The Behavior Of Real Interest Rates In Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Programs

This paper examines the behavior of real interest rates in exchange-rate based stabilization programs. The analysis is based on a model with imperfect capital mobility and optimizing agents. A permanent reduction in the devaluation rate is first shown to have an ambiguous effect on real interest rates on impact. The analysis is then extended to consider a stabilization program characterized by an initial reduction in the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, and the announcement of a future increase in income taxes. The impact effect on real interest rates is shown to depend upon the degree of credibility of the announcement. Real interest rates may fall if agents do not believe that taxes will be raised, and rise if the future tax reform is sufficiently credible.

This paper examines the behavior of real interest rates at the inception of exchange-rate-based stabilization programs. The analysis is based on an optimizing model of a small open economy facing imperfect world capital markets. A reduction in the devaluation rate is shown to have a positive impact on real interest rates. By contrast, a program characterized by an initial reduction in the devaluation rate and a perceived future increase in government spending has an ambiguous effect - which depends in particular on the degree of credibility of the fiscal policy stance.

This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility, a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption. In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.

This paper studies price stabilization policy under both predetermined and flexible exchange rates. Under predetermined exchange rates, a non-credible stabilization program results in an initial expansion of output, followed by a later recession. The initial expansion accompanies an appreciating real exchange rate. Under flexible exchange rates, the recession occurs at the beginning of the program. The real exchange rate appreciates sharply on impact but depreciates afterwards. Lack of credibility is more costly under predetermined exchange rates because the real effects are more pronounced.

Complementing the explanation provided by Calvo and Vegh (1994) for money-based stabilization programs, exchange rate uncertainty introduced to a particular version of the portfolio approach with imperfect competition in the banking system leads to a bias toward appreciation that is directly related to the divergence of expectations and that dampens the interaction between portfolio movements and the real exchange rate. Based on Frankel-Froot, uncertainty exists when the fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate is temporarily unknown in a foreign exchange market with two types of agents: ‘parity-guessers,’ who expect a jump to a reference parity level, and ‘money-followers,’ who expect nominal depreciation equal to the monetary rule.

In high inflation economies exchange- rate- based stabilizations typically start with a boom, with the recession coming later. In contrast, in similar programs in the moderate inflation European economies, the recession generally appears upfront. When such programs result in a boom, it is driven by different forces than in the high inflation economies.

Do exchange-rate-based stabilizations generate distinctive economic dynamics? To address this question, this paper identifies stabilization episodes using criteria that differ from those in previous empirical studies of exchange-rate-based stabilizations. We find that, while some differences can be detected between exchange-rate-based stabilizations and stabilizations where the exchange rate is not the anchor, the behavior of important variables does not appear to differ—especially output growth, which is good in both cases. There is also no evidence that fiscal discipline is enhanced by adopting an exchange-rate anchor, or that there are any systematic differences in the success records of stabilizations that use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and those that do not.

This paper compares the experience with exchange-rate–based stabilization (ERBS) of four Western European countries with that of high-inflation developing countries. In general, the behavior of key macroeconomic variables—inflation, output, demand, the real exchange rate and the current account—in the four countries examined did not correspond to the pattern observed in developing countries, although some resemblance to this pattern could be found in Italy in 1987–92 and Greece in 1994–96. The experience with ERBS in Western Europe highlights the importance of incomes policy as an ingredient of a successful stabilization program and shows that the adoption of a looser anchor does not necessarily reduce the output cost of disinflation.