopoly. This sequence of events is best understood in terms of a learning curve in which the response of businessmen over time was related to the changing institutional environment in which they were forced to operate.

Drawing on a historical and political economy analysis, this book provides insight on how, under neoliberal hegemony, the internet was transformed from an emancipatory project for humanity to the final frontier of unrestrained capitalism.

Seminar paper from the year 2010 in the subject Business economics - Trade and Distribution, Maastricht University, language: English, abstract: The US automobile industry is a good example of an oligopoly. It consists mainly of three major firms, General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler. The influence of this oligopoly can be seen in the prices and the development and introduction of new car models into the American car market. Extensive work has been done on the field of collusive behaviour in the US automobile market and moreover the introduction of the small car in the 1950s shows how the firms collude when it comes to the introduction of a new car.

This paper analyzes a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. It incorporates the following models as special cases: incremental investment, patent races, learning-by-doing, and network externalities. We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through further cost-reducing or quality-improving investments. In many commonly-studied oligopoly games, such investments are strategic substitutes. We derive a new comparative statics result that applies to games with strategic substitutes, and we use the result to derive conditions under which leading firms invest more than lagging firms. We show that the conditions are satisfied in a variety of commonly-studied oligopoly models. We also highlight plausible countervailing effects from two distinct sources. First, leading firms may find it more costly than others to achieve the same increment to their state. This force is particularly salient in many models of patent races, where firms make research investments in an attempt to find a new technology that delivers a given level of cost or quality. Second, countervailing effects may arise in dynamic games with more than two firms, when firms are sufficiently patient. Key words: oligopoly games, strategic substitutes, innovation, investment, increasing dominance, market concentration.

The dramatic shifts in heartland regional economies in the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries have thrown into question the ability of capitalist development to produce permanent growth, economic well being, and balanced regional development. This book develops a theory that radically reconceptualizes the economic forces producing regional change and tests it empirically for a set of fifteen sectors in the U.S. It offers a pioneering approach which should enable planners and managers to better cope with baffling changes in the current economic viability of regions. Traditional theories of regional development have failed to account for innovation and longrun structural change. They have ignored the role of corporate strategy and the existence of market power. Markusen's "profit-cycle theory" provides a key to understanding how, why, and when a region's leading industries undergo major changes. The theory is synthetic, building upon Schumpeterian and Marxist work on innovation and capitalist dynamics, upon the product cycle theories of business economists, and upon theories of oligopolistic behavior. Markusen argues that changing sources of profitability along an industry's evolutionary path will first concentrate and later disperse production geographically, setting in motion a methodically destabilizing process for regional economies. The profit-cycle theory is tested in depth against the steel sector's experience over a century, and against the experiences of sectors in different stages of development, ranging from innovative ones like semiconductors and computers, to mature and troubled sectors like automobiles, textiles, and lumber. The temporal and crosssectional data drawn from the census of manufactures support the theory and its spatial hypotheses. In a final chapter Markusen explores the implications of the research for regional development. Ann Markusen is Assistant Professor, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley.