Southeast Asia Building The Bases

Using photos, maps, charts and extensive travel throughout Vietnam, Tregaskis covered every major port, airfield, bridge, building, hospital, & storage facility engineered & constructed in Vietnam by the United States Navy SEABEES and other military engineers and American civilian engineers (1962-1972). He weaves this story, of one of the largest war-time construction efforts in history, through the backdrop of the major battles of the war and its political intrigues.

Using photos, maps, charts and extensive travel throughout Vietnam, Tregaskis covered every major port, airfield, bridge, building, hospital, & storage facility engineered & constructed in Vietnam by the United States Navy SEABEES and other military engineers and American civilian engineers (1962-1972). He weaves this story, of one of the largest war-time construction efforts in history, through the backdrop of the major battles of the war and its political intrigues.

The Vietnam War ended nearly fifty years ago but the central paradox of the struggle endures: how did the world’s strongest nation fail to secure freedom for the Republic of Vietnam? Michael F. Morris addresses this vexing question by focusing on the senior Marine headquarters in the conflict’s most dangerous region. Known as I Corps, the northern five provinces of South Vietnam witnessed the bloodiest fighting of the entire war. I Corps also contained the Viet Cong’s strongest infrastructure, key portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the important political and economic prizes of Hue and Da Nang. For Americans, it was the site of the first major military operation (Operation STARLITE); the Battles of Hue City and Khe Sanh during the 1968 Tet Offensive; and a military innovation known as the Combined Action Platoon (CAP), a counterinsurgency technique designed to secure the region’s villages. The Marine zone served as Saigon’s “canary in the coal mine”—if the war was to be won, allied action must succeed in its most contested region. With such deep significance, I Corps holds many answers to the lasting questions of the Vietnam War. Following the Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)—the primary US tactical command in I Corps from 1965 to 1970—Corps Competency? provides the first composite analysis of the critical role of the senior Marine headquarters and offers a coherence missing in piecemeal accounts. Despite the critical importance of I Corps, relatively little is known about its overall impact on the war due to disconnected and patchy historical study of the region. In this comprehensive and newly insightful study of the Vietnam War, Michael Morris tells a story that illustrates what can happen when a corps headquarters is not ready for the conflict it encounters and then fights the war it wants to rather than the one it must. The views expressed in this work are those of the author and not the official position of the United States government, Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, or Marine Corps University.