The Economics Of Permissible Wto Retaliation

WTO arbitrators rely on economics to establish the permissible retaliation limits authorized by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which arguably serves to enforce the overall agreement. We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of the DSU process. First, we identify, characterize, and categorize the major classes of disputes - e.g., those affecting import protection versus export promotion - and use the Bagwell and Staiger interpretation of the WTO principle of reciprocity to provide a theoretical framework that arbitrators can use to identify the maximum level of retaliatory countermeasures. Second, we allocate each of the ten DSU arbitrations that have taken place thus far into one of these categories and compare the arbitrators' actual approach with the theory. Third, we use this framework to identify three crucial elements to the arbitrators' decision-making process for each case: i) the formula that they decide to adopt for identifying appropriate countermeasures, ii) their political-legal-economic decision on a WTO consistent counterfactual to use to implement the formula, and iii) the quantitative methods they use to necessarily construct the (unobserved) WTO-consistent counterfactual. We examine not only the arbitrations that have taken place thus far, but our approach also illustrates a template for many additional types of arbitrations likely to take place under the DSU. Finally, in the disputes in which this reciprocity approach has not been used, we identify procedural difficulties that arbitrators confront thus highlighting the constraints that hinder their use of economic analysis in practice.

A critical assessment of trade retaliation in the WTO by academics, diplomats and practitioners involved in such actions.

"This work provides in-depth legal analysis of the procedural and substantive aspects of retaliation under the WTO dispute settlement system with particular reference to relevant rules and case law. It identifies peculiarities of WTO retaliation as compared with countermeasures of general international law. It examines the retaliation regime under GATT 1947 and the Dispute Settlement Understanding, as well as the special retaliation regime under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. It includes a case study with respect to the calculation of the level of retaliation in Article 22.6/4.11 arbitration. Finally, it explores the gaps in the current retaliation system with regard to both procedural Issues and the matter of efficacy, and analyzes all relevant solutions. In sum, this book Is designed to examine the way the WTO retaliation system works and explore possible Improvements." --Book Jacket.

"The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. "--World Bank web site.

The central point of this book concerns three main issues: the problems of WTO retaliation, the question of the effectiveness of retaliation, and the purposes of retaliation. WTO retaliation is often deemed ineffective due to its inherited shortcomings. This book highlights the significance in identifying the purposes of retaliation prior to evaluating its effectiveness. Put differently, it refers to the purpose-based approach of effectiveness. It is a common understanding that the purpose of WTO retaliation is to induce compliance. This book, nevertheless, argues in favour of coexistence of the multiple purposes of retaliation, including reaching a mutually agreeable solution. These views are based on the extensive research conducted on the purposes of WTO retaliation, namely through interpreting Article 22 of the DSU; examining the remedies rules within the frameworks of public international law, and law and economics; and assessing the academic writings/debates as well as the statements of arbitrators. Finally, by evaluating a number of disputes involving WTO retaliation, this book demonstrates the reasonableness and soundness of WTO retaliation in light of its multiple purposes.

One of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.

It is hard to think of a better topic for multi-disciplinary study than trade retaliation in the WTO. When a country violates WTO rules, the remedy of last resort is bilateral, state-to-state trade sanctions. Such trade sanctions are imposed against the violating country by one or more other WTO members that took the initiative to challenge the breach. WTO retaliation must, however, be multilaterally authorized by the WTO following, first, an elaborate procedure establishing (continued) breach in the first place and, second, an arbitration on whether the retaliation is 'equivalent' or 'appropriate' in light of the harm caused by the original violation. This is where the law comes in: Arbitrators must apply legal criteria to assess the harm caused by a WTO violation, select benchmarks and counterfactuals to do so, as well as decide, where requested, on whether the conditions for so-called cross-retaliation are met (that is, retaliation in the form of, for example, suspending intellectual property rights in response to a WTO-inconsistent import restriction). This process obviously involves economics as well, both economic theory (what is the role of violation-cum-retaliation in an incomplete contract?; what is the optimal design of remedies for breach of contract?) and applied or quantitative economics (how does one calculate lost trade, lost royalties or other economic harm caused by a WTO violation?; how does one make sure that the retaliation in response is 'equivalent'?). Finally, the design, implementation and effectiveness of WTO retaliation is deeply political, ranging from the decision of whether to retaliate in the first place (especially salient in developing countries) to selecting specific products to retaliate against (e.g. with a view to compensate or protect domestic, import-competing industries at home, say, Mexico keeping out US corn syrup to please Mexican cane sugar producers; or, alternatively, to exert maximum political pressure in the violating country, say, the EC restricting Florida orange juice to affect US President Bush's re-election chances in 2004).