The Concept Of Abuse In Eu Competition Law

The objective(s) of Article 102 TFEU, what exactly makes a practice abusive and the standard of harm under Article 102 TFEU have not yet been settled. This lack of clarity creates uncertainty for businesses and, coupled with the current state of economics in this area, raises an important question of legitimacy. Using law and economic approaches, this book inquires into the possible objectives of Article 102 TFEU and proposes a modern approach to interpreting 'abuse'. In doing so, this book establishes an overarching concept of 'abuse' that conforms to the historical roots of the provision, to the text of the provision itself, and to modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. This book therefore inquires into what Article 102 TFEU is about, what it can be about and what it should be about regarding both objectives and scope. The book demonstrates that the separation of exploitative abuse from exclusionary abuse is artificial and unsound. It examines the roots of Article 102 TFEU and the historical context of the adoption of the Treaty, the case law, policy and literature on exploitative abuses and, where relevant, on exclusionary abuses. The book investigates potential objectives, such as fairness and welfare, as well as the potential conflict between such objectives. Finally, it critically assesses the European Commission's modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, before proposing a reformed approach to 'abuse' which is centred on three necessary and sufficient conditions: exploitation, exclusion and a lack of an increase in efficiency.

Granting rebates to a customer or refusing to supply a competitor are examples of ordinary commercial practices, which become ‘abusive’ under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) when carried out by ‘dominant’ firms. This topical book provides an up-to-date account of the emerging trends in the enforcement and interpretation of this provision at both the EU and national level.

Under Article 102 TFEU, dominant firms are allowed to compete, but only to the extent their market behaviour does not constitute an abuse. Needless to say, the wording of the article neither explains what an abusive restriction of competition is nor how such a practice can be identified. Rather than developing a one-size-fits-all test applicable to all forms of market behaviour by dominant firms, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (ex; Court of First Instance) have set out a system of tests for separate categories of conduct. Drawing on the full range of the EU Courts’ relevant case law, this very useful book analyses the conditions that must be fulfilled for a broad range of business practices to be deemed abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and also identifies the criteria that must be fulfilled for a practice to be ‘objectively justified’. The potentially abusive practices studied here (as defined in the relevant case law) include the following: predatory pricing; margin squeezing; exclusivity agreements; loyalty rebates; refusals to supply to induce exclusivity; secondary line price discrimination; vexatious litigation; acquisitions of intellectual property rights (IPRs); refusals to supply necessary inputs; provision of storage equipment on the condition of exclusive use; selective above-cost price cuts; tying; technological integration; and refusal to license IPRs. The author also contrasts the Commission’s decisional practice with the case law, assesses approaches under U.S. antitrust law to similar forms of conduct, and incorporates insights from economic theory. This study greatly enhances our understanding of the distinction between abusive conduct and lawful competition. In the course of its clarification of the EU Courts’ responses to individual forms of market behaviour, an overall approach to the identification of exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU begins to come into view. Apart from the important new synthesis the work offers legal scholars, there can be little doubt this book will prove a valuable asset and even an inspiration to competition lawyers.

Succinct and concise, this textbook covers all the procedural and substantive aspects of EU competition law. It explores primary and secondary law through the prism of ECJ case law. Abuse of a dominant position and merger control are discussed and a separate chapter on cartels ensures the student receives the broadest possible perspective on the subject. In addition, the book's consistent structure aids understanding: section summaries underline key principles, questions reinforce learning and essay discussion topics encourage further exploration. By setting out the economic principles which underpin the subject, the author allows the student to engage with the complexity of competition law with confidence. Integrated examples and an uncluttered writing style make this required reading for all students of the subject.

A ground breaking study of how the interaction between the European Commission and the EU Courts has shaped EU competition law.

European Commission Decisions on Competition provides a comprehensive economic classification and analysis of all European Commission decisions adopted pursuant to Articles 101, 102 and 106 of the FEU Treaty from 1962 to 2009. It also includes a sample of landmark European merger cases. The decisions are organised according to the principal economic theory applied in the case. For each economic category, the seminal Commission decision that became a reference point for that type of anticompetitive behaviour is described. For this, a fixed template format is used throughout the book. All subsequent decisions in which the same economic principle was applied are listed chronologically. It complements the most widely used textbooks in industrial organisation, competition economics and competition law, to which detailed references are offered. The book contains source material for teachers and students, scholars of competition law and economics, as well as practising competition lawyers and officials.

Three questions surround the interpretation and application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. What is its underlying purpose? Is it necessary to demonstrate actual or likely anticompetitive effects on the market place when applying Article 82? And how can dominant undertakings defend themselves against a finding of abuse? Instead of the usual discussion of objectives, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen questions whether the Commission's chosen objective of consumer welfare is legitimate. While many Community lawyers would readily accept and indeed welcome the objective of consumer welfare, this is not supported by case law. The Community Courts do not always favour consumer welfare at the expense of economic freedom. This is important for dominant undertakings' ability to advance efficiencies and for understanding why the Chicago and post-Chicago School arguments cannot be injected into Article 82.

All are agreed that the digital economy contributes to a dynamic evolution of markets and competition. Nonetheless, concerns are increasingly raised about the market dominance of a few key players. Because these companies hold the power to drive rivals out of business, regulators have begun to seek scope for competition enforcement in cases where companies claim that withholding data is needed to satisfy customers and cut costs. This book is the first focus on how competition law enforcement tools can be applied to refusals of dominant firms to give access data on online platforms such as search engines, social networks, and e-commerce platforms – commonly referred to as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the Internet. The question arises whether the denial of a dominant firm to grant competitors access to its data could constitute a ‘refusal to deal’ and lead to competition law liability under the so-called ‘essential facilities doctrine', according to which firms need access to shared knowledge in order to be able to compete. A possible duty to share data with rivals also brings to the forefront the interaction of competition law with data protection legislation considering that the required information may include personal data of individuals. Building on the refusal to deal concept, and using a multidisciplinary approach, the analysis covers such issues and topics as the following: – data portability; – interoperability; – data as a competitive advantage or entry barrier in digital markets; – market definition and dominance with respect to data; – disruptive versus sustaining innovation; – role of intellectual property regimes; – economic trade-off in essential facilities cases; – relationship of competition enforcement with data protection law and – data-related competition concerns in merger cases. The author draws on a wealth of relevant material, including EU and US decision-making practice, case law, and policy documents, as well as economic and empirical literature on the link between competition and innovation. The book concludes with a proposed framework for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to potential forms of abuse of dominance relating to data. In addition, it makes suggestions as to how data protection interests can be integrated into competition policy. An invaluable contribution to ongoing academic and policy discussions about how data-related competition concerns should be addressed under competition law, the analysis clearly demonstrates how existing competition tools for market definition and assessment of dominance can be applied to online platforms. It will be of immeasurable value to the many jurists, business persons, and academics concerned with this very timely subject.

This book offers an original interpretation of the case law on exclusionary abuses under Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU, according to the numbering introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon), and it identifies the various factors that have shaped the application of this provision through its history. The book provides an in-depth analysis of the European Commission's Guidance on enforcement priorities under Article 82 and it makes a provocative proposal for further modernisation of the analysis of exclusionary abuses by recasting the prohibition of abuse of dominance as a norm which deals only with unilateral conduct. The first part of the book reconsiders fundamental legal and economic concepts underpinning the assessment of exclusionary abuses and identifies the difficulties posed by the principal forms of abusive practices (refusals to deal, predatory pricing, rebates and tying). The EU case law is compared with the US experience under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The second part of the book explores solutions, based on the premise that the reform of Article 82 (now Article 102 TFEU) should be in line with the modernisation of Article 81 (now Article 101 TFEU) and the EU merger control rules. The last chapter demonstrates the gradual convergence of the application of Articles 81 and 82 in the area of vertical restraints. It points towards a redefined division of labour between these two provisions with a view to ensuring efficient enforcement, better protection of consumer interests, and clearer incentives for dominant firms to invest in desirable commercial practices. The book will be of interest to students and practitioners of EU competition law, and to those in other jurisdictions where the application of competition law to practices of dominant firms is controversial.

How can the concept of abuse of European Union law – which can be defined as undesirable choice of law artificially made by a private citizen – generate so much disagreement among equally intelligent individuals? Seeking to transcend the classical debate between its supporters and adversaries, the present study submits that the concept of abuse of EU law is located on three major fault-lines of EU law, which accounts for the well-established controversies in the field. The first fault-line, which is common to all legal orders, opposes legal congruence (the tendency to yield equitable legal outcomes) to legal certainty (the tendency to yield predictable legal outcomes). Partisans of legal congruence tend to advocate the prohibition of abuses of law, whereas partisans of legal certainty tend to oppose it. The second fault-line is specific to EU law and divides two conceptions of the regulation of the internal market. If economic integration is conceived as the promotion of cross-border competition among private businesses (the paradigm of 'regulatory neutrality'), choices of law must be proscribed as abusive, for they distort business competition. But if economic integration is intended to promote competition among Member States (the paradigm of 'regulatory competition'), choices of law by EU citizens represent a desirable process of arbitrage among national laws. The third and final fault-line corresponds to the tension between two orientations of the economic constitution of the European Union, namely the fear of private power and the fear of public power. Those who fear private power most tend to endorse the prohibition of abuses of law, whereas those who fear public power most tend to reject it. Seen in this way, the concept of abuse of EU law offers a forum in which fundamental questions about the nature and function of EU law can be confronted and examined in a new light. In May 2013, the thesis that this book was based on won the First Edition of the European Law Faculties Association Award for Outstanding Doctoral Thesis.