The Commanders Of Chancellorsville

The award-winning Civil War historian explores the battle between two strikingly different generals: “Fighting Joe” Hooker and Robert E. Lee. As equally matched in skill as they were opposite in personality, the brash Union Gen. Joseph Hooker boasted of a sure defeat of the reserved Gen. Robert E. Lee. “I’ve got Robert E. Lee right where I want him, and even God Himself cannot stop me from destroying him,” boasted Hooker. Yet the battle of Chancellorsville stands as Lee’s greatest triumph. The story of the two generals has never been explored as it is here. “Fighting Joe” Hooker was brilliant, but also profane and bombastic, and his army so undisciplined that their pursuit of camp “followers” spawned the modern euphemism for prostitute. Robert E. Lee, equally gifted, was known as the definitive devout, self-controlled Southern gentleman, leading an army that was exhausted, underfed, and outmanned. Chancellorsville stands not just as a pivotal battle of the Civil War but as the personal war between two warriors—stalking, striking, and counter-striking their way to ultimate victory or defeat. Praise for the work of Edward G. Longacre, a winner of the Fletcher Pratt and Douglas Southall Freeman awards “Breezy and informative . . . Longacre remains even handed throughout and maintains a lively pace.” —Publishers Weekly “Well-researched, fast paced.” —Pennsylvania History

Did “Fighting Joe” Hooker of the Army of the Potomac lose his nerve during the Chancellorsville Campaign of 1863? Perhaps history has failed to recognize Major General Joseph Hooker’s true commander’s intent for this campaign. Hooker’s intent was simple: maneuver forces to Lee’s flank and rear in order to force a withdrawal of Confederate troops from Fredericksburg. Hooker had no intention of engaging in a “risky confrontation” with General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Hooker’s approach for planning his spring offensive would focus the Army of Potomac’s efforts toward outmaneuvering Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Hooker had put forth the idea of moving on Richmond and Lincoln advised him that his objective was Lee’s army and not Richmond. Hooker does pursue Lee’s army, as the main objective and not Richmond as the President had directed but the means that Hooker pursued to that end are misleading. Hooker entered what he considered the initial stage of his spring offensive at Chancellorsville thinking that he would first defeat Lee’s army by maneuver. Prior to Chancellorsville, however, Hooker was already making preparations for driving to Richmond. Hooker had intended to confront Lee with the dilemma of being threatened from all sides. Unfortunately, Hooker had failed to communicate his intentions for his army’s movements of May 1, 1863 and confusion ran rampant among his subordinate commanders. Almost exclusively, Hooker developed the actual details of the plan himself. This flaw would result in numerous disconnects in Hooker’s plan. Hooker’s plan would fail due to his own steadfast belief in the ability of his plan to force Lee to withdraw. To say that Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac is misleading because Lee did not defeat the army, he defeated Hooker as he fought a very effective defensive battle that removed the Federal threat from Virginia due to Hooker’s failings as an army commander.

Contains more than 20 maps, diagrams and illustrations Although "Fighting Joe" Hooker skillfully executes a well-conceived plan and out-flanks his adversary, months of offensive planning are shelved as he suddenly orders his army on the defensive. Lee seizes the initiative and achieves what has often been called his most brilliant victory. How could this happen when Hooker's army outnumbers that of Lee 2 to 1 and is far superior in artillery and logistics? Answers to these and other questions concerning leadership, communications, use of terrain, and the psychology of men in battle, are often found by personal reconnaissance of the battlefield. This book offers a staff ride briefing of Chancellorsville. Since 1906 staff rides have been used to in the education of U.S. Army officers to narrow the gap between peacetime training and war.

For 130 years historians and military strategists have been obsessed by the battle of Chancellorsville. It began with an audaciously planned stroke by Union general Joe Hooker as he sent his army across the Rappahannock River and around Robert E. Lee's lines. It ended with that same army fleeing back in near total disarray -- and Hooker's reputation in ruins. This splendid account of Chancellorsville -- the first in more than 35 years -- explains Lee's most brilliant victory even as it places the battle within the larger canvas of the Civil War. Drawing on a wealth of first-hand sources, it creates a novelistic chronicle of tactics and characters while it retraces every thrust and parry of the two armies and the fateful decisions of their commanders, from Hooker's glaring display of moral weakness to the inspired risk-taking of Lee and Stonewall Jackson, who was mortally wounded by friendly fire. At once impassioned and gracefully balanced, Chancellorsville 1863 is a grand achievement in Civil War history.

Includes 4 maps and numerous other illustrations In The Chancellorsville Campaign, January–May 1863, author Bradford Wineman examines the battle of Chancellorsville in which a powerful Union Army, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, was pitted against a smaller but well-led Confederate force under General Robert E. Lee. Hooker planned a bold flanking maneuver to secure a Union victory, crush the rebel army, and open the way for a march toward Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate capital. He anticipated a glorious victory for his Federal troops. In the end it was Lee, and his chief lieutenant, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, who achieved what many historians have called the South’s greatest victory during the Civil War. Once Hooker had maneuvered the bulk of his forces over the Rappahannock River the Union commander gathered his troops into a defensive position at Chancellorsville and waited for Lee to attack. Lee seized the initiative, made several risky tactical moves, and drove the Federals from the field after three days of intense fighting. Only the death of the “Stonewall” Jackson tarnished Lee’s crowning victory.

Originally published in 1958, this Stackpole classic retains its popular appeal and easy readability. Now updated with commentary and notes by D. Scott Hartwig, it will be of special interest to Civil War buffs and historians. Exceptional maps and illustrations.

A new look at the Civil War battle that led to Stonewall Jackson’s death: A Publishers Weekly Best Book of the Year and “tour de force in military history” (Library Journal). From the award-winning, national bestselling author of Gettysburg, this is the definitive account of the Chancellorsville campaign, from the moment “Fighting Joe” Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac to the Union’s stinging, albeit temporary, defeat. Along with a vivid description of the experiences of the troops, Stephen Sears provides “a stunning analysis of how terrain, personality, chance, and other factors affect fighting and distort strategic design” (Library Journal). “Most notable is his use of Union military intelligence reports to show how Gen. Joseph Hooker was fed a stream of accurate information about Robert E. Lee’s troops; conversely, Sears points out the battlefield communications failures that hampered the Union army at critical times . . . A model campaign study, Sears’s account of Chancellorsville is likely to remain the standard for years to come.” —Publishers Weekly “The finest and most provocative Civil War historian writing today.” —Chicago Tribune Includes maps

The winter of 1862-1863 found the Union Army of the Potomac in sad shape, after bloody battles, multiple defeats, lack of adequate provisions and high desertion rates. When Major General Joseph Hooker took command, he set about revamping conditions. Instructed by President Lincoln to make the destruction of General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia the Union's top priority, Hooker mounted the Chancellorsville Campaign. Lee's aggressive battlefield manner coupled with Hooker's failure to initiate an assault led to a sound defeat by Confederate forces and left Hooker--who ultimately had only himself and his lack of initiative to blame--looking for a scapegoat. Among those Hooker attempted to hold responsible was the courageous Sixth Army Corps, Major General John Sedgwick commanding, the unit responsible for the sole Union victory of the entire campaign. This history of the battlefield engagements of the Sixth Army Corps on May 3 and 4, 1863, is compiled from contemporary accounts and a variety of postwar histories.