The Debt Equity Choice Of Japanese Firms

As a result of deregulation, there was a dramatic shift during the 1980s in Japan away from bank debt financing towards public debt financing: in 1975, more than 90% of the corporate debt of public companies was bank debt; in 1992 it was less than 50%. This paper presents a theory of the choice between bank debt and public debt and then examines the theory using firm level data on borrowing sources in Japan. We find that high net worth companies are more prone to use public debt. We also find that the more successful members of industrial groups (or keiretsu) and less successful owner-managed firms tended to access the public debt markets. We offer a number of interpretations of these results in light of the theory.

This paper investigates the long-term performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt and equity. We examine a wide range of types of issues: private issues, public issues, offshore issues, and rights issues. We find the issuing firms perform poorly (except for equity rights issues) even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issue announcements is not significantly negative for Japanese firms. This underperformance is strongest for firms issuing public convertible debt in Japan. Though in the U.S. underperformance appears to be concentrated in the smaller firms and in the firms with a high market-to-book ratio, this is not the case in Japan. Simple behavioral explanations for the underperformance of U.S. equity issuing firms do not seem consistent with the Japanese experience, but both countries fit a story where investors and managers are too optimistic about the investment opportunities of some firms.

We explore the determinants of the number of long-term bank relations of listed Japanese firms using a unique data set covering the period 1982-1999. Japanese listed firms have about seven long-term bank loan relations on average, but show a large variation around the average. We analyze the determinants of the choice for the number of bank relations. We use data on loan and equity ownership to address the impact of the Japan-specific bank-firm relations and bank control on the number of loans decision. Having a relation with a top-equity holding bank reduces the number of bank relations, while debt-rich and cash-poor firms have more bank relations.

This paper, using 833 observations of listed Japanese firms between the years 1992 to 2000, explore the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis concerning the disciplinary role of ownership structure in corporate capital structure policy. The results show (1) the sensitivity of ownership structure to leverage depends on growth opportunities and free cash flow. (2) Keiretsu classification affects relations between ownership structure and leverage. Overall, the results generally support the free cash flow hypothesis.

We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps driven by deleveraging, using a simple Keynesian model. When constrained agents engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained agents to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. However, if the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In such an environment, agents' exante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient. Welfare can be improved by ex-ante macroprudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. The size of the required intervention depends on the differences in marginal propensity to consume between borrowers and lenders during the deleveraging episode. In our model, contractionary monetary policy is inferior to macroprudential policy in addressing excessive leverage, and it can even have the unintended consequence of increasing leverage.