Taxation Of Foreign Business Income Within The European Internal Market

The rules of the Member States on the taxation of the foreign business income of companies, whether such rules are based on the fiscal principle of territoriality or on the principle of worldwide taxation, are in conflict with the objective of achievement of the internal market. This objective is indeed difficult to reach when it comes to the taxation of foreign income, given that the Member States are far from taxing companies doing business cross-border as if their operations were purely domestic. Areas of conflict include particularly the taxation of foreign profits, the deduction of foreign losses, the elimination of international double taxation and the attribution of profits to permanent establishments. This dissertation analyses this conflict on the basis of a study of the case law of the European Court of Justice as well as some of the key provisions of the European treaties. It appears that both the fiscal principle of territoriality and the principle of worldwide taxation give rise to complex issues of compatibility with the law of the European Union. Although the analysis conducted throughout the dissertation provides some guidance for the taxation of the foreign business income of companies, it is concluded that the Court cannot, by itself, efficiently resolve the conflict between such taxation and the objective of achievement of the internal market.

Carsten Wendt analyses the necessity, the concept as well as potential advantages and effects of a common tax base for multinational enterprises in the European Union. He addresses important issues concerning a common tax base, such as the definition of the consolidated group, the technique and scope of consolidation and the formula used to allocate the consolidated tax base among the involved member states.

Analysis of problems in the field of company taxation in the Internal Market: the obstacles to cross-border economic activity and their possible remedies. This study (the major source document for the European Commission's policy statement on company taxation COM (2001) 582 also considers the possibilities for a reform of company taxation at EU level which would aim at providing companies with a single consolidated tax base for their EU-wide activities.

Tax competition in the form of harmful tax practices can distort trade and investment patterns, erode national tax bases and shift part of the tax burden onto less mobile tax bases. The Report emphasises that governments must intensify their cooperative actions to curb harmful tax practices.

How should Europe respond to society's calls for a sound and properly functioning corporate tax system for the internal market? With the aim of contributing to the deliberations on this subject, the proposal of the author is for the EU Member States to jump ahead in the debate and remodel the CCTB/CCCTB draft directives into a new system of international taxation, i.e. a unitary taxation model for taxing the worldwide economic profits of multinationals, using a destination-based apportionment formula (CCCTB 2.0) to apportion the tax base to countries both within and outside the European Union. Under such a system, it would be up to the EU Member States themselves to determine the rate applying to the tax base apportioned to them. This would take tax out of the equation in the case of marginal financing and investment decisions, while also curtailing its influence on investment location decisions and, at the same time, making 'gaming the system' more difficult. EU Member States would, in turn, regain their autonomy to set their corporate tax rates at the levels they regard as appropriate, while the proposed model would also end the 'race to the bottom' within the European Union. If the European Union were to be the first mover, self-interest would prompt other countries and regions to follow its lead. The resulting production location neutrality would encourage international businesses to embrace the model and lobby for transition as rapidly as possible. Driven by self-interest and competitive responses, such a move could initiate a transition to the worldwide adoption of destination-based taxation of excess earnings - in other words, harmonization through competition. As the innovator, the European Union would enjoy the greatest economic benefit during the transitional period, when countries' profit tax systems would be evolving towards an equilibrium in which destination-based tax would become the new global standard. The final destination would be a new destination-based company tax paradigm operating both neutrally and non-discriminatorily on the supply side. That would produce a result that would not only be fair, but would also - and primarily - provide a systemic and economically efficient solution for the international problem of BEPS.

How should Europe respond to society's calls for a sound and properly functioning corporate tax system for the internal market? With the aim of contributing to the deliberations on this subject, the proposal of the author is for the EU Member States to jump ahead in the debate and remodel the CCTB/CCCTB draft directives into a new system of international taxation, i.e. a unitary taxation model for taxing the worldwide economic profits of multinationals, using a destination-based apportionment formula (CCCTB 2.0) to apportion the tax base to countries both within and outside the European Union. Under such a system, it would be up to the EU Member States themselves to determine the rate applying to the tax base apportioned to them. This would take tax out of the equation in the case of marginal financing and investment decisions, while also curtailing its influence on investment location decisions and, at the same time, making 'gaming the system' more difficult. EU Member States would, in turn, regain their autonomy to set their corporate tax rates at the levels they regard as appropriate, while the proposed model would also end the 'race to the bottom' within the European Union. If the European Union were to be the first mover, self-interest would prompt other countries and regions to follow its lead. The resulting production location neutrality would encourage international businesses to embrace the model and lobby for transition as rapidly as possible. Driven by self-interest and competitive responses, such a move could initiate a transition to the worldwide adoption of destination-based taxation of excess earnings - in other words, harmonization through competition. As the innovator, the European Union would enjoy the greatest economic benefit during the transitional period, when countries' profit tax systems would be evolving towards an equilibrium in which destination-based tax would become the new global standard. The final destination would be a new destination-based company tax paradigm operating both neutrally and non-discriminatorily on the supply side. That would produce a result that would not only be fair, but would also - and primarily - provide a systemic and economically efficient solution for the international problem of BEPS.Full-text Paper.

"When it comes to taxation, administrative costs to the tax authorities and compliance costs to the taxpayers arise. A lot of studies have already been conducted in order to shed more light on such “hidden costs” of taxation. Particularly in the field of transfer pricing, administrative and compliance costs are assumed to be quite high due to the obligation of computing and documenting an arm’s length price for each intra-group-transaction. Apparently, European policy makers have also become aware of this problem since the European Commission’s report released in 2001 (“Company Taxation in the Internal Market”) recommends targeted measures in the short run and comprehensive ones in the long run, crossing the border line of the currently prevailing transfer pricing approach, inter alia in order to combat compliance costs in the field of transfer pricing. Eighteen national reports from countries all over the world and a general report deal with the basics of administrative and compliance costs of taxation in general as well as compliance costs in the field of transfer pricing in particular. The book is completed by three special reports on certain issues. The findings of the reports included is greatly influenced by the discussions on the occasion of the Jean Monnet Conference on this topic which was held in spring 2006 in Rust (Austria) under the academic guidance of the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration." -- Back cover.

High profile cases before the European Commission and the EU courts have intensified scrutiny of the link between State aid law and the taxation of multinational enterprises. Certain decisions have raised questions about fiscal sovereignty and the interpretation of the rules on State aid – in particular the notion of selectivity, which have not been addressed in detail by existing research. The combination of the evolution of the notion of selectivity in State aid law, on the one hand, and the need to adapt the rules for the taxation of the profits of multinational enterprises to the modern economy, on the other hand, makes it necessary to assess whether existing as well as alternative rules for the allocation of the corporate tax base might entail a selective treatment. This book responds to the need of research in the area of State aid law applied to the taxation of the income of multinational enterprises, focusing on the crucial concept of selectivity. The analysis proceeds with a detailed investigation of the theoretical issues that arise when applying the selectivity test in State aid law to three methods for the allocation of the corporate tax base between the members of multinational enterprises: – the arm’s length principle; – transfer pricing safe harbours; and – systems of formula apportionment. This research project is conducted at a theoretical level, without considering national provisions or particular tax treaties. The author suggests an analytical framework on the application of the selectivity test to the three allocation methods. It is concluded that these methods are likely to have certain selective features, with varying possibilities to be justified by the inner logic of a corporate income tax system. It is also demonstrated that selectivity occurs for different reasons, due to the different rationales of the three allocation methods. This book is intended at contributing to the academic literature on the impact of State aid law on the principles for the taxation of the income of multinational enterprises. The outcome of this research project is also relevant for lawmakers who need to reconcile the imperatives of State aid law with the design of rules that match their tax policies, as well as for judges or lawyers who apply the rules on State aid to tax provisions.