State Fusion Centers

The 9/11 Commission investigating the September 11, 2001, attacks concluded that the nationOCOs intelligence community had failed to OCyconnect the dots, OCO thus ushering in the era of homeland security. As a result state and local fusion centers emerged; however, there is little research available addressing either their activities or effectiveness. Joyal explores these and related issues. Drawing upon the perceptions of those working in and closely with state fusion centers, particularly law enforcement, it appears that fusion centers are successful in improving law enforcementOCOs ability to collect and share information; however, they continue to struggle with several challenges, namely developing robust analytical capabilities and overcoming persistent subcultural obstacles."

The United States has poured over a billion dollars into a network of interagency intelligence centers called “fusion centers.” These centers were ostensibly set up to prevent terrorism, but politicians, the press, and policy advocates have criticized them for failing on this account. So why do these security systems persist? Pacifying the Homeland travels inside the secret world of intelligence fusion, looks beyond the apparent failure of fusion centers, and reveals a broader shift away from mass incarceration and toward a more surveillance- and police-intensive system of social regulation. Provided with unprecedented access to domestic intelligence centers, Brendan McQuade uncovers how the institutionalization of intelligence fusion enables decarceration without fully addressing the underlying social problems at the root of mass incarceration. The result is a startling analysis that contributes to the debates on surveillance, mass incarceration, and policing and challenges readers to see surveillance, policing, mass incarceration, and the security state in an entirely new light.

The value proposition for fusion centres is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent manmade (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. As recipients of federal government-provided national intelligence, another goal of fusion centres is to model how events inimical to U.S. interests overseas may be manifested in their communities, and align protective resources accordingly. There are several risks to the fusion centre concept -- including potential privacy and civil liberties violations, and the possible inability of fusion centres to demonstrate utility in the absence of future terrorist attacks, particularly during periods of relative state fiscal austerity. Fusion centres are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one "model" for how a centre should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centres.

Contents: (1) Increase in Precursor Crimes: Causes; Decline in State Sponsorship; Amateurization of Terror; Shift in Threat Environ.; Enhanced Counterterrorism Measures; (2) Ex. of Terrorist Precursor Activity in the U.S.: Front Bus. and Charities; Counterfeiting Money; Counterfeit Goods; Fraud (Benefits, Food Stamps); Narcotics; Smuggling and Import/Export Violations; Bribery; Robbery/Theft; Phone Scams and Cell Phone Activity; Immigration and Identity Crimes; Incitement; Training; Div. of Labor within Terrorist Org.; Potential for Ident. and Infiltration; Fundraising and Longevity of Terror Campaigns; Precursor Crimes¿ Effect on Threat Environ.; (3) Fed. Role, and SLT Role in Intell./Invest. of Crimes; Coord. of Fed. and SLT Efforts.

Following 9/11, state and local gov¿ts. formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing info., the fed. gov¿t. -- incl. the Dept. of Homeland Security, Dept. of Justice, and the Program Manager for the Info. Sharing Environ. -- is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on: (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of 9/07; and (2) fed. efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This report is based on an 10/07 report on 58 fusion centers and related fed. efforts to support them as well as updated info. obtained by reviewing plans describing selected fed. efforts. Includes recommend. Illus.

This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.

In the aftermath of the information sharing failures leading to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York City, at the Pentagon, and in a Pennsylvania field, states and localities across the United States established what are known today as State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. Collectively known as the National Network of Fusion Centers, many of these (now numbering 78) fusion centres are still in their infancy. The Homeland has been attacked five times since 2001: the Little Rock Recruiting Station shooting (2009); the Fort Hood shooting (2009); the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day (2009); the attempted car bombing in Times Square (2010), and the Boston Marathon bombings (2013). In the wake of these attacks, we have come to understand that homeland security, including counter-terrorism efforts, must be a national responsibility, a true and equal partnership across all levels of government, and inclusive of the American people themselves. A top down, wholly federal approach simply does not and cannot suffice. Fully integrating state and local law enforcement and emergency response providers as national mission partners requires a grassroots intelligence and analytic capability. This book provides a comprehensive study of the National Network of Fusion Centers in an effort to understand current strengths and gaps and provide recommendations for improvement.

Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.