The Changing Nature Of Warfare The Factors Mediating Future Conflict And Implications For Special Operations Forces

This book challenges the prevailing sentiment regarding the nature of war. Designed to generate discussion on topics where little or none has been acceptable, it pushes the envelope of traditional political and military science thinking. It argues that the nature of war has changed at a fundamental level-that of definition. Further, information technology is so pervasive and interpenetrating that its impact cannot be relegated to mere alteration in the techniques by which war is prosecuted. Rather, information technology facilitates new social structures, exacerbates competing hierarchical beliefs, and, combined with other factors, enhances the ability of powerful nations, or other philosophical organizations, to impose their will on adversaries. It is this ability for imposition of will, not the level of violence inflicted, that will determine whether or not a conflict has been won or lost. Other sacred cows are gored in this book by stating: >The nation-state is a failing concept with limited utility and great liability >Boundaries, once thought to be absolute, are in reality arbitrary >Ideology, not materialism, motivates many people and therefore sources of conflict and terrorism cannot be eliminated solely by reducing poverty >Personal allegiance(s) will no longer be assured >Violence, while it will remain prominent, will be optional in future conflicts

This paper challenges the prevailing sentiment regarding the nature of war. Designed to generate discussion on topics where little or none has been acceptable, it pushes the envelope of traditional political and military science thinking. It argues that the nature of war has changed at a fundamental level-that of definition. Further, information technology is so pervasive and interpenetrating that its impact cannot be relegated to mere alteration in the techniques by which war is prosecuted. Rather, information technology facilitates new social structures, exacerbates competing hierarchical beliefs, and, combined with other factors, enhances the ability of powerful nations, or other philosophical organizations, to impose their will on adversaries.

This work argues for a shift in expectations for "unconventional warfare" with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.

The U.S. National Security Strategy is the basis of a preventive solution through global engagement, which fosters international interoperability and cooperation to defeat complex asymmetric threats. The study examined how U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) can advance this interoperability and cooperation, and identified three evolving roles; Strike Force, Warrior Diplomats, and Global Scouts. As they transition into the 21st century, the central research question is: will U.S. Army Special Forces need to redefine themselves in terms of mission, doctrine, training, or organization as a result of their evolving roles conditioned by an asymmetric threat environment? The study examined the relevance of core, collateral, and emerging missions. It concluded that basic SF doctrine remains sound, but the changing environment and evolving roles of SF will call for a certain amount of refinement. Tactics, techniques, and procedures will change as new technologies are introduced into SF organizations, but emphasis on the human element remains essential, and SF core competencies and warrior skills must be preserved. The study concluded with recommendations to preserve the relevance and efficiency of SF as the premier mechanism for extending U.S. influence in a world of increased global interaction, required to meet security needs.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of "command of the sea" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm.

The moment in the sun for special operations sometimes appears to have passed, seemingly eclipsed by preparations for potential conflict under the guise of "great power" competition, combined with failure in Afghanistan. Yet the war in Ukraine serves as a reminder that special operations play an even greater role today?before, during and presumably after conflict. The challenge remains dealing with current irregular and hybrid threats, at the same time as preparing for an uncertain future, as threats and technologies evolve at a dizzying pace. Focusing too much on the future of conventional warfare creates a void in national security discussions related to special operations. This book seeks to fill that gap, drawing on the expertise of scholars and practitioners in the field, from the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the United States, to answer what, if anything, special operations can or should seek to do, and how. The contributors explore such topics as proxies, non-state special forces, capabilities, innovation and transformation, artificial intelligence, and special operations in space and cyberspace. These chapters are united by their analysis that special operations will have future strategic and operational value, for allies and adversaries alike, provided that difficult choices are made in the present.

This volume of the Future of Warfare series examines some of the most significant factors shaping military trends over the next ten to 15 years: changes in the size, quality, and character of military forces available to the United States and its potential adversaries. The report identifies six trends that will shape who and where the United States is most likely to fight in the future, how those wars will be conducted, and why they will occur. These trends are: decreasing U.S. conventional force size, increasing near-peer conventional modernization and professionalization, continuing development of asymmetric capabilities by second-tier powers, increasing adversary use of gray-zone tactics, continuing democratization of violence, and emerging artificial intelligence as a class of disruptive technologies.

This 2018 study focuses on command and control for irregular warfare operations and the organizational design elements that determine when special operations forces (SOF) can be a supported command. The complexities, uncertainty, speed, and need for interoperability in the 21st-century operational environment require flexible organizations capable of integrating across U.S. governmental agencies. Integration and organizational flexibility are fundamental to conventional forces-but what about their interdependence with SOF to achieve maximum effects? Militaries have long been uniting conventional and irregular forces. Since the Revolutionary War, U.S. conventional and irregular forces have fought side by side. Throughout each conflict, SOF have performed a supporting role. The conditions on today's battlefields are much more decentralized and much less simple. The environment is unstable, with U.S. and enemy forces conducting asymmetrical warfare. Insurgencies have required fighting unconventionally. Additionally, information flows can cause friction that further destabilizes the environment. The argument is not that conventional forces cannot adapt to a dynamic operational environment-only that their organizational structure is less effective in an uncertain or complex environment. Dynamic, unpredictable environments call for an organic, decentralized structure. Insights from organizational theory suggest SOF units can be the supported command in these conditions. I. INTRODUCTION * A. THESIS QUESTION * B. RESEARCH AND SCOPE * C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW * D. METHODOLOGY * 1. Performance within the General Environment * 2. Structural Configuration * 3. Galbraith Star Model * 4. Projected Results * II. CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT * III. CASE STUDIES * A. SPECIAL ACTIONS FORCES (SAF) 1963-1972 * 1. Introduction * 2. Background (1953-1962) * 3. Analysis * 4. Conclusion * B. AFGHANISTAN VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS * C. TASK FORCE VIKING * 1. Introduction * 2. Background * 3. Analysis * 4. Conclusion * IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * A. FUTURE CONFLICT TRENDS * B. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE * C. CONCLUSION * APPENDIX. GLOSSARY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN TERMS