Sextus Empiricus And Pyrrhonean Scepticism

Alan Bailey offers a clear exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism.

Five Modes of Scepticism examines the argument forms that lie at the heart of Pyrrhonian scepticism as expressed in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These are the Agrippan modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity and relativity; modes which are supposed to bring about that quintessentially sceptical mental state of suspended judgement. Stefan Sienkiewicz analyses how the modes are supposed to do this, both individually and collectively, and from two perspectives. On the one hand there is the perspective of the sceptic's dogmatic opponent and on the other there is the perspective of the sceptic himself. Epistemically speaking, the dogmatist and the sceptic are two different creatures with two different viewpoints. The book elucidates the corresponding differences in the argumentative structure of the modes depending on which of these perspectives is adopted. Previous treatments of the modes have interpreted them from a dogmatic perspective; one of the tasks of the present work is to reorient the way in which scholars have traditionally engaged with the modes. Sienkiewicz advocates moving away from the perspective of the sceptic's opponent - the dogmatist - towards the perspective of the sceptic and trying to make sense of how the sceptic can come to suspend judgement on the basis of the Agrippan modes.

Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, is a work of major importance for the history of Greek philosophy. It is the fullest extant account of ancient scepticism, and it is also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Its first part contains an elaborate exposition of the Pyrrhonian variety of scepticism; its second and third parts are critical and destructive, arguing against 'dogmatism' in logic, epistemology, science and ethics - an approach that revolutionized the study of philosophy when Sextus' works were rediscovered and published in the sixteenth century. This volume presents the accurate and readable translation which was first published in 1994, together with a substantial new historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Barnes.

Explores what it was like to argue and to live as a practitioner of Pyrrhonist skepticism.

Brian C. Ribeiro’s Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers invites us to view the Pyrrhonist tradition as involving all those who share a commitment to the activity of Pyrrhonizing and develops fresh, provocative readings of Sextus, Montaigne, and Hume as radical Pyrrhonizing skeptics.

A new and accurate translation of an important work of ancient Greek scepticism.

Casey Perin presents a new interpretation of key ideas and arguments in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a founding text of the Sceptical tradition in philosophy. Perin examines Sextus' commitment to the search for truth and to certain principles of rationality, the scope of his scepticism, and its consequences for action and agency.

This work presents a portrait of Nietzsche as the skeptic par excellence in the modern period, by demonstrating how a careful and informed understanding of ancient Pyrrhonism illuminates his reflections on truth, knowledge and morality, as well as the very nature and value of philosophic inquiry.

"Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry -- not doubt, or whatever else later forms of skepticism took to be at the core of skeptical philosophy. Sextus Empiricus's writings offer the most sophisticated and detailed version of ancient skepticism in the Pyrrhonian tradition. According to Sextus, skeptics neither claim to 'know nothing' nor hold knowledge to be unattainable. Instead they continue to investigate (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.1-4). Being a skeptic, unlike, say, a Stoic or a Platonist, is not a matter of holding a certain view. It is to engage in ongoing inquiry of a certain sort. This makes Pyrrhonism an enigmatic presence in the history of philosophy. It offers no theories to interpret, no proofs in any ordinary sense to excavate. Pyrrhonism is self-consciously open ended, foreseeing epicycles of objections and replies, arguments and counterarguments in perpetuity. Just as enigmatic is its voice for posterity, Sextus Empiricus (fl. 2nd century CE). While a large quantity of his works survives, assessing his place in the history of philosophy and his relevance for contemporary philosophy is challenging, for it is often difficult to decipher where his sources end and he begins. This volume investigates epistemology after Sextus, both ways in which he has influenced the history of philosophy and ways in which he and the Pyrrhonian tradition he represents ought to contribute to contemporary debates. We aim to (re-)instate Sextus as an important philosopher in these discussions in much the same way that Aristotle has been brought into discussions in contemporary ethics, action theory, and metaphysics"--

Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.