The Command Of The Sea

In this grand history of naval warfare, Palmer observes five centuries of dramatic encounters under sail and steam. From reliance on signal flags in the seventeenth century to satellite communications in the twenty-first, admirals looked to the next advance in technology as the one that would allow them to control their forces. But while abilities to communicate improved, Palmer shows how other technologies simultaneously shrank admirals' windows of decision. The result was simple, if not obvious: naval commanders have never had sufficient means or time to direct subordinates in battle.

First published in 1943, this book has long been the key resource for U.S. Navy officers preparing for command at sea. This sixth edition reflects the sweeping changes that have occurred over the past decade in the mechanics of how command at sea is executed and the context in which commanding officers work. Among these changes are the adoption of a new maritime strategy that identifies maritime security and humanitarian assistance as core competencies, a post 9/11 environment in which maritime intercept operations and irregular warfare are key, the rise of piracy, increasing joint and combined operations, the growing capacity to share information, and the modernization of the fleet. An expanded discussion of the submarine-related aspects of command is also included.

"N. A. M. Rodger provides reassessments of such famous figures as Pepys, Hawke, Howe, and St. Vincent. The particular and distinct qualities of Nelson and Collingwood are contrasted, and the world of the officers and men who made up the originals of Jack Aubrey and Horatio Hornblower is brought to life. Rodger's comparative view of other navies - French, Dutch, Spanish, and American - allows him to make a fresh assessment of the qualities of the British."--BOOK JACKET.

Reproduction of the original: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian Stafford Corbett

From one of the most admired admirals of his generation—and the only admiral to serve as Supreme Allied Commander at NATO—comes a remarkable voyage through all of the world’s most important bodies of water, providing the story of naval power as a driver of human history and a crucial element in our current geopolitical path. From the time of the Greeks and the Persians clashing in the Mediterranean, sea power has determined world power. To an extent that is often underappreciated, it still does. No one understands this better than Admiral Jim Stavridis. In Sea Power, Admiral Stavridis takes us with him on a tour of the world’s oceans from the admiral’s chair, showing us how the geography of the oceans has shaped the destiny of nations, and how naval power has in a real sense made the world we live in today, and will shape the world we live in tomorrow. Not least, Sea Power is marvelous naval history, giving us fresh insight into great naval engagements from the battles of Salamis and Lepanto through to Trafalgar, the Battle of the Atlantic, and submarine conflicts of the Cold War. It is also a keen-eyed reckoning with the likely sites of our next major naval conflicts, particularly the Arctic Ocean, Eastern Mediterranean, and the South China Sea. Finally, Sea Power steps back to take a holistic view of the plagues to our oceans that are best seen that way, from piracy to pollution. When most of us look at a globe, we focus on the shape of the of the seven continents. Admiral Stavridis sees the shapes of the seven seas. After reading Sea Power, you will too. Not since Alfred Thayer Mahan’s legendary The Influence of Sea Power upon History have we had such a powerful reckoning with this vital subject.

This infectiously readable memoir by the most colorful and controversial Navy Secretary in memory provides the inside story of the origins and battles at home and abroad in building a 600-ship Navy. Young, bright, and ambitious, John Lehman came to office refusing to be just another figurehead. For the six years he served in the Reagan administration, he helped forge an aggressive strategy for achieving maritime supremacy and for rebuilding the U.S. Navy. In this bestselling personal account of those years between 1981 and 1987, he speaks with candor and authority about the ills of the military establishment and the struggles and frustrations he encountered. Lehman reveals instances of political intrigue, including his dramatic Oval Office confrontation with Admiral Rickover at the time of the admiral's firing in 1982 and battles within the Pentagon and Congress. His explanation of the administration's new naval strategy has been called the most comprehensive and lucid ever written, and his descriptions of the Navy in combat over Libya, Lebanon, and Grenada are packed with fascinating details that only an insider could know. The bold insights he presents of a critical turning point in the Cold War will continue to inform and, with the addition of new material to this paperback edition, promise to renewed discussion of the role of the U.S. Navy then and into the future.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett emerged as foundational thinkers on naval strategy and maritime power. Important in their lifetimes, their writings remain relevant in the contemporary environment. The significance of Corbett and Mahan to modern naval strategy seems beyond question, but too often their theories are simplified or used without a real understanding of their fundamental bases.Labeling a strategy, operation, or even a navy “Mahanian” or “Corbettian” tells very little. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought provides an in-depth introduction and a means to stimulate discussion about the theories of Mahan and Corbett. Although there is no substitute for opening the actual writings of Mahan and Corbett, this requires time, not just to read but most importantly to understand how states exploit the sea in the strategic sense. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought takes the reader from their grand strategic foundations of sea power and maritime strategy, through their ideas about naval warfare and strategy, to how Mahan and Corbett thought a navy should integrate with other instruments of national power, and finally, to how they thought states with powerful navies win wars. This window into naval strategy provides twenty-first-century readers an understanding of what navies can and perhaps more importantly cannot do in the international environment.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.