The Air Campaign

One of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimensions of war. Explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. Focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. Presents fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. 20 photos. Bibliography.

In the short history of air warfare, no nation with superior air forces has ever lost a war to the force of enemy arms. Air superiority by itself, however, no longer guarantees victory. This book, one of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimension of war, explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. In The Air Campaign, Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively-through rough mass, concentration, and economy of forces-because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

In light of the age-old belief of Confucius that no idea is new, Dr. Mets examines the role of Colonel Warden in the Gulf War to determine if a revolution in military affairs had occurred. He relies on several twentieth-century antecedents to Warden, including Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell to distill a pattern. Mets also addresses whether "the argument that antedated the Gulf War to the effect that such conflicts between states using conventional weapons and methods are a pressing phenomenon." Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, provides an overview of Mets's discussion.

An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.

From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe.Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the con- text of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future.

The #1 New York Times bestseller-updated with additional information on the current Iraq War-now in trade paperback. General Chuck Horner commanded the U.S. and allied air assets-the forces of a dozen nations- during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and was responsible for the design and execution of one of the most devastating air campaigns in history. Never before has the Gulf air war planning, a process filled with controversy and stormy personalities, been revealed in such rich, provocative detail. In this edition of Every Man a Tiger, General Horner looks at the current Gulf conflict and comments on the use of air power in Iraq.

In 1940, the strategically vital island of Malta was Britain's last toehold in the central Mediterranean, wreaking havoc among Axis shipping. Launching an air campaign to knock Malta out of the war, first Italy and then Germany sought to force a surrender or reduce the defences enough to allow an invasion. Drawing on original documents, multilingual aviation analyst Ryan Noppen explains how technical and tactical problems caused the original Italian air campaign of 1940–41 to fail, and then how the German intervention came close to knocking Malta out of the war. Using stunning full colour artwork, this fascinating book explains why the attempt by the Axis powers to take the British colony of Malta ultimately failed.