The Constitutional Foundations Of Judicial Review

This book comprehensively analyses the foundations of judicial review.

Contains papers and comments from the conference on the Foundations of Judicial Review, held in Cambridge, England, May 22, 1999, and some previously published papers.

Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself. Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.

In the late 1980s, a vigorous debate began about how we may best justify, in constitutional terms, the English courts’ jurisdiction to judicially review the exercise of public power derived from an Act of Parliament. Two rival theories emerged in this debate, the ultra vires theory and the common law theory. The debate between the supporters of these two theories has never satisfactorily been resolved and has been criticised as being futile. Yet, the debate raises some fundamental questions about the constitution of the United Kingdom, particularly: the relationship between Parliament and the courts; the nature of parliamentary supremacy in the contemporary constitution; and the possibility and validity of relying on legislative intent. This book critically analyses the ultra vires and common law theories and argues that neither offers a convincing explanation for the courts’ judicial review jurisdiction. Instead, the author puts forward the theory that parliamentary supremacy – and, in turn, the relationship between Parliament and the courts – is not absolute and does not operate in a hard and fast way but, rather, functions in a more flexible way and that the courts will balance particular Acts of Parliament against competing statutes or principles. McGarry argues that this new conception of parliamentary supremacy leads to an alternative theory of judicial review which significantly differs from both the ultra vires and common law theories. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of UK public law.

This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.

Irreverent, provocative, and engaging, Desperately Seeking Certainty attacks the current legal vogue for grand unified theories of constitutional interpretation. On both the Right and the Left, prominent legal scholars are attempting to build all of constitutional law from a single foundational idea. Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry find that in the end no single, all-encompassing theory can successfully guide judges or provide definitive or even sensible answers to every constitutional question. Their book brilliantly reveals how problematic foundationalism is and shows how the pragmatic, multifaceted common law methods already used by the Court provide a far better means of reaching sound decisions and controlling judicial discretion than do any of the grand theories.

The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value. Abstracted from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must regain its connection with questions of political principle and moral value. Although the critics of ultra vires have rightly emphasized the foundational role of the common law, they have misconceived its nature and implications. On the one hand, they have invited the charge of judicial supremacism by marginalizing the role of legislative intent; on the other, their affirmation of absolute parliamentary sovereignty (within the context of this debate) undermines the critique of ultra vires. In substance, therefore, the rival camps occupy essentially the same ground, equally trapped by a formalism that entrenches a stark confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A conception of shared sovereignty, or interdependent sovereignties, provides a better foundation for judicial review.

Constitutionalization of world politics is emerging as an unintended consequence of international treaty making driven by the logic of democratic power. The analysis will appeal to scholars of International Relations and International Law interested in international cooperation, as well as institutional and constitutional theory and practice.

Explores the English origins of the principles of judicial review in common law jurisdictions and autochthonous pressures for their adaptation.