The Cooperator Dilemma

A comprehensive and current presentation of the collective-action approach

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.

Despite the depiction of nature "red in tooth and claw," cooperation is actually widespread in the animal kingdom. Various types of cooperative behaviors have been documented in everything from insects to primates, and in every imaginable ecological scenario. Yet why animals cooperate is still a hotly contested question in literature on evolution and animal behavior. This book examines the history surrounding the study of cooperation, and proceeds to examine the conceptual, theoretical and empirical work on this fascinating subject. Early on, it outlines the four different categories of cooperation -- reciprocal altruism, kinship, group-selected cooperation and byproduct mutualism -- and ties these categories together in a single framework called the Cooperator's Dilemma. Hundreds of studies on cooperation in insects, fish, birds and mammals are reviewed. Cooperation in this wide array of taxa includes, but is not limited to, cooperative hunting, anti-predator behavior, foraging, sexual coalitions, grooming, helpers-at-the nest, territoriality, 'policing' behavior and group thermoregulation. Each example outlined is tied back to the theoretical framework developed early on, whenever the data allows. Future experiments designed to further elucidate a particular type of cooperation are provided throughout the book.

A social dilemma is a game which at first glance has only inefficient solutions. If efficient solutions are to be achieved, some kind of cooperation among the players is required. This book asks two basic questions, closely intertwined with each other: 1. How is cooperation possible among rational players in such a social dilemma? Which changes in the social context of a social dilemma situation are necessary in order for players to rationally choose the cooperative option? 2. How do real players actually behave in social dilemma situations? Do they behave "rationally" at all? Or, conversely, what kind of reasoning, attitudes, emotions, etc. shape the behavior of real players in social dilemmas? What kind of interventions, what kind of internal mechanisms within a real group may change players' willingness to cooperate? These two general questions mark the broad spectrum of the problem which has been, over the last three decades, investigated in various disciplines, and which has brought many new ideas and new observations into the study of the old question of social order in a world of born egoists. Accordingly, this volume contains contributions by biologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers.

Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human–environmental–social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost.

This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.

Modern approaches to public relations cluster into three camps along a continuum: conflict-oriented egoism, e.g. forms of contingency theory that focus almost exclusively on the wellbeing of an entity; redressed egoism, e.g. subsidies to redress PR’s egoistic nature; and forms of self-interested cooperation, e.g. fully functioning society theory. Public Relations, Cooperation, and Justice draws upon interdisciplinary research from evolutionary biology, philosophy, and rhetoric to establish that relationships built on cooperation and justice are more productive than those built on conflict and egoistic competition. Just as important, this innovative book shuns normative, utopian appeals, offering instead only empirical, materialistic evidence for its conclusions. This is a powerful, multidisciplinary, and well-documented analysis, including specific strategies for the enactment of PR as a quest for cooperation and justice, which aligns the discipline of public relations with basic human nature. It will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of public relations and communication ethics.

The question of how cooperation and social order can evolve from a Hobbesian state of nature of a “war of all against all” has always been at the core of social scientific inquiry. Social dilemmas are the main analytical paradigm used by social scientists to explain competition, cooperation, and conflict in human groups. The formal analysis of social dilemmas allows for identifying the conditions under which cooperation evolves or unravels. This knowledge informs the design of institutions that promote cooperative behavior. Yet to gain practical relevance in policymaking and institutional design, predictions derived from the analysis of social dilemmas must be put to an empirical test. The collection of articles in this book gives an overview of state-of-the-art research on social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation. It covers theoretical contributions and offers a broad range of examples on how theoretical insights can be empirically verified and applied to cooperation problems in everyday life. By bringing together a group of distinguished scholars, the book fills an important gap in sociological scholarship and addresses some of the most interesting questions of human sociality.

This book presents an accessible and state-of-the-art survey of current research on social dilemmas. A social dilemma arises when actions that are justifiable in terms of individual rationality (e.g. over-harvesting resources, or using private instead of public transportation) threaten the common good and in the long run the individual's own self-interest as well. The study of social dilemmas has important links with many areas in psychology, as well as with cognate disciplines such as risk analysis, environmental science, political science, and economics. Accordingly, the book should appeal not only to psychologists but also to a wider audience of scholars and researchers. Contributors include both established authorities and recent innovators, and the organization and contents of the book reflect the most recent trends in this exciting area. Increased attention is given to modeling dynamics and processes in social dilemmas, and greater emphasis placed on exploring structural solutions to dilemmas. New findings and theoretical developments regarding group and inter-group processes are highlighted and a move is made away from a heavy reliance on laboratory experiments and game theory to field studies and real-world applications. A scholarly prospective chapter at the beginning and an integrative concluding chapter provide useful overviews of the area and the contributions to the book.