Russias Invasion Of Ukraine Nato Response

For three decades after the Cold War, NATO member states no longer faced a major threat, and focussed on out-of-area operations. They took the opportunity to reduce defence spending and foster their own national defence industries; interoperability was limited to air and maritime missions on a small scale. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and war by proxy in eastern Donbass was a wake-up call, while China’s creeping seizure and fortification of islands in the South China Sea, as well as its relentless acquisition of Western technologies, similarly alerted the Western leadership to a less benign strategic environment. But the real shift occurred in 2022. China and Russia not only announced their ‘unlimited friendship’, but made clear their intention to reduce American hegemony by breaking up the NATO alliance and its Pacific equivalents. This volume is the first account of the challenges and solutions for so-called strategic integration in this coercive global situation. The contributors show, thematically and through selected national case-studies, how strategic integration and interoperability are conceived, debated, problematised and resolved. The chapters are written with specific reference to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has galvanised a new era of integration and alliance cooperation within NATO.

The book offers a detailed analysis on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A book needs to be written on this to make sense, from a theoretical perspective, why this invasion has occurred and what the main actors are pursuing. The originality rests on testing main international relations theories: realism, liberalism and constructivism to the war that emerges with the practices and approaches during the Cold War to date from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Soviet Union (and now Russia) and Ukraine. The monograph commences with a historical overview of NATO and how it has engaged in expansionism policy to further contain Russia in contemporary international affairs with the accession of additional former Soviet states. This helps to explain the current Russian invasion of Ukraine that would attract great readership. The main argument presented rests on the pursuance of realist interests by NATO, Ukraine and Russia for containment, national security interests and as a response to the security dilemma respectively. This has served as the main catalyst of this conflict that has made diplomacy, international law and collective security measures problematic to implement.

Although U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planners have long focused on preparing for the contingency of a large-scale conflict with Russia, the Ukraine war has created a unique set of circumstances that make a more limited Russian attack plausible. This Perspective outlines the characteristics of the potential Russian attack that are relevant to informing a U.S. or NATO response, including Moscow's possible motivations for launching the attack, what the United States could try to accomplish in its response, and how different types of U.S. or NATO responses might help to advance U.S. goals in the conflict. Using four hypothetical limited Russian attack scenarios, the authors explore how variations across two dimensions of a U.S. or NATO response-the proportionality of a possible kinetic response and the nature of non-kinetic responses-could lead to trade-offs in the pursuit of different U.S. goals. From this analysis, the authors identify key considerations to assist U.S. policymakers weighing how to address various contingencies.

Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, this book reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall “The most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available.”—Andrew Moravscik, Foreign Affairs Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange—but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union’s own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the Central Region addresses national security threats and strategic opportunities for the United States and its allies in the Middle East and Central Asia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Recognizing that integrated deterrence is not constrained by geography or domain, this book focuses on the complex threats and challenges confronting U.S. national security and foreign policy in a post-Ukraine invasion environment. That is to say, what happens in Ukraine does not stay in Ukraine. It affects everyone from the region to the cyberspace domain to people on the other side of the world, due to changes in commodity prices. Specifically, this volume explores how revised analyses of Russia may alter U.S. and allied strategies in a shifting international system and within the framing of strategic competition. Experts in this volume examine how the war in Ukraine will influence Russian strategy and foreign policy in the Middle East, Central Asia, and globally; what effect the Ukraine invasion could have on global and regional geopolitics and geoeconomics; and the United States’ ability to protect national interests in the Central Region. The reasons for this are multiple and complex. In this volume, we explore many issues that have confounded security experts by asking questions such as: What happens after the Russian invasion? What lessons did the U.S., Ukraine, NATO, and the European Union learn about Russia? What lessons did Russia learn about itself and its military after the Ukraine invasion? What lessons did the U.S. learn in Afghanistan that apply to Ukraine? Why was the initial analysis of the Russian invasion so wrong? How has power shifted in the international system since the Ukraine invasion? How has the security environment shifted since the Ukraine invasion? For the U.S. to continue supporting its partners in the Middle East and Central Asia, it must anticipate what new opportunities will arise from Russia’s missteps in Ukraine. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the Central Region addresses these challenges and opportunities and informs policymakers on the changing contours of the Great Power Competition.

This report evaluates the potential for further escalation in the conflict in Ukraine, including the prospects for escalation to Russian nuclear use. The report is intended to inform U.S. and NATO policymakers as they consider how to avoid further escalation of the conflict while assisting Ukraine in its efforts to defeat the Russian invasion and to better inform the public debate around these issues.

This book explores why there is a major war again in Europe. Putin’s actions need to be understood if not forgiven. With the Ukraine conflict increasingly seen as a proxy war of NATO versus Russia, how likely is the fighting to spread? The author, a highly respected journalist and political commentator, explains why Russia invaded a sovereign neighbour. To what extent did NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders in the aftermath of the Cold War provoke Putin? Did the West’s recent humiliating defeats in the Middle East and South Asia encourage Putin to exploit what he saw as its decadent strategic weakness and lack of resolve? What were the reasons for Russia’s savage behaviour in Ukraine? How might the Ukraine war end and what will the post-bellum world look like? The war in Ukraine has had worldwide impact with cost of living, food and energy crises and raised the risk of nuclear Armageddon by accident or intent so this book has universal appeal; not just to military buffs. It examines the complex military and political issues in layman’s language while the story is told as a compelling historical narrative. Professor Moorcraft, who has worked in Ukraine and has witnessed Russian troops in action in Afghanistan and other theatres, is superbly qualified to write this work.