The Arab Israeli Conflict In Soviet Us Relations

Israel's relations with each of the superpowers was determined by global factors. The dilemma facing Israel was how to reconcile its interests with those of the United States, having failed to do so with the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the cold war the United States considered Israel a burden rather than an asset and had to accommodate support for Israel with keeping the Arab states within the western orbit. Partisan policy could have dealt a mortal blow to the fundamental assumption of American global strategy. Namely that the Middle East should not be allowed to become a cold war arena. The book shows how the fledgling state of Israel had to manoeuvre between the superpowers to survive.

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of détente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War détente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as détente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.–Soviet relations.

An |sraeli Ambassador's account of the longest and most tense period in Israeli-Soviet diplomatic relations, from their renewal in 1953 to their severance in 1967. His work analyses the era from the month preceding Stalin's death to the weeks following the Six Day War - one of severance, resumption and then severance again- along two parallel processes.

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.

The dramatic global, regional and domestic changes that occurred after the unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union have created a need to examine a host of theoretical and practical issues, particularly in regard to security and foreign relations. The U.S.-Israeli 'special relationships' is no exception. This seemed, and is still viewed as, one of the most solid and stable bilateral relationships. Yet the new international and domestic reality in both the U.S. and Israel warrants a thorough re-examination. The essays in this collection deal with, among other things, the general global setting and its implications for this relationship; with 'hard' strategic factors; and less tangible aspects, such as American images of Israel, the attitudes of other American religious denominations, and the situation of the American Jewish community.

This 1977 book was undertaken with the purpose of determining the degree of Soviet involvement in the Middle East crisis, from the expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972, through the planning stage of the war and the war itself, up to the disengagement agreements which in fact finally brought the war to a close. Dr Golan first investigates Soviet interests in the region, particularly in connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the relationships of these regional interests - be they strategic, political, economic or ideological - to Soviet global interests. There follows a detailed study of Soviet policy towards the Middle East crisis as seen through Soviet relations with the Arab states and the Palestinians, Soviet propaganda to the Arab world, Soviet-American relations, Soviet domestic and international problems related to Middle East policy, and, more specifically, the Soviet attitude towards a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This book surveys discourse and opinion in the United States toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1991. Contrary to popular myth, it demonstrates that U.S. support for Israel is not based on the pro-Israel lobby, but rather is deeply rooted in American political culture. That support has increased since 9/11. However, the bulk of this increase has been among Republicans, conservatives, evangelicals, and Orthodox Jews. Meanwhile, among Democrats, liberals, the Mainline Protestant Church, and non-Orthodox Jews, criticism of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians has become more vociferous. This book works to explain this paradox.