Science Ideology And Development

Psy-sciences (psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, pedagogy, criminology, special education, etc.) have been connected to politics in different ways since the early twentieth century. Here in twenty-two essays scholars address a variety of these intersections from a historical perspective. The chapters include such diverse topics as the cultural history of psychoanalysis, the complicated relationship between psychoanalysis and the occult, and the struggles for dominance between the various schools of psychology. They show the ambivalent positions of the "psy" sciences in the dictatorships and authoritarian regimes of Nazi Germany, East European communism, Latin-American military dictatorships, and South African apartheid, revealing the crucial role of psychology in legitimating and "normalizing" these regimes. The authors also discuss the ideological and political aspects of mental health and illness in Hungary, Germany, post-WW1 Transylvania, and Russia. Other chapters describe the attempt by critical psychology to understand the production of academic, therapeutic, and everyday psychological knowledge in the context of the power relations of modern capitalist societies.

"A book that shakes philosophy of science to its roots. Laudan both destroys and creates. With detailed, scathing criticisms, he attacks the 'pregnant confusions' in extant philosophies of science. The progress they espouse derives from strictly empirical criteria, he complains, and this clashes with historical evidence. Accordingly, Laudan constructs a remedy from historical examples that involves nothing less than the redefinition of scientific rationality and progress . . . Surprisingly, after this reshuffling, science still looks like a noble-and progressive-enterprise ... The glory of Laudan's system is that it preserves scientific rationality and progress in the presence of social influence. We can admit extra-scientific influences without lapsing into complete relativism. . . a must for both observers and practitioners of science." --Physics Today "A critique and substantial revision of the historic theories of scientific rationality and progress (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc.). Laudan focuses on contextual problem solving effectiveness (carefully defined) as a criterion for progress, and expands the notion of 'paradigm' to a 'research tradition,' thus providing a meta-empirical basis for the commensurability of competing theories. From this perspective, Laudan suggests revised programs for history and philosophy of science, the history of ideas, and the sociology of science. A superb work, closely argued, clearly written, and extensively annotated, this book will become a widely required text in intermediate courses."--Choice

Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.

"Religion is not a primitive thing that science is in the process of defeating. Science is neither the only form of knowledge nor a plot by Satan; it's a tool of human knowledge that enables us to understand the physical workings of the world." This is how Joseph Hinman describes in a nutshell the philosophical "war" between religion and science. Both of these things would be better referred to in the plural: "the sciences" and "religions," because neither is a monolith, but rather a group of disciplines on the one hand, and a set of approaches to the big questions about the human condition, on the other. But we have a tendency to refer to them both in the singular, as two ways of viewing reality that are in conflict. Which of them gets to be the "umpire of reality"? In this era, when a strident religious ideology cries out for political power and a return to a nostalgic time of dominance, the claims of what is called "new atheism"- that religion is a destructive force that needs to be overcome by the pure rationality of science- can seem persuasive. But is new atheism actually scientific? Or does it also reflect an ideology, in its insistence that scientific findings allow no place for personal, metaphysical faith? Hinman approaches this debate from the perspective of a faith that is neither strident nor domineering, but that seeks to defend religion against atheistic attacks that use "science" as a reductionistic tool of anti-religious ideology. Addressing such topics as the historical development of science, the nature of religious experience, the influence of underlying assumptions on human perception, and the sort of evidence that supports belief in God, Hinman (also author of The Trace of God: a Rational Warrant for Belief), requests that we set aside ideology in pursuit of what science and religion, each in its own sphere, can bring to enrich our lives. Joseph Hinman's fresh, innovative and comprehensive contribution to the ongoing scientific-religious debate assures the reader that we really don't need to choose between science and belief.

Taking a set of central issues from ancient Greek medicine and biology, this book studies firstly, the interaction between scientific theorising and folklore or popular assumptions; secondly, the ideological character of scientific inquiry. Topics of interest in the philosphy and sociology of science illuminated here include the relationship between primitive thought and early science, the roles of the consensus on the scientific community, tradition and the authority of the written text, in the development of science.

Professor David Kettler commented at the time of initial release, that this book is "writing with great poise and clarity, the author says important things in a deceptively simple way about a problem of paramount significance. A fine piece of clarification, blending just the right mixture of respect and impiety toward the important heroes of contemporary political science, this is the kind of book I look forward to having available for our courses in political theory."Ideology, though long pronounced moribund, continues to play a central role in contemporary political inquiry. In this reevaluation of the true function of political science, the author lays down guidelines for the construction of fruitful political interpretations in the large areas where ideological assumptions and claims cannot be adequately tested. He analyzes two representative theories of power in American society-those of the "pluralists" who affirm and the "elitists" who dispute the case for democracy-and demonstrates how personal preferences and group-oriented interests enter into the development of these concepts. Speaking to all social scientists and students engaged in the study of political processes, Connolly details the methods by which the investigator-who inevitably brings his own beliefs and values to the task-can lay bare and control the ideological aspects of his own work and that of others.A critical examination of the writings of some of the leading figures in recent and contemporary political inquiry, such as Karl Mannheim, C. Wright Mills, Robert Dahl, Daniel Bell, and Seymour Martin Lipset leads him to assign a decisive role for the political scientist in the creation of carefully formulated ideologies. An original mind, drawing upon an exceptionally rich store of knowledge, has here produced an important book which will be of immediate-and challenging-relevance to the work and studies of all scholars, graduate students, and majors in the field

This book provides complete, systematic expositions of the classical sociological thinkers, theories, and concepts--from the 18th-century Enlightenment to the 20th century. It features broad, extended, and balanced coverage of both the European theorists of Social Structure as well as the Classical American Theorists of Social Psychology. Covers Montesquieu; Rousseau; Mary Wollstonecraft; Bonald and Maistre; Saint-Simon; Auguste Comte; Alexis de Tocqueville; Harriet Martineau; Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill; Karl Marx; Frederick Engels; Max Weber; Gaitano Mosca; Robert Michels); Émile Durkheim; Karl Mannheim; Charles Sanders Peirce; William James; John Dewey; George Herbert Mead. For anyone interested in Classical Social Theory and Classical Principles of Social Psychology.