Spillover From The Conflict In Syria

All roads lead to Damascus and then back out again, but in different directions. The financial and military aid flowing into Syria from patrons and neighbors is intended to determine the outcome of the conflict between a loose confederation of rebel factions and the regime in Damascus. Instead, this outside support has the potential to perpetuate the existing civil war and to ignite larger regional hostilities between Sunni and Shia areas that could reshape the political geography of the Middle East. This report examines the main factors that are likely to contribute to or impede the spread of violence from civil war and insurgency in Syria, and then examines how they apply to Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan.

A unique collaboration providing an analysis of the conflict in Syria, focusing on the integration between legal and political studies.

On June 27, 2012, the American Enterprise Institute, the Institute for the Study of War and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution jointly conducted a one-day crisis simulation that focused on the impact of spillover from the deepening civil war in Syria. The simulation consisted of three moves and featured an American, a Turkish, and a Saudi team. The intent was to explore the interaction between the U.S. government and two of its most important regional allies, allies most able to act in Syria for various reasons (and among the most affected by the violence in Syria). The simulation looked at potential developments between August 2012 and April 2013.

The people of the Mashreq have seen more than their share of deaths, economic losses, and instability over the past decade. As the decade-long conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic created new challenges and worsened the existing ones, economic activity declined, labor markets deteriorated, and poverty increased. These trends would overwhelm even the most advanced economies in the world. The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the Conflict in Syria identifies the impact of the Syrian conflict on economic and social outcomes in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. It combines a large number of data sources, statistical approaches, and a suite of economic models to isolate the specific impact of the Syrian conflict from that of global and regional factors, and it explicitly analyzes the mechanisms through which such an impact is manifested. The analysis suggests that a persistent short-termism in policy making has so far propagated the shock emanating from the Syrian conflict, which led to costly and ineffective service provision, lost economic opportunities, and underfunded programs. The report advocates for a fundamental shift from the short-term mitigation policies to a medium-term regional strategy to address pertinent structural problems. Moreover, as the countries in the Mashreq look toward recovery, a policy approach that takes into account the region’s interconnectedness and seeks to build on it provides better prospects for the people. Such a regional approach that addresses cross-boundary issues—including migration, trade, and infrastructure—will require local, regional, and international commitments.

The Syrian conflict is accelerating Lebanon's political and institutional decline and poses a serious long-term threat to its economy. To describe the increase in violence and instability in Lebanon since the war began as simply a spillover distorts the reality of the situation. More accurately, the Syrian conflict has exposed and deepened preexisting rifts among Lebanese and exacerbated Lebanon's economic challenges. This issue brief assesses the political, security, and humanitarian implications of the Syria crisis in Lebanon. Events in Syria have sharpened existing fault lines in Lebanon due to Hezbollah's involvement in Syria, an increasingly volatile security situation, and a growing refugee problem.

Turkey has struggled to find the right response to the Syrian civil war, which has brought shellfire, bombs, militias, refugees, sectarian tensions and uncertainty to its southern border. It has so far generously welcomed at least 300,000 Syrians. But this number could triple this year and prove unsustainable, with Turkey and the international community slow to work together, the Syrian conflict in a stalemate and Syria turning into a failed state. Turkey should allow entry to destitute Syrians waiting to cross, and change its regulations so that it can better receive international funds and assistance. The international community in turn should be far more generous and engaged in support of the Turkish aid effort. Regionally, the Syria conflict symbolises how Turkey's 'zero problem' policy has become multiple problems. Ankara's bitter feud with Damascus and open support for opposition fighters box it in. The crisis has blocked Turkey's main trade routes to the Arab world and opened a new front in its Kurdish problem. Whereas Turkey in 2008 was praised for its ability to speak to all regional players from Israel to Iran, it has now aligned predominantly with conservative Sunni Muslim partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. New threats from Syria and Iran have persuaded it to revitalise security ties, albeit partially, with its U.S. and EU partners. Turkey is seen increasingly as a partisan actor. While Turkish leaders claim it has sufficient resources to be the region's main power, leverage over Syrian events is clearly limited.

"The Syrian crisis is not over yet but the period of full-fledged civil war in that country appears to be drawing to a close, and it is now possible to view this calamity with some perspective. This short book will address the following questions about the conflict: How and why did quiet demonstrations in Southern Syria develop into a brutal civil war? Why did the political opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Assad remain weak and divided? How did radical Jihadi Islamists take over the main military opposition to the Syrian regime? How did the Syrian conflict become a main arena of the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry? What explains the ambivalent Western attitude towards the Syrian rebellion? How did US policy under the Obama administration evolve and why did both Obama and Trump decide not to make a major investment in it? How stable is the status quo? And how could the conflict re-erupt in a different form? According to Rabinovitch, the Syrian regime and its supporters (including the Russians and the Iranians) have indeed emerged as victors, but it's a limited victory at best. The Syrian state under Assad controls only about 60 percent of the national territory and the potential for renewed violence is considerable. Assad's continued survival has come at the cost of deep dependency on Iran and Russia; his is now, arguably, a vassal state. This means that the country will remain in crisis for the foreseeable future, even if the full-scale civil war phase has come to an end. In his last chapter, Rabinovich will recommend policy options for the U.S"--