The Collected Works Of James M Buchanan

An index to the series "The Collected works of James M. Buchanan."

"The Limits of Liberty is concerned mainly with two topics. One is an attempt to construct a new contractarian theory of the state, and the other deals with its legitimate limits. The latter is a matter of great practical importance and is of no small significance from the standpoint of political philosophy."—Scott Gordon, Journal of Political Economy James Buchanan offers a strikingly innovative approach to a pervasive problem of social philosophy. The problem is one of the classic paradoxes concerning man's freedom in society: in order to protect individual freedom, the state must restrict each person's right to act. Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions.

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory. The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's book-length works such as 'The Calculus of Consent' or 'The Reason of Rules' (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan') are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioural models to government. But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice. In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings: general approach; public choice and its critics; voters; voting models; rent seeking; regulation; public choice and public expenditures. As Robert D Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, "Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works', these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."

Public-goods theory constituted a major element in James M. Buchanan's research agenda throughout the 1960s. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods is a major part of that work. At the time that Buchanan was elaborating on his theories of public goods, the prevailing trend in public economics was the emergence of public-expenditure theory, which attempted to form a comprehensive theory of the state around the notion of market failure. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods established Buchanan's broad purpose of explicitly comparing market performance with political performance. As such, the book is an important part of Buchanan's contractarian theory of the "productive state." Conceived originally as a series of lectures given at Cambridge University in 1961 and 1962, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods is written for students, but is in no way a textbook of dry pedagogy. Instead, as Geoffrey Brennan writes in the foreword, "What Buchanan provides here is a clear statement of the contractarian approach to public goods problems, very much in the 'voluntary exchange' tradition of Wicksell and Lindhal." James M. Buchanan (1919-2013) was an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and was considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

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In one of the major publishing endeavors of recent decades, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, the Nobel laureate in Economics in 1986, is being published in twenty volumes under the auspices of The Liberty Fund. The series will include ten monographs and all of the important journal articles, papers, and essays that Buchanan has produced in a distinguished career spanning more than a half-century. The monographs will appear in a new form and with the addition of indexes in those cases where no index or only a partial index was originally provided. In addition, each volume includes a foreword by one of the series' three editors, Professors Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt, and Robert D Tollison, each of whom is a distinguished economist in his own right. This is a series that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It is a series that will also appeal to the general student of liberty, for Buchanan has, perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar, helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterizes so much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of 'the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals,' and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty."

Democracy in Deficit is one of the early comprehensive attempts to apply the basic principles of public-choice analysis to macroeconomic theory and policy. According to Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, "The central purpose of the book was to examine the simple precepts of Keynesian economics through the lens of public-choice theory. The basic discovery was that Keynesian economics had a bias toward deficits in terms of political self-interest.” Democracy in Deficit opened the door for much of the current work on political business cycles and the incorporation of public-choice considerations into macroeconomic theory. Even in the area of monetarism, Buchanan’s landmark work has greatly influenced the sway of contemporary theorists away from the nearly universally held belief of Keynesian theory. Democracy in Deficit contributes greatly to Buchanan’s lifelong fiscal and monetary rules to guide long-term policy in macroeconomics. The book serves to bolster Buchanan’s central beliefs in the necessity of a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in monetary rules rather than central bank discretion. The book is co-authored with Richard Wagner, a respected colleague of Buchanan, whom Buchanan recognized as helping to keep the book free of polemics and on target with its central purpose of applying the elementary theory of public choice. James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century. The entire series will include: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods Volume 6: Cost and Choice Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit Volume 9: The Power to Tax Volume 10: The Reason of Rules Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice Volume 14: Debt and Taxes Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events Volume 20: Indexes

A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making

Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government