The Death Of Detente

Vividly written and based on up-to-date scholarship, this title provides an interpretive overview of the international history of the Cold War.

The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

Killing Detente tells the story of a major episode of intelligence intervention in politics in the mid-1970s that led to the derailing of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the resurgence of the Cold War in the following decade. Although the basic outlines of the story are already known, Anne Cahn succeeded in getting many previously declassified documents released and uses these, supplemented by seventy interviews with principal players, to add much greater depth and detail to our understanding of this troubling event in U. S. history. In the mid-1970s a very controversial intelligence estimate was performed by people outside the government. They were given access to our most secret files and leaked their report to the press when Jimmy Carter was elected president. This study, which became known as &"The Team B Report,&" became the intellectual forbearer of the &"window of vulnerability&" and led to the demise of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. Team B was the fundamental turning point in renewing the Cold War in the 1980s. The debate over the leaked report moved the center of arms control policy strongly to the right from where it had been during the years of detente. Team B presaged the triumph of Ronald Reagan and a military buildup on a scale unprecedented in peacetime that left present and future generations with the most crippling debt in our nation&’s history. This book is about attempts to destroy improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Those opposed to the easing of tensions between the two countries used every means available, including accusing the Central Intelligence Agency of understating the threat posed by the Soviets. Charging the CIA this way seems preposterous now.

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of detente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War detente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as detente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.-Soviet relations.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the Cold War changed almost overnight. The Soviet Union embarked on a course of reconciliation and greater openness. However, despite an end to the Korean War and progress on many other outstanding East-West questions, the Western world remained mistrustful of Soviet motives and policies and Soviet leaders remained suspicious of Western intentions. Less than a decade after Stalin's death the Berlin Wall was erected and the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world close to nuclear annihilation. Was this development unavoidable? Was an opportunity missed to overcome and terminate the Cold War? Was there a possibility for the creation of a more stable, less threatening, and less costly world in both human and material terms? It is only now, after the end of the Cold War and based on recently declassified western documents and revelations from once-closed archives in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, that new light can be shed on the nature of international Cold War policies in the years after Stalin's death. The essays in this book offer a historical understanding of this crucial period of the Cold War, assessing both the possibilities for change and the obstacles to d tente. The book draws on the collective talents of an international group of scholars with a wide range of historical, geographical, and linguistic expertise. All of the essays are based on original research, many of them drawing from previously inaccessible archival documents from both the East and West. This book should be read by everyone interested in the final stage of the defining conflict that was the Cold War. Contributions by: Csaba B k s, G nter Bischof, Jeffrey Brooks, Ira Chernus, Jerald A. Combs, Lloyd Gardner, Jussi M. Hanhim ki, Hope M. Harrison, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Mark Kramer, Klaus Larres, Vojtech Mastny, Kenneth Osgood, Kathryn C. Statler, and Qiang Zhai

The release of previously unavailable Soviet archives has allowed a re-examination of Anglo-Soviet relations during Churchill's peacetime administration, with special emphasis on the Kremlin's motivation for resisting the Prime Minister's attempts to end the Cold War. Throughout 1951-55, the time was not yet ripe for détente: the USSR and Western powers were less than willing to accommodate each other. Instead they engaged in the consolidation of their own blocs and the build-up of their defensive potential. With Winston Churchill becoming the most outspoken advocate of détente, the Kremlin greeted the return to power of the Conservative Party under his leadership with a general mistrust. After Josef Stalin's death in March 1953, détente remained a distant reality. The collective leadership was keen to reduce international tensions without modifying its predecessor's foreign policy, or abandoning Soviet strongholds of central and eastern Europe. As part of its peace offensive, the Kremlin was prepared to improve the atmosphere in relations with Britain and increase the volume of Anglo-Soviet trade. However, the British remained mistrustful of the intentions of Stalin's successors, and refrained from initiatives leading to a relaxation of export controls independent from American embargo policy. The author demonstrates that Stalin's heirs suspected that Churchill's pursuit of détente was designed to secure far-reaching concessions. Moscow also felt that as a junior partner acting in full dependence on and in co-operation with US policy, Churchill was in no position to conciliate between the USSR and the USA. Engaged in a domestic struggle for power, members of the collective leadership were reluctant to allow their opponent, Georgi Malenkov, to negotiate single-handedly with western statesmen. It was only after Nikita Khrushchev's ascendance to power and Churchill's resignation from office that the Kremlin was prepared to participate in summit talks with the western heads of government.