The Basic Principles Of Operational Art And Tactics A Soviet View Translated And Published Under The Auspices Of The United States Air Force

The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics was translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The original Russian edition was published by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense in the USSR.The author, Colonel Vasiliy Yefisovich Savkin, has served on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy. As a candidate of Military Science he has written several military affairs articles and authored at least two earlier books.According to Soviet military theorists, operational art and tactics are two of the three components of military art. The third is strategy. Operational art is the connecting link between strategy and tactics, and is called on to work out the theory and practice of preparing and conducting contemporary operations. This book, focusing on operational art and tactics, does not deal with either doctrine, which represents the official Soviet view of the nature of a future war, or strategy, since the most important aspect of strategy is policy. In U.S. terms the book treats operations, tactics, laws of war and laws of armed conflict.

This work considers the modern antecedants and evolution of the operational art in military thought and practice in both peace and wartime. This theme is developed over time and across military cultures. A comparative framework allows the treatment of the overall theme by examining the concept of the operational art in the context of different nationalities, different military organizations, and different societies. This study situates the current operational art in its historical context.

The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.