Soviet Night Operations In World War Ii

This study examines the extensive experiences of the Soviet Army as it struggled to master the night. Driven by necessity to operate in the relative safety of darkness, the Soviet Army in World War II learned to capitalize on night operations and to exploit that capability in its quest for victory over the German Army, The Soviets have not forgotten that experience, and since the war, they have emphasized the advantages of night combat. As they train for night operations, they closely study the experiences of World War II in the belief that certain basic techniques and conditions of battle transcend time and the vagaries of technological change.

Surprise is a vital ingredient in conducting successful warfare. As early as 500 B.C., the Chinese general Sun Tzu recognized this simple fact in his oft-quoted treatise on the art of war. Throughout history, commanders have employed the darkness of night to gain surprise and to grasp th.e-initiative from the hands of the enemy. Yet, while night operations have progressed from the nocturnal marches of Joshua and the exploits of Judas Maccabeus in biblical times to the more recent firefights in Vietnam and Afghanistan, problems involving special night training, control, and manpower have more often than not dissuaded commanders from attempting large-scale operations in the dark. Night combat has frequently been the recourse af the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is?a double-edged weapan,? and Iike terrain,?it favors the one who best uses it and hinders the one who does not."

Night combat has frequently been the recourse of the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is a double-edged weapon. During World War II, the Soviets effectively exploited darkness in a variety of operations from withdrawal to pursuit. As the war dragged on, the Red Army relied increasingly on night operations and so refined its abilities that it was able to progress from limited tactical missions by relatively small units to front-level operations by armies with complex coordination and control. Today Soviet military writers frequently discuss night operations, as they do all operations, with reference to their experiences in the Second World War. They appear convinced, as one Soviet general and historian has noted, that their troops should be equally capable of operating both during the day and at night and that night operations have an urgent significance in modern warfare.

Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.

The purpose of this text is to provide the Army with a factual account of the organization and operations of the Soviet resistance movement behind the German forces on the Eastern Front during World War II. This movement offers a particularly valuable case study, for it can be viewed both in relation to the German occupation in the Soviet Union and to the offensive and defensive operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. The scope of the study includes an over-all picture of a quasi-military organization in relation to a larger conflict between two regular armies. It is not a study in partisan tactics, nor is it intended to be. German measures taken to combat the partisan movement are sketched in, but the story in large part remains that of an organization and how it operated. The German planning for the invasion of Russia is treated at some length because many of the circumstances which favored the rise and development of the movement had their bases in errors the Germans made in their initial planning. The operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army are likewise described in considerable detail as the backdrop against which the operations of the partisan units are projected. Because of the lack of reliable Soviet sources, the story has been told much as the Germans recorded it. German documents written during the course of World War II constitute the principal sources, but many survivors who had experience in Russia have made important contributions based upon their personal experience.