Security Sector Reform In Constitutional Transitions

Security sector reform (SSR) is central to the democratic transitions currently unfolding across the globe, as a diverse range of countries grapple with how to transform militias, tribal forces, and dominant military, police, and intelligence agencies into democratically controlled and accountable security services. SSR will be a key element in shifts from authoritarian to democratic rule for the foreseeable future, since abuse of the security sector is a central technique of autocratic government. This edited collection advances solutions through a selection of case studies from around the world that cover a wide range of contexts.

Security sector reform, democratization and constitutional reform are intrinsically linked. The constitution-building process can therefore provide a critical forum for negotiations over changes in the relationship between civilian and security sector institutions. This Policy Paper aims to support advisors and decision-makers in navigating these complex transitions. The Paper focuses on the relationship between security sector reform (SSR) and constitutional reform processes. While SSR and constitution-building are typically seen as separate issues, in practice they are deeply interconnected, and the success of a transition to constitutional democracy depends on the successful handling of security sector issues. Constitutional reform and SSR processes intersect in democratic transitions from military rule, civil war and authoritarian regimes.

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Security sector reform (SSR) and transitional justice processes often occur alongside each other in societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, involve many of the same actors, are supported by some of the same partner countries and impact on each other. Yet the relationship between SSR and transitional justice, or “dealing with the past” (DwP) as it is also called, remains underexplored and is often marked by ignorance and resistance. While SSR and transitional justice processes can get into each other’s way, this paper argues that SSR and DwP are intrinsically linked and can complement each other. SSR can make for better transitional justice and vice versa. Transitional justice needs SSR to prevent a recurrence of abuses, an essential element of justice. SSR can learn from transitional justice not only that it is better to deal with rather than ignore an abusive past but also how to address an abusive legacy in the security sector. The validity of these assumptions is tested in two case studies: the police reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995 and the SSR process in Nepal after 2006.

The “Arab Spring” of 2010-2011 demonstrated that authoritarian collapse does not guarantee a transition to democracy. After revolutions, newly elected governments face a dilemma: they must rely on existing security institutions to restore order and stability, but they also must reform these potentially counterrevolutionary forces. In addition, these governments are now responsible to newly enfranchised populations. This paper offers a tradeoff hypothesis to explain the success or failure of transitional reforms, and points to elites' framing of public debates as a primary factor leading public opinion, which either demands or neglects difficult reforms during moments of transition. The theory is tested with an original survey of Tunisian adults conducted in January 2017. An embedded vignette experiment asks respondents to adjudicate between investments in security sector reform versus economic or political reform, the exact types of tradeoffs countries face during the transition from authoritarian rule. An additional treatment tests whether citizens perceive a tradeoff between providing national security - i.e. against terrorist threats - and reforming the military to protect civil liberties, a question that has been debated since Tunisia's 2011 uprising. I find that public opinion can be swayed by the framing of tradeoffs. Economic development is strongly preferred over other reforms. This finding has important implications for the success of both security sector reform and democratic consolidation.

Security sector reform (SSR) and transitional justice processes often occur alongside each other in societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, involve many of the same actors, are supported by some of the same partner countries and impact on each other. Yet the relationship between SSR and transitional justice, or â dealing with the pastâ (DwP) as it is also called, remains underexplored and is often marked by ignorance and resistance. While SSR and transitional justice processes can get into each otherâ s way, this paper argues that SSR and DwP are intrinsically linked and can complement each other. SSR can make for better transitional justice and vice versa. Transitional justice needs SSR to prevent a recurrence of abuses, an essential element of justice. SSR can learn from transitional justice not only that it is better to deal with rather than ignore an abusive past but also how to address an abusive legacy in the security sector. The validity of these assumptions is tested in two case studies: the police reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995 and the SSR process in Nepal after 2006. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to a Creative Commons license permitting commercial use. All rights not granted by the work's license are retained by the author or authors.

Prioritizing Security Sector Reform: A New U.S. Approach argues that security sector reform should be at the core of a new U.S. policy to strengthen the security sector capacity of countries where U.S. interests are at stake. Today's fragile environments feature a host of postconflict and postauthoritarian states and transitioning and new democracies that have at least one critical thing in common: Their security sectors are dysfunctional. Why these states cannot fulfill their most basic function-the protection of the population and their government-varies widely, but the underlying reason is the same. The security sector does not function because security sector institutions and forces are absent, ineffective, predatory, or illegitimate. In place of large, boots-on-the-ground interventions relying on expensive train and equip programs with only fleeting impact, Washington needs a new approach for engaging in fragile environments and a policy for prioritizing where it engages and for what purpose. The volume offers case studies to exemplify the context in which a new U.S. approach might be warranted, discusses other countries' experiences with security sector reform policies and examines how the United States should design and implement a security sector reform policy. Book jacket.