The Dynamics Of Tax Cuts

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the effects of temporary business tax cuts. First, the analysis extends the Ricardian equivalence result to an environment with production and establishes that a temporary tax cut financed by a future tax-increase has no real effect if the tax is lump-sum and capital markets are perfect. Second, it shows that in the presence of financing frictions which raise the cost of investment, the policy temporarily relaxes the financing constraint thereby reducing the marginal cost of investment. This direct effect implies positive marginal propensities to invest out of tax cuts. Third, when the tax is distortionary, the expectation of high future tax rates reduces the expected marginal return on investment mitigating the direct stimulative effects.

Using the post-WWII data of U.S. federal corporate income tax changes, within a Smooth Transition VAR, this paper finds that the output effect of capital income tax cuts is government debt-dependent: it is less expansionary when debt is high than when it is low. To explore the mechanisms that can drive this fiscal state-dependent tax effect, the paper uses a DSGE model with regime-switching fiscal policy and finds that a capital income tax cut is stimulative to the extent that it is unlikely to result in a future fiscal adjustment. As government debt increases to a sufficiently high level, the probability of future fiscal adjustments starts rising, and the expansionary effects of a capital income tax cut can diminish substantially, whether the expected adjustments are through a policy reversal or a consumption tax increase. Also, a capital income tax cut need not always have large revenue feedback effects as suggested in the literature.

This paper uses an industry equilibrium model where some firms are financially constrained to quantify the effects of a transitory corporate tax cut funded by a future tax increase on the U.S. economy. It finds that by increasing current cash-flows tax cuts alleviate financing frictions, hereby stimulating current investment. Per dollar of tax stimulus, aggregate investment increases by 26 cents on impact, and aggregate output by 3.5 cents. The average effect masks heterogeneity: multipliers are close to 1 for constrained firms, especially new entrants, and negative for larger and unconstrained firms. The output effects extend well past the period the policy is reversed, leading to a cumulative multiplier of 7.2 cents. Multipliers are significantly larger when controlling for the investment crowding-out effect among unconstrained firms.

Since the Reagan Revolution of the early 1980s, Republicans have consistently championed tax cuts for individuals and businesses, regardless of whether the economy is booming or in recession or whether the federal budget is in surplus or deficit. In Starving the Beast, sociologist Monica Prasad uncovers the origins of the GOP’s relentless focus on tax cuts and shows how this is a uniquely American phenomenon. Drawing on never-before seen archival documents, Prasad traces the history of the 1981 tax cut—the famous “supply side” tax cut, which became the cornerstone for the next several decades of Republican domestic economic policy. She demonstrates that the main impetus behind this tax cut was not business group pressure, racial animus, or a belief that tax cuts would pay for themselves. Rather, the tax cut emerged because Republicans believed that following World War II, Democrats had created an extremely durable power structure based on offering government programs to Americans, through which they were able to unify an otherwise fractious coalition of farmers, workers, and African Americans and retain control of Congress for four decades. Republicans were reduced to lecturing about balanced budgets, an issue that did not win them many elections. The Republican party began to see tax cuts as an opportunity to alter these basic building blocks of American power. If Democratic power was built out of government programs, Republicans found a new power source in offering tax cuts. Once it became clear that the resulting deficits could be financed by foreign capital, this program reoriented the Republican Party, transforming it from the party of fiscal rectitude into a party whose main domestic policy goal is reducing taxes. With one party promoting government programs to appeal to voters and the other party promoting tax cuts to appeal to voters, and neither party able to generate electoral coalitions around addressing more pressing political and economic problems, this history reveals problems at the heart of contemporary American democracy itself. Prasad suggests some ways forward. Since the end of World War II, many European nations have combined strong social protections with policies to stimulate economic growth such as lower taxes on capital and less regulation on businesses than in the U.S. Starving the Beast suggests that taking inspiration from this model of progressive policies embedded in market-promoting political economy could serve to build an American economy that works better for all.

A reduction in income tax rates generates substantial dynamic responses within the framework of the standard neoclassical growth model. The short-run revenue loss after an income tax cut is partly - or, depending on parameter values, even completely - offset by growth in the long-run, due to the resulting incentives to further accumulate capital. We study how the dynamic response of government revenue to a tax cut changes if we allow a Ramsey economy to engage in international trade: the open economy's ability to reallocate resources between labor-intensive and capital-intensive industries reduces the negative effect of factor accumulation on factor returns, thus encouraging the economy to accumulate more than it would do under autarky. We explore the quantitative implications of this intuition for the US in terms of two issues recently treated in the literature: dynamic scoring and the Laffer curve. Our results demonstrate the internaional trade enhances the response of government revenue to tax cuts by a relevant amount. In our benchmark calibration, a reduction in the capital-income tax rate has virtually no effect on government revenue in steady state.

Keeping the economy strong will require addressing two distinct but related problems. Steadily rising federal debt makes it harder to grow our economy, boost our living standards, respond to wars or recessions, address social needs, and maintain our role as a global leader. At the same time, we have let critical investments lag and left many people behind even as overall prosperity has grown. In Fiscal Therapy, William Gale, a leading authority on how federal tax and budget policy affects the economy, provides a trenchant discussion of the challenges posed by the imbalances between spending and revenue. America is facing a gradual decline as debt accumulates and delay raises the costs of action. But there is hope: fiscal responsibility aligns with both conservative and liberal goals and citizens of all stripes can support the notion of making life better for our children and grandchildren. Gale provides a plan to make the economy and nation stronger, one that controls entitlement spending but preserves and enhances their anti-poverty and social insurance roles, increases public investments on human and physical capital, and raises and reforms taxes to pay for government services in a fair and efficient way. What is needed, he argues, is to balance today's needs against tomorrow's obligations. We face significant fiscal challenges but, if we are wise enough to seize our opportunities, we can strengthen our economy, increase opportunity, reduce inequality, and build better lives for our children and grandchildren. We do not have to kill popular programs or starve government. Indeed, one main goal of fiscal reform is to maintain the vital functions that government provides. We need to act responsibly, pay for the government we want, and shape that government in ways that serve us best.

Congress enacted major tax cuts in 2001, 2002, and 2003. The acts reduced marginal income tax rates; reduced taxes on married couples, dividends, capital gains, and on estates and gifts; increased the child tax credit; and accelerated depreciation for business investment. The tax cuts resulted in an estimated revenue loss of 0.4% of GDP in 2001, 1.1% in 2002, and 1.6% in 2003. Most of the tax cuts are scheduled to expire after 10 years, but proponents intended that they be permanent. Since government spending rose as taxes were cut, the cuts can be characterized as deficit financed. It is hard to be certain what effects the tax cuts have had on the economy because there is no way to compare actual events to the counterfactual case where the tax cuts were not enacted. The most common method of estimating a tax cut's effect is to feed it into a macroeconomic model of the economy and see what the model predicts. Note that this is typically done before the fact: economic estimates of the tax cut's effect are not based on actual ex post data. These estimates are highly uncertain since there is no one macroeconomic model that adequately captures all of the economy's dynamics, no consensus among macroeconomists as to which one model is most suitable for policy simulations, and no model with a strong track record in accurately projecting economic events. Most estimates predict that the tax cuts will increase economic growth in the short term and reduce it in the long run. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation predicts that the 2003 tax cut will increase GDP by an average of 0.2 to 0.5% in the first five years and decrease it by -0.1 to -0.2% over the next five years. Keynesian models find the largest positive short-term effect of the tax cuts on the economy. But these effects are completely temporary because they focus on how tax cuts boost aggregate spending; in the long run, prices adjust, and production rather than spending determines the level of output. In neo-classical (Solow) growth models, deficit-financed tax cuts reduce national saving, thereby reducing national income because capital investment can only be financed through national saving or foreign borrowing. If the latter occurs, the result will be an increased trade deficit. In intertemporal models, a deficit-financed tax cut is unsustainable: it must be offset in the future by a tax increase or spending cut to prevent the national debt from growing indefinitely. Thus, in these models tax cuts followed by tax increases lead individuals to shift work and saving into the low-tax period, increasing growth, and out of the high-tax period, reducing growth. The period encompassing the tax cuts featured a recession of average duration but below-average depth, an initially sluggish recovery, a deep and unusually long decline in employment, a small decline in hours worked, a sharp and long lasting contraction in investment spending, a significant decline in national saving, and an unusually large trade deficit. Opponents see this as evidence that the tax cuts were ineffective; proponents argue that the economy would have performed worse in their absence. One should also consider that some, perhaps most, of the recovery was due to monetary rather than fiscal stimulus. (This report will not be updated.)