The Air Campaign Planning For Combat

One of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimensions of war. Explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. Focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. Presents fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. 20 photos. Bibliography.

In the short history of air warfare, no nation with superior air forces has ever lost a war to the force of enemy arms. Air superiority by itself, however, no longer guarantees victory. This book, one of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimension of war, explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. In The Air Campaign, Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively-through rough mass, concentration, and economy of forces-because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.

In "The Air Campaign," Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively -- through mass, concentration, and economy of forces -- because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.

"The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war." Colin Powell Colin Powell, My American Journey Since its original publication The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.

The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war. Colin PowellColin Powell, My American JourneySince its original publication The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.

Much has been made about the planning for and execution of the aerial dimension of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A major debate both within and outside of the US Air Force has been associated with the influence of Col John Warden. He was then a member of the Air Staff in the Pentagon and theoretically without an assigned function in theater-level campaign planning. Arguments that the Gulf War was a manifestation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) with profound implications have greatly but unnecessarily complicated the debate. Equally important is the argument that antedated the Gulf War to the effect that such conflicts between states using conventional weapons and methods are a passing phenomenon. The Gulf War might have been the last of its breed.

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the context of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success-a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future. C. R. Anderegg Director of Air Force History

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the con- text of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future.