The Changing Effect Of Amicus Curiae Briefs On The United States Supreme Court

Over the course of the twentieth century, there has been a substantial increase in the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in the Supreme Court. These briefs provide the justices with important information from third parties regarding a case. Oftentimes, amicus briefs work to persuade the justices to decide a case in a certain manner. The government, interest groups, private citizens, and foreign entities all file these briefs. Through filing these briefs, they seek to promote their interests and viewpoints to the Court. As amicus brief participation has increased, the Court has been able to hear the opinions of individuals and entities it otherwise would not have been privy to. The United States Supreme Court is also the most insulated branch of government from public opinion, due to in part by the life-time tenures of the justices on the Court. This allows the members of the Court to make rulings without regard for public backlash or fear of being removed from the bench. These factors have led to research into what instances is the Court more or less likely to listen to the opinions of the amicus brief filers. Variables coded include the amount of language that the Court includes in its majority opinions from the filed amicus curiae briefs, whether the Court cites amicus briefs in the footnotes of its majority opinion, whether the brief filer is a public or private entity, the decision of the lower court, and the ideological direction of the Supreme Courts decision in order to develop a better understanding of how influential these brief filers actually are to the Court. The results of this study indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between the partisanship of the amicus brief filer and the majority decision of the Court. The decision of the lower court also had a statistically significant and negative relationship with the majority opinion of the Court, which demonstrates that there is a greater likelihood that the justices will overturn the decision of the lower court and produce an ideologically opposite majority opinion. The United States Solicitor General also had a high amicus brief success rate. Of the fifteen cases in which the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief, ten of the majority opinions of the Court reflected the same ideology set forth by the Solicitor Generals amicus brief.

First edition, 1998, had subtitle : How to write it and use it effectively.

For decades scholars have investigated the role of amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court decision-making. Existing work on the influence of these briefs on opinion content focuses exclusively on the use of "borrowed language" where the justices take language directly from the briefs and incorporate it into their majority opinions. Most of the time justices borrow language without attribution. However, much less often, they decide to formally cite the amici. This presents an interesting puzzle; why do justices sometimes borrow language without attribution while at other times they explicitly cite amici while using little of their language?In this dissertation I argue that borrowing language from an amicus brief and citing it are two distinct uses, done for different reasons, with different implications. Borrowing language is unique in that it is discreet in nature and is unlikely to be revealed to the reader. Therefore, the justices have leeway when it comes to borrowing language as there should be limited influence on perceptions of the Court and its decisions (i.e. the Court's legitimacy). Citing amicus curiae briefs, however, is much different in that it is clearly revealed to the reader. As such, there can be implications for the Court's legitimacy depending on what types of interests the justices cite. I test the implications of this theory using data on over 1,600 cases where amicus briefs were filed in the 1988-2008 terms. I find that the justices borrow language when they need information, and they borrow from ideologically congruent actors. I also find that the evidence on whether they deliberately avoid citing ideologically extreme interests is mixed. On the one hand, they cite less frequently and are less likely to cite in salient cases, but they do still cite ideologically overt interests. Finally, I implement a survey experiment using a high quality, census balanced sample of 3,000 respondents to test whether citations can influence acceptance of Supreme Court decisions. I find that the public is less accepting of citations to ideologically extreme interests and that they are less accepting of decisions that cite interests that are ideologically incompatible with their own preferences

This is a compendium volume of amicus briefs (the largest number ever presented to the Supreme Court) for the use of scholars in this field.