The Economics And Politics Of The Slowdown In Regulatory Reform

Regulation has become a front-page topic recently, often referenced by politicians in conjunction with the current state of the U.S. economy. Yet despite regulation’s increased presence in current politics and media, The Politics of Regulatory Reform argues that the regulatory process and its influence on the economy is misunderstood by the general public as well as by many politicians. In this book, two experienced regulation scholars confront questions relevant to both academic scholars and those with a general interest in ascertaining the effects and importance of regulation. How does regulation impact the economy? What roles do politicians play in making regulatory decisions? Why do politicians enact laws that require regulations and then try to hamper agencies abilities to issue those same regulations? The authors answer these questions and untangle the misperceptions behind regulation by using an area of regulatory policy that has been underutilized until now. Rather than focusing on the federal government, Shapiro and Borie-Holtz have gathered a unique dataset on the regulatory process and output in the United States. They use state-specific data from twenty-eight states, as well as a series of case studies on regulatory reform, to question widespread impressions and ideas about the regulatory process. The result is an incisive and comprehensive study of the relationship between politics and regulation that also encompasses the effects of regulation and the reasons why regulatory reforms are enacted.

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.

Over the past fifteen years, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have transformed the relationship between governments and corporations. The changes are complex and the terms used to describe them often obscure the reality. In Freer Markets, More Rules, Steven K. Vogel dispenses with euphemisms and makes sense of this recent transformation. In defiance of conventional wisdom, Vogel contends that the deregulation revolution of the 1980s and 1990s never happened. The advanced industrial countries moved toward liberalization or freer markets at the same time that they imposed reregulation or more rules. Moreover, the countries involved did not converge in regulatory practice but combined liberalization and reregulation in markedly different ways. The state itself, far more than private interest groups, drove the process of regulatory reform. Thus, the story of deregulation is one rich in paradox: a movement aimed at reducing regulation increased it; a movement propelled by global forces reinforced national differences; and a movement that purported to reduce state power was led by the state itself. Vogel's astute and far-reaching analysis compares deregulation in Britain and Japan, with special attention to the telecommunication and financial services industries. He also considers such important sectors as broadcasting, transportation, and utilities in the United States, France, and Germany.

Regulatory change is typically understood as a response to significant crises like the Great Depression, or salient events that focus public attention, like Earth Day 1970. Without discounting the importance of these kinds of events, change often assumes more gradual and less visible forms. But how do we ‘see’ change, and what institutions and processes are behind it? In this book, author Marc Eisner brings these questions to bear on the analysis of regulatory change, walking the reader through a clear-eyed and careful examination of: the dynamics of regulatory change since the 1970s social regulation and institutional design forms of gradual change – including conversion, layering, and drift gridlock, polarization, and the privatization of regulation financial collapse and the anatomy of regulatory failure Demonstrating that transparency and accountability – the hallmarks of public regulation – are increasingly absent, and that deregulation was but one factor in our most recent significant financial collapse, the Great Recession, this book urges readers to look beyond deregulation and consider the broader political implications for our current system of voluntary participation in regulatory programs and the proliferation of public-private partnerships. This book provides an accessible introduction to the complex topic of regulatory politics, ideal for upper-level and graduate courses on regulation, government and business, bureaucratic politics, and public policy.

This book, now available in paperback, suggests that the scope and breadth of regulatory reforms since the mid-1980s and particularly during the 1990s, are so striking that they necessitate a reappraisal of current approaches to the study of the politics of regulation. The authors call for the adoption of different and fresh perspectives to examine this area. The contributors to this volume analyze how regulatory regimes that were once peculiar to the US and a few industries have, in recent years, come to define the best practice of governance over the world capitalist economy and over numerous social and economic sectors. They go on to suggest various explanations for the expansion of regulatory institutions, addressing some of the most critical problems and offering new methodological techniques to enable further study. The contributions also provide distinct cross-national and cross-sectoral comparative approaches, and emphasize the changes in the economic and social context of regulation and the implications of these developments on the rise of the regulatory state. These changes, together with the general advance in the study of regulation, undoubtedly demand a re-evaluation of the theory of regulation, its methodologies and scope of application. This book is a perceptive investigation of recent evolutions in the manner and extent of governance through regulation. Scholars and students of comparative politics, public policy, regulation theory, institutional economics and political sociology will find it to be essential reading. It will also prove a valuable source of reference for those working or dealing with regulatory authorities and for business managers in private industries and services operating under a regulatory framework.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.

In Regulatory Politics in Transition Marc Eisner argues that to understand fully the importance of regulatory policy we need to survey the critical policy shifts brought about during the Progressive period, the New Deal, and the contemporary period. Eisner adopts a regulatory regime framework to address the combination of policy change and institutional innovation across multiple policies in each period. For each of these periods Eisner examines economic structural changes and the prevailing political economic and administrative theories that conditioned the design of new policies and institutions. Throughout, Eisner adds a valuable historical dimension to the discussion of regulation, by showing how policies and institutions were shaped by particular historical and political circumstances. The new edition examines how the efficiency regime of the 1980s found a new expression in the regulatory reinvention during the Clinton presidency. Moreover, it explores the impact of globalization trends and international regimes upon the politics of regulation and asks whether a new global regime is on the horizon.